From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 07:42:58 -0600amicrypt@amishare.com (Allen Pulsifer) writes:
• keys eventually exchanged out of band
• key fingerprint eventually transmitted out of band
• transmission of key fingerprint in band ... but difficult
for MTIM to detect ... non-standard encoding for
key fingerprint .. key fingerprint encoded in audio transmission,
key fingerprint encoded in graphics
i've been to websites that have graphic obfuscating technigues as countermeasures for automated web harvesters ... some text is presented in an obfuscated graphics and a request for the human to type in the repeated text.
however, w/o a great deal of trouble, you have countermeasures to key substitution that can defeat most automated technigues and increase the effort for human-based operations.
so the majority of the situations we are talking about ... are running extremely weakly secured machines. the people that would have strongly secured machines ... would also be using stronger out-of-band processes for key exchange already.
so for the remaining set ... that would tend to be sloppy about their key exchange technologies which might be susceptible to key substitution, they would also tend to have relatively insecure machines.
so the assertion is that for this set, the incremental cost for catching even relatively trivial key fingerprint obfuscation techniques would be more expensive than direct attack on their end-point machines ... having a virus/trojan horse installed so they control the end-point machines. I've seen some reference yesterday stating that the number of zombie machines out there now is on the order of 40 million.
this is somewhat security proportional to risk ... as well as the attacker typically goes for the weakest link. i'm not suggesting that trivial obfuscation techniques aren't impossible for an attacker to deal with ... just that the cost of dealing with even trivial obfuscation will make other targets/mechanisms more attractive. Say, in addition ... i publish a picture on my website where i'm standing beside a sign of my key fingerprint. I'm no longer limited to the text-based email environment from the 60s.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 08:00:07 -0600Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> writes:
digital signatures weren't designed to be legal signatures ... digital signatures were designed to provide strong authentication and indicate whether or not the bits have been modified.
the important part in legal signatures isn't whether or not the person's signatures can be forged ... even large X is acceptable as legal signature ... as long as human intent was demonstrated.
The issue isn't whether or not a digital signature can be considered a legal signature ... and/or whether it can be easier to forge or not forge a digital signature. The issue is does the application of a digital signature show intent that the human agrees, approves, and/or authorizes the contents.
digital signatures were designed for strong authentication ... and there are lots of protocols floating around which use digital signatures in just that way ... where digital signatures are applied to stuff where the human has never seen the bits. If there is a convential use of a human's private key for applying digital signatures to things that a human has never read ... then you can be compromising the use of the same private key for applying digital signatures to things which are to be treated as legal signatures.
doesn't really have a whole lot to do with technology ... it has to do with expectations ... and does a human believe that every time some specific thing happens does it involve them demonstrating intent, agrees, approves, and/or authorizes.
it is one of the reasons for the point-of-sale and the EU FINREAD standard treating the device generating a digital signature as an authentication event and that there is a separate sequence/process used for demonstrating intent, agrees, approves, and/or authorizes.
The act of pressing the YES button is trivially comparable to a person writing an X. It isn't an issue of the form that it takes ... it is an issue that it requires a human to demonstrate intent, agrees, approves, and/or authorizes.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 08:45:06 -0600Guy Macon <http://www.guymacon.com> writes:
so the original story was i wanted to take a $500 (at the time) milspec part, cost reduce it so that it was both more secure and still cost effective to deploy on all magstripe cards ... and all i needed was that it would
a) cost the attacker more to extract the key than they could ever benefit from having the key
b) take the attacker longer to extract the key than it typically takes to process a lost/stolen card report and deactivate the registered public key
some number of chipcards have had infrastructure shared-secret keys ... and therefor extracting the shared-secret key places the whole infrastructure under attack.
this was targeted at being deployed in the magstripe enhancement scenario ... i had to make it cheap enuf that it was deployable in magstripe ... and still be more secure than the original $500 milspec part.
so the issue is that targeting it for an online authentication mode paradigm ... so we start with the card being lost/stolen and the clock starts ticking.
first issue is does the attacker get the key extracted before the public key has been deactivated in the account record ... and therefor having the private key is of no value.
second issue is even if the attacker marginally wins the race and is able to possibly execute a single $100 atm financial transaction before the public key is deactivated ... would the attacking organization believe it is worthwhile to them.
so in the security world you have threats and countermeasures and is the possible cost of the attack worth the possible return.
in the financial world you have risks and risk management/mitigation.
risk mitigation is not having any sort of infrastructure shared-secret ... the scope of any compromise is strictly bounded w/o impacting the whole infrastructure
risk mitigation is having a something you have authentication device that is relatively difficult to compromise/counterfeit.
risk mitigation is online authentication mode infrastructure ... so that as soon as device is reported lost/stolen ... all transactions for that specific public key is immediately deactivated.
risk mitigation is online authentication mode infrastructure ... where it is possible to make the bounds on the possible total value of active transactions strictly proportional to the assurance level of the specific device ... where the assurance of any specific device includes whether it is lost or stolen and/or whether there is real-time knowledge of emerging technology exploits that will immediately downgrade the assurance level of subject devices in real time (possibly change from a $100k credit limit to a $1k credit limit in real time based on all real time knowledge about assurance level of the specific devices and/or classes of devices).
one i had to select the different chip pieces that met a broad range of cost and benefit requirements ... and architect an infrastructure where there was real-time control over the risk (financial exposure) proportional to assurance. For instance, having a card lost/stolen significantly lowered its assurance. Also architect an infrastructure that eliminated systemic risks .... things like system-wide infrastructure shared-secrets that would put the whole infrastructure at risk
note that the chip chosen for $300 credit limit accounts ... might not be the same one chose for $1million credit limit accounts ... or that the credit limit associated with a specific chip could change in real-time as circumstances changed.
how many ibm 4758s would you be willing to carry around in your wallet ... especially if you could only do $300 transactions.
the original AADS chip strawman posting from 98
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#straw
somebody cross-posted and it ran concurrently on some list in the UK that involved people actively doing attacks.
actually i have another problem with eal4-high ... the problem is that most chips with eal5/eal6 evaluations have it done on the bare-bones infrastructure and the crypto loaded later. the problem if you burn in the crypto as part of silicon manufacturing and have a chip where the programming can't be changed, then the evaluation has to be done against the complete chip ... including the burned in crypto. you may otherwise have a chip that has been evaluated at eal5 or eal6 ... but if you have a chip that can't be changed and the crypto has been burned it as part of silicon manufacturing (i.e. before the wafer has been sliced and diced) ... then the crypto has to be part of the chip evaluation. just try finding semi-formal or formal evaluation criteria for fips186-2, ecdsa in order to do an eal5/eal6 evaluation. there was a conformance specification that existing momentarily but was almost immediately withdrawn and they've been promising a replacement any day now.
also if you look at the published protection profile for smartcards, almost the while thing is about how do you provide assurance for loading programming on the chip. if the programming is hardwired and can't be changed the majority of the protection profile becomes N/A.
random AADS chip strawman pieces:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#bioinfo1 QC Bio-info leak?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#bioinfo2 QC Bio-info leak?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#bioinfo3 QC Bio-info leak?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#debitfraud Debit card fraud in Canada
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#straw AADS Strawman
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#strawm1 AADS Strawman
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#strawm2 AADS Strawman
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#strawm3 AADS Strawman
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#strawm4 AADS Strawman
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech3 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech9 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech10 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#carnivore2 Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#passwords Passwords don't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959risk1 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959risk2 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#3dsecure 3D Secure Vulnerabilities? Photo ID's and Payment Infrastructure
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#keygen Welome to the Internet, here's your private key
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#keygen2 Welome to the Internet, here's your private key
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#boyd AN AGILITY-BASED OODA MODEL FOR THE e-COMMERCE/e-BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#1 Basic credit-card payment question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#13 Words, Books, and Key Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#46 Giuliani: ID cards won't curb freedoms
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#19 TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#18 A challenge
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#25 WYTM?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#10 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example:secure computing kernel needed)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#12 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#0 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)<
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#40 AADS Chip Strawman & aSuretee
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#65 eBay Customers Targetted by Credit Card Scam
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#53 Authentication white paper
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#60 PKI's not working
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#keygen Welome to the Internet, here's your private key
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#keygen2 Welome to the Internet, here's your private key
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#boyd AN AGILITY-BASED OODA MODEL FOR THE e-COMMERCE/e-BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#1 Basic credit-card payment question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#13 Words, Books, and Key Usage
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#46 Giuliani: ID cards won't curb freedoms
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#19 TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#18 A challenge
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#25 WYTM?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#10 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example:secure computing kernel needed)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#12 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#0 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)<
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#passwords Passwords don't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959risk1 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959risk2 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#3dsecure 3D Secure Vulnerabilities? Photo ID's and Payment Infrastructure
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#40 AADS Chip Strawman & aSuretee
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#65 eBay Customers Targetted by Credit Card Scam
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#53 Authentication white paper
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#60 PKI's not working
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 09:12:44 -0600Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> writes:
"so what would i say the utility/value of digital signatures"
... i will append URLs of what i've already said in this thread
"and CAs for e-commerce and other potential applications of digital signatures"
what i've continuing been saying.
we help put together the business process that utilizes the SSL domain
name server certificates ... for what is now being called ecommerce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3
so i've described what we did originally, how it actually works and what
it actually accomplishes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcert
i've also described various things that it doesn't accomplish and work to address some of those things. some number of the improvements to accomplish what SSL domain name server certificates don't address ... turns out to make the use of certificates redundant and superfluous. Its like if you had a bank with piles of money in the middle of the floor and scores of armed guards constantly running around. Someday you installed a bank vault with six foot thick walls and six foot thick door. It might occur to you that you might not need all of those armed guards.
lots of people seem to automatically equate digital signatures and public keys with certificates and CAs.
my assertion has simply been that digital signatures and public keys aren't the same as certificates and CAs ... and there are lots of environments where digital signatures and public keys could be used and for those environments, certificates are redundant and superfluous.
there are reams and reams of things written by hundreds of people regarding the uses of certificates and CAs. furthermore, my wife and I were instrumental in making many of the current CAs viable by helping create the stuff now called ecommerce.
so rather than ad nauseum repeating the same points ... here is a URL
with pointers to collection of posts on naked public key and/or
certificate-less operation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#certless
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 10:18:43 -0600there was also some amount of process engineering. as a young innocent i got indoctrinated in every additional step in the manufacturing process increases costs.
keygen is integrated with original chip power on/test while it is still in the wafer. public key is appended to the results of the initial power on/test results that is already being exported ... and is carried as part of the existing chip q/a infrastructure (i.e. public key in some sense is integrated into the power on/test results as an indication of valid chip).
other issue was making sure that the power requirements were such that it could function in a iso 14443 proximity environment ... so there were some close power consumption requirements ... and the possibility of using it in transit applications with turnstyles, etc ... also created some time constraints (couldn't make a lot of power/time trade-offs).
recent posting in this n.g. on some of the other issues
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#30 ECC Encryption
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates? Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 13:29:47 -0600... also ... if you don't have a CA-oriented trust hierarchy ... there is no system risk issues with some keys needing more protection than others because it would could bring the whole infrastructure tumbling down. there was once some government financial infrastructure statement that they would never use CA-oriented trust hierarchies because the possibility root key vulnerabilities simply represented an excessive systemic risk problem.
you compartmentalize each key pair ... and therefor you bound systemic risk issues. also if you are talking about online authentication based model .... where the verification of digital signature is used to functionally imply something you have authentication ... then by definition if you loose physical control of the token ... then you have already violated the something you have authentication infrastucture and you have to disable the associated public key.
if you have to take physical control to extract the private key ... the infrastructure countermeasure is actually no different whether or not you can extract the private key once physical control has been lost. the infrastructure is oriented towards something you have authentication and simple loss of physical control activates the countermeasures ... and we no longer actually care whether you can physical extract the private key ... or can use the stolen token w/o extracting the private key ... or whatever.
The obvious threat to a something you have infrastructure is loss of physical control ... and the countermeasures are in place to handle that.
the real threat to the infrastructure is can the private key be duplicated/extracted w/o anybody realizing there has been loss of physical control (and/or there not need to be loss of physical control in order to duplicate the private key).
this is effective the exploit and vulnerabilities that the existing magstripe infrastructure is dealing with. there can be duplicate something you have authentication w/o the card owner realizing it (at least until they see the statement or the fraud detection recognizes some pattern violation).
in fact, that turns out to be another argument against the offline credential based model ... with the online authentication based model, some responsible party is seeing the transactions/events ... and be able to detect additional kinds of fraud patterns and security violations .... that is not possible in the offline credential scenario.
Of course the fraud risk needs to be high enough to support not only the cost of online authentication based model ... but the additional real-time fraud detection. However, as online and data processing in general turns into commodity ... the threshold trade-off for that has been dropping.
this continues to relegate the offline credential based model to smaller and smaller, as well as lower and lower value niche applications.
as the nich market value continues to decline for the offline credential based model ... there can be a severe downward pressure on what can be charge/invested for the credentials, with extreme downward pressure on what can be charged for credentials ... it would tend to also create a cash-flow problem for the certification authority operator to maintain high integrity and high assurance operation. Any cutback in the level of integrity of the certification authority operation would also place extreme downward pressure on the going price for the credential .... since any integrity reduction in a certification authority operation would also tend to preclude higher value market niches requiring high integrity operations.
at some point, you may reach discontinuity where online authentication based model has become so ubiquitous and the cost has declined to the point where there are no viable market niches left to support various kinds of commercial certification authority operation.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 15:54:01 -0600Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> writes:
i repeatedly stated that when the relying party has direct access to the real information ... then certificates are redundant and superfluous.
i've NEVER said that digital signatures are redundant.
I have observed that there are some people who seem to believe that CAs and certificates are equavalent and identical to asymmetric cryptography, digital signatures, public keys, etc. In such situations, there seems to be an extremely noisy channel that any mention of certificates being redundant and superfluous comes out as digital signatures are such.
I'm co-author of x9.59 financial standard that uses digital signatues
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#privacy
which is some path on its way to ISO
in this scenario not only can certificates be redundant and superfluous ... but they can actually represent a payload bloat of a factor of one hundred times.
There is an alternative explanation that I sometime have to resort to which some people seem to find more palatable.
It derives from the X9F standards work on certificate compression; attempting to address the horrible payload bloat that standard certificates cause. The two standard compression techniques
1) take the bit patterns and looks to see if there is redundant information and use a much more efficient encoding mechanism to represent the bit pattern
2) analyse the logical information content and determine if the relying party already has a copy of particular field values. if the relying party is known to always have a copy of the specific field value, then the field can be removed from the certificate, aka it is redundant and superfluous to transmit to the relying party fields of information that the relying party already possessed.
so as part of the detailed investigation of payment infrastructures as part of the x9.59 standards work ... was that the relying parties (consumer's financial institution that would be receiving the digitally signed payment instruction) would already have all fields that were part of the certificate.
as a result we could eliminate all fields from the certificate and were left with extremely efficient zero-byte certificates to append to x9.59 transactions for transmission to the relying party.
In this case, the zero-byte certificates weren't redundant and superfluous, it was just that every field in the certificates were redundant and superfluous. We faithly manage the zero-byte certificates and made sure that the zero-byte certificates are appended to every x9.59 transaction.
we had made the remarkable accomplishment of infinite compression for certificates.
random past discussion of our remarkable achievement for infinite compression:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#client4 Client-side revocation checking capability
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#storage Storage of Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech3 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech6 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss1 KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp- 00.txt))
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss6 KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp- 00.txt))
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm4.htm#6 Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm4.htm#9 Thin PKI won - You lost
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#x959 X9.59 Electronic Payment Standard
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#spki2 Simple PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#35 ALARMED ... Only Mostly Dead ... RIP PKI .. addenda
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#36 ALARMED ... Only Mostly Dead ... RIP PKI .. addenda II
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#39 ALARMED ... Only Mostly Dead ... RIP PKI .. addenda
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#28 Employee Certificates - Security Issues
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#64 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#13 A challenge
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#20 surrogate/agent addenda (long)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#30 Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#41 certificates & the alternative view
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#76 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#68 Confusing Authentication and Identiification?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#aadsrel2 AADS related information ... summary
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959discus X9.59 discussions at X9A & X9F
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#93 Question regarding authentication implementation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#41 Why trust root CAs ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#3 Why trust root CAs ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#15 Why trust root CAs ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#57 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#58 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#79 Q: ANSI X9.68 certificate format standard
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#35 Can I create my own SSL key?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#79 FREE X.509 Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#65 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#16 Net banking, is it safe???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#7 Digital Signature Standards
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 17:22:35 -0600Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> writes:
consumer goes to their bank and registers their public key.
the public key is stored in account record (this is even specified in the definition for PKI CA registration authorities).
the bank issues them a relying-party-only certificate ....
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#rpo
even german banks started doing this in the mid-90s when it was
realized the privacy issues with an identity certificate. there was
presentation by somebody from one of the big german banks on the issue
at conference in 1998:
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/conference-paper/1998/10/08/proceedings-of-the-21st-nissc-1998
the purpose of the certificate is for digitally signed communication and digitally signed transactions with the consumer's bank. however, we subsequently were doing some payload bloat studies about the serious payload bloat of certifications on the standard payment infrastructure. as part of the study on compressing certificates we formulated the information theory that it was redundant and superfluous for a bank customer to be repeatedly transmitting fields in an relying-party-only certificate back to their financial institution which involved fields that the their financial institution already possessed. that was when we realized that all fields in a relying-party-only certificate could be compressed from a relying-party-only certificate resulting in the infinitly compressed zero-byte relying-party-only certificate.
if it makes you feel better ... we haven't gotten rid of the certificates as being redundant and superfluous ... we have just eliminated all redundant and superfluous fields in a relying-party-only certificate, resulting in an infinitly compressed zero-byte relying-party-only certificates; and in fact we faithfully attach zero-byte relying-party-only certificates to all of our communication with the relying-party ... the consumer's financial institution.
we made the discovery of the astounding infinite compression technique and the benefits of zero-byte relying-party-only certificates when we were investigating the severe payload bloat the standard certificates placed on the payment infrastructure with digitally signed payment transactions.
we got the idea of the infinitly compressed zero-byte relying-party-only compression from the relying-party-only certificate presentation that was given at the referenced conference by member(s) of the german banking community describing what they were doing with relying-party-only certificates.
so I actually misspoke, we haven't gotten rid of redundant and superfluous relying-party-only certificates ... we have just infinitly compressed the relying-party-only certificates to zero-bytes by eliminating all fields that are redundant and superfluous.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2004 17:58:42 -0600Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> writes:
i've said that in situations where the relying party already has all the information (either directly or via online connectivity) then the certificate is redundant and superfluous.
however if it makes you feel better ... the certificate isn't actually redundant and superfluous to the relying party ... it is just all the fields in the certificate are redundant and superfluous that are redundant to the relying party ... and therefor we are actually using these infinitly compressed, zero-byte certificates.
however, for you to understand when a relying party already has access to all the fields that might be contained in a certificate ... you might actually also have to understand something about the business process.
i'm making an assertion that if somebody possesses a piece of information ... then it is redundant and superfluous to send the same information to that person.
now you repeatedly stated numerous times that you know absolutely nothing about the subject and therefore you have no basis on which to make any judgement about what fields any particular relying party in any particular business operation might already possess.
so given that you don't know anything at all about the subject ... will you at least acknowledge there might be some situations where if I already know something, then it might just be possible for it to be redundant and superfluous to keep sending me the same information over and over again.
is there any general situation at all that you can conceive of where if somebody might possibly know and/or learn something .... would it then be redundant and superfluous to repeatedly provide them with that same identical information again and again?
lets make a hypothetical assumption that you might have learned the alphabet in grade school ... and possibly might even still remember what the alphabet is. Would it possibly be redundant and superfluous to make you go back and repeat grade school .... lets say the same grade for the next 12 years ... in order that you could repeatedly relearn the alphabet.
in any case, and while you possibly still can't comprehend the concept that somebody might just possibly have some piece of information and that it would be redundant and superfluous to repeatedly send them the same information over and over again ...
i assert that we've actually made a study of some number of situations and made lists of information that specific types of relying parties have access to in various business operations. We've also been able to match of several of these pieces of information ... with types of information that might be found in a certificate. We've been able to design optimally compressed certificates for specific business environments ... by eliminating the fields in certificates that relying parties would already possess.
so based on you repeatedly statements that you actually have no knowledge at all of the subject ... i'm simple making the assertion that there can be situations where if somebody already has some piece of information ... then it can be redundant and superfluous to repeatedly provide them with the same information over and over again.
it doesn't actually matter who the CA is ... what matters is whether the relying-party already has access to information (directly or via any other means) to information in a certificate ... in which case ... for that specific business operations ... and for those certificates such pieces of information can be eliminated from certificates used in those business operations. Furthermore, if some relying parties have access to all information in a certificate ... then all information can be eliminated from such certificates used in those business operations ... achieving infinitly compressed, zero-byte certificates.
i don't know whether you can't comprehend the concept that relying parties might have information via means other than certificates ... or you can't comprehend the concept that it is possible to do business process analysis of information on certificates and figure out if there is actually usefull for any specific business operation.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Smart card Authentification Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 07:50:59 -0600"lyal" writes:
so the whole design point of the original offline credential based model stuff ... assumes that the operation doesn't have to propagate past the local environment. however, in the point-of-sale ... you even get into circular logic ... if you are using certificate based paradigm ... it can't leave the local environment w/o causing enormous payload bloat and elapsed time impact on overall processing.
another issue then at the point-of-sale is that any mutual authentication ... has the chipcard doing public key operations on the certificate from the point-of-sale terminal ... because/since it is going to be offline, the chipcard has to also trust the point-of-sale terminal before it does some of its operations.
it is possible to beef up chipcards to do RSA public key operations to get the elapsed time within acceptable bounds ... but it involves putting in lot more circuts and drawing a lot more power. the power profile are within the acceptable bounds of 7816/contact infrastructures .... but the transition to 14443 contactless represents a real challenge since it significantly exceeds available power/time specifications.
as long as you have (7816) physical contact ... there is a lot more latitude in protocols .... but the transition to 14443 puts a lot of limitations on the amount of power/time that is drawn from the air as well as the bits/time that can be transferred.
this changes in the online scenario ... having both the chipcard and the terminal simply digitally sign the transaction and send it up to the relying party (the consumer's financial institution) using an online authentication based model operation ... the relying party can verify the pair of the digital signatures (terminal and card) before approving the transactions. there is no issue of the card or the terminal having to trust the other .... since the transaction isn't offline.
There is a significant reduction in the chatter that has to occur in the local point-of-sale environment ... and effectively all of the authentication checking operations are pushed up to the relying party (the consumer's financial institution). There is not the requirement that the chipcard and the terminal have to establish trust in each other as a condition of performing an offline transactions. With simple digital signature going on at point-of-sale ... it is possible to get the power/time and elapsed time profile well within what is available in a proximity/14443 environment (at least if you are talking fips186-2, ecdsa).
You also get out of the circular logic with the offline credential based model of it having to be offline because the infrastructure can't tolerate the payload bloat of the certificates. Going to online authentication based model, the payload bloat of normal certificates disappears (i.e. it is possible to use infinite compression and achieve zero-byte certificates).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 10:15:25 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
there was some effort mapping virtual wellets from the 1980s-era into smart cards because they were the availble consumer convenient portable computing state-of-the-art.
a big issue in the 80s ... was that the technology wasn't there for portable input/output to go along with the consumer convenient portable computing state-of-the-art ... and as a result there was big push in ISO 7816 standards so that you could have ubiquitous fixed input/output stations that would (physical) interoperate with the available portable computing (smartcard) technology.
starting in the early 90s, you started to see emerging portable input/output technology penetrate the market with PDAs and cellphones.
as consumer convenient portable computing devices with their own, builtin input/output capability, you should start to see the shift from physical format specific interoperability ... to primarily communication protocol interoperationaly.
you've already seen the shift away from the purely physical format interoperability of iso 7816 "smartcards" .... to a variety of physical formats that utilize USB for the physical connections.
also, once you have broken with iso 7816 for physical interoperability, ... like iso 14443 proximity ... you also have opened up numerous physical format operation.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 12:02:19 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
however, majority of total transactions are done by high-volume merchants ... who tend to have concentrators ... and in fact, there was some number from two years ago that a single merchant accounted for 1/4 to 1/3rd of all retail store transactions in the us.
... there are same terminals handling credit, debit, pre-paid, gift, loyalty, etc. part of the problem is somewhat chicken and egg and trying to roll any kind of infrastructure change that requires physical swap at lot of different locations.
slightly related post concerning point-of-sale technology
in at least this same titled subject ... if not the actual
subthread
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#10
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 08:05:37 -0600"Helmut P. Einfalt" writes:
in the US, in the early 90s ... it was realized that with the rapidly declining cost & ubiquitous availability of online support ... they could deploy online electronic cash much less expensively than what was done in other parts of the world (the expense of chipcards was being viewed as overcoming the higher cost .. and/or lack of online connectivity). I believe the first one was in '95 by a company called first financial and the first customer was blockbuster.
basically it has been the same magstripe technology and leverages the existing massive deployment of magstripe point-of-sale and ubiquitous online network. the relationship between the merchant, the merchant terminal, the merchant connectivity to the merchant financial institution processor stays effectively the same ... but at the merchant financial institution processor ... the magstripe info gets routed to a different backend transaction processor.
these are the gift/stored-value cards that you see at many check-out places like starbucks, major department stores, grocery stores, etc.
a big component of all the gift/stored-value cards have always been the float.
one business analysis of the mondex electronic chip stored-value card was that it was almost all float. you could see that when mondex international began picking up licensees in different countries once they offered to split the float. also at one point, several european central banks told mondex international that they would be given a couple years grace on the float ... effectively in order to help subsidize deployment ... but if by an off-chance they ever become successful ... they would have to start crediting client accounts with the interest on unspent balances.
a couple random refs ... quickly pulled from search engine using
"mondex" and "float"
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/smartcards.htm
http://www.dreamscape.co.in/kb-ips.html
mondex international was based on an infrastructure-wide shared-secret(s) (relying on the chips to guarantee that the secret was never exposed) ... but they sponsored an internet standards payment group ... which eventually morphed into the current ietf working group doing ECML (electronic commerce markup language) ... currently with RFCs 3505, 3106, and 2706.
having a chip-based protection of infrastructure-wide shared-secrets is the basis for at least some of the publicity for chipcard exploits ... the effort to attack any specific chip ... results in having the means for compromising the whole infrastructure.
other more recent payment chipcard attacks are what has been descriped
in the UK press as YES card. couple past refs to yes cards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#37 Security of Oyster Cards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#45 command line switches [Re: [REALLY OT!] Overuse of symbolic constants]
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 10:10:36 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
1) may be much harder to counterfeit than magstripe for authentication 2) can be used for offline transactions
the second/#2 was somewhat viewed that the increased cost of chipcards (vis-a-vis magstripe) to address #1, could be offset by eliminating the need for an online infrastructure.
however, if exploits do occur in #1 (like counterfeits) ... they may be much more difficult to deal with in a #2 (offline) environment. this became an issue with the (counterfeit) yes cards.
it isn't actually necessary to use chipcards for (#2) offline transactions ... but it was one way of justifying the cost for #1. as the cost of online infrastructures and online processing has come down ... this becomes less & less of an issue.
as other forms of consumer convenient portable computing devices become more pervasive (PDAs, cellphones) ... wireless based protocols for point-of-sale are becoming more attractive as alternatives (and can also be designed to address #1, since to some extent, a similar counterfeiting issue already exists for cellphones).
the issue of offline/online for chipcards is somewhat orthogonal to their use as purely strong authentication (difficult to counterfeit) device ... other than the issue of it being intrastructure cost offset (which is being significantly mitigated by dropping costs of ubiquitous online infrastructures).
a debit card at point-of-sale basically is two-factor authentication
• something you have (card)
• something you know (pin)
there has been a number of recent UK news stories about confusion that
may showup with the pending switchover to chip&pin for credit
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 14:28:25 -0600... in the debit/matstripe case, the magstripe value and the pin are transmitted to online infrastructure and both verified ... achieving two-factor authentication:
in the chip&pin case ... with offline operation ... there is no outside entity to verify the pin ... so business rules are installed in the chip and certified. the chip is certified as not working as it should w/o the correct pin ... that based on the response from a trusted chip, something you know authentication can be inferred.
in the yes card scenario ... the chip has the online banking business rules installed regarding correct pin, credit limit and some number of other characteristics. the offline terminals ... once they believe they have verified a valid banking chip ... then rely on the consumer specific business rules in each chip.
sometime in 1999 or 2000, the first yes card appeared in nice (france, basically a chip&pin application for more secure credit card operation), and then spread thru the rest of europe. the yes card reference comes from the fact that once the yes card has convinced the terminal that it is a valid bank card with valid business rules ... then it always answers yes to
• was the correct pin entered (yes card will say yes regardless of PIN entered)
• is the purchase within the consumer's credit limit
• should this be an offline transaction
so once yes cards exist ... they are difficult to make go away ... becuase they are all offline transactions and won't be discovered until much later.
now in the following post:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#2
there is reference that one of ibm's top of the line, most secure security device could be compromised with relatively modest amount of effort.
the systemic risk in something like the mondex scenario .... is once you have extracted the infrastructure shared-secret ... you can manufacture a large number of counterfeit cards ... with basically unlimited values.
in the original yes card scenario ... it simply required skimming the terminal for card transactions ... and injecting the skimmed value in the counterfeit cards.
the newer generation of chip&pin cards are going to challenge/response type communication .... but the chips are still susceptable to extracting secrets ... as per the above mention of attacks on truely high-end crypto hardware.
so lets say that it costs as much as $50k to attack a chip card and extract its information (compared to possibly even more expensive attacks on high end devices).
a criminal organization extracts the necessary information to convince infrastructure point-of-sale terminals that they have a valid card ... inject the information into 5000 yes cards and sell them on the black market for $100 each. They'll still clear over $400k.
the issue is that the systemic risks have shifted from infrastructure shared-secrets (as in the mondex case) to all the point-of-sale terminals in the world being programmed for offline transactions and to trust that chip cards correctly implement the banking infrastructure business rules (the systemic risk is all those point-of-sale terminals trusting chips to correctly implement the bank infrastructure business rules).
the countermeasure for counterfeit yes cards with trusted business rules is to go to online, checking if the card has been deactivated. however, if you go to online transactions ... then you can simply utilize business rules in the backend banking system .... and any programming and business rules in the chip card become redundant and superfluous.
recent related posts in this thread:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#10
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#11
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#12
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#13
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 14:44:27 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
basically it is security proportional to risk issue ... and cost/beneift of risk mitigation.
if the value of what is at risk is low enuf ... then it is harder to justify more expensive online door badge systems .... however, the online door badge system can mitigate a lot of risks that offline systems have trouble with.
Many of the door badge systems at higher value commercial infrastructures were purely offline in the 60s & 70s ... but you started seeing migration to online door badge systems in the 80s ... including things like extremely detailed audit activity being securely recorded (possibly integrated with online surveilllance cameras). This is comparedwith some number of the low-value infrastructures that were still possibly key-based in the 60s (or had nothing) ... moving up to offline door badge systems.
one of the things you started to see starting in the early 80s was serious insider and collusion countermeasures (i.e. it isn't a matter of only letting the insiders in and keeping the outsiders out). The 90s somewhat defocused that with lots of concern in the press about outsider attacks (via the internet). However, even at that, a recent study found that at least 77 percent of possibly internet related fraud involved an insider somehow.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 15:22:04 -0600Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
for some time, i had half dozen offices, a lab and other stuff in the los gatos lab ... which was primarily a chip design and chip design tool operation. one of its claims to fame was to have been the first to use scanning electronic microscope on a live running chip. in their case the technique was used as part of chip debugging and development. it was also responsible for the LSM logic simulator.
at one time it was considered the most beautiful lab in the company ... you could have deer or possibly wild boar outside your window. in the 90s they finally closed the lab, tore down the building and sold off the grounds (couple hundred acres) for housing development.
random lsg past references:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#16 Computer of the century
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#57 South San Jose (was Tysons Corner, Virginia)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#3 Chip Emulators - was How does a chip get designed?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#55 Multics hardware (was Re: "Soul of a New Machine" Computer?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#26 LSM, YSE, & EVE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#45 Wanted: the SOUNDS of classic computing
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#31 asynchronous CPUs
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#3 Ping: Anne & Lynn Wheeler
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#14 Ping: Anne & Lynn Wheeler
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#25 More complex operations now a better choice?
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wars against bad things Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2004 09:26:52 -0600"Gary A. Gorgen" writes:
there were some write-ups blaming the project for starting the
plug compatible manufacture controller business.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#360pcm
which, in turn, supposedly spawed the (aborted) FS project:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#futuresys
which in turn was supposedly one of the reasons Amdahl left and started plug compatable processor business.
i ran into somebody 6-7 years ago who said they had been selling the p/e boxes into NASA in the 80s (they had been bought by perkin-elmer by then) ... but claimed that the wire-wrap channel adapter board was possibly the original design. there was some comment that they never saw any justification that any redesign would result in incremental sales that would justify the redesign.
In the late 90s, i ran across one such box still handling large communication load in a big mainframe datacenter.
random past mention of interdata
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#30 interdata and perkin/elmer
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#37 interdata & perkin/elmer machines
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#39 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#12 Old Computers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#234 Computer of the century
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#49 VM (not VMS or Virtual Machine, the IBM sort)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#36 Interdata, Perkin-Elmer, et al.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#37 Interdata, Perkin-Elmer, et al.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#48 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#51 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#54 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#80 Unisys vs IBM mainframe comparisons
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#81 Unisys vs IBM mainframe comparisons
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#6 History of ASCII (was Re: Why Not! Why not???)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#68 TSS ancient history, was X86 ultimate CISC? designs)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#5 Sv: First video terminal?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#17 IBM 1142 reader/punch (Re: First video terminal?)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#75 Z/90, S/390, 370/ESA (slightly off topic)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#34 Very CISC Instuctions (Was: why the machine word size ...)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#35 Imitation...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#53 Pre ARPAnet email?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#44 Golden Era of Compilers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#48 any 70's era supercomputers that ran as slow as today's supercomputers?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#30 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#32 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#50 Flip the bits in a byte
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#8 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#43 QTAM (was: MVS History)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#44 QTAM (was: MVS History)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#23 Alpha vs. Itanic: facts vs. FUD
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#37 Playing Cards was Re: looking for information on the IBM 7090
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#47 How Long have you worked with MF's ? (poll)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#52 Mainframes and "mini-computers"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#44 50 years ago (1952)?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#68 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#36 Difference between Unix and Linux?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#75 30th b'day
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#2 What is microcode?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#21 Original K & R C Compilers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#32 why does wait state exist?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#33 why does wait state exist?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002q.html#39 HASP:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#73 Card Columns
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#15 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#28 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#70 COMTEN- IBM networking boxes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#76 COMTEN- IBM networking boxes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#44 Why only 24 bits on S/360?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#72 cp/67 35th anniversary
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#8 cp/67 35th anniversary
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#13 unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#30 IBM channels, was Re: Microkernels are not "all or nothing"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#53 model 91/CRJE and IKJLEW
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#50 Call-gate-like mechanism
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#16 When nerds were nerds
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#35 40th anniversary of IBM System/360 on 7 Apr 2004
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#47 new to mainframe asm
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#40 Microprocessor History Site
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#5 A POX on you, Dennis Ritchie!!!
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#9 Need to understand difference between EBCDIC and EDCDIC
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#12 network history
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wars against bad things Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2004 09:29:09 -0600"Gary A. Gorgen" writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wars against bad things Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2004 13:34:06 -0600"Gary A. Gorgen" writes:
i had done this software support for channel extender ... allowing local controllers & devices to operate at the end of some telco link. for various reasons, i had chosen to simulate "channel check" when various telco errors occurred ... in order to kick-off various operating system recovery/retry routines.
along came the 3090 ... which was designed to have something like 3-5 channel check errors per annum (not per annum per machine ... but per annum across all machines).
After 3090s had been out a year ... R-something? was reporting that there had been an aggregate of something like 15-20 channel check errors in the first year across all machines .... which launched a detailed audit of what had gone wrong.
they finally found me ... and after a little bit additional investigation, i decided that for all intents and purposes, simulating an IFCC (interface control check) instead of a CC (channel check) would do as well from the standpoint of the error retry/recovery procedures activated.
random past posts on channel extender support:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#24 CP spooling & programming technology
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#27 Mainframes & Unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#21 Computer of the century
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#22 Computer of the century
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#38 How to learn assembler language for OS/390 ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#22 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#46 3270 protocol
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#25 ESCON Data Transfer Rate
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#60 Mainframes and "mini-computers"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#43 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#48 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#74 Itanium2 power limited?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#34 Calculating expected reliability for designed system
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#23 CPU Impact of degraded I/O
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#24 CPU Impact of degraded I/O
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#15 Mainframe Tape Drive Usage Metrics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#22 What is timesharing, anyway?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#29 Architect Mainframe system - books/guidenance
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#31 Moribund TSO/E
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#28 The attack of the killer mainframes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#33 The attack of the killer mainframes
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: The Reincarnation of Virtual Machines Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 14 Aug 2004 14:26:16 -0600ACM Queue - The Reincarnation of Virtual Machines - Like the best of the 1970s and 1980s, VMs have returned to the scene -- and they're a lot cooler than polyester pants.
i was still an undergraduate but I got to go to the spring '68 Houston
share meeting announcement of cp/67. three people from the science
center
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech
had come out to the university at the end of jan. '68 to install
cp/67. posting on 35th anniversary announcement of cp/67
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#72
photo from the 30th b'day party for vm/370 at share 99 in san fran:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/LynnWheeler023.jpg
it was one of the main stays of personal computing in the '70s ...
not only being offered from corporate datacenters .... including
the majority of the computers on the internal network ... minor reference
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#112
other references to the internal network
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork.html#internalnet
but was also offered as timesharing platform by a number of commercial
timesharing companies
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Methods of payment Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 15 Aug 2004 08:28:47 -0600rogblake10@iname10.com (Roger Blake) writes:
some overview
http://www.eta-find.gov/ETADepositHow.cfm
faq
http://www.eta-find.gov/ETAFactsPage1.cfm
home page
http://www.eta-find.gov/Index.htm
overview of some of the issues:
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/community/unbanked/tum05.html
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 15 Aug 2004 08:40:11 -0600jmfbahciv writes:
in theory the debit fee discount payed by the retailer (on the cash back amount) is less than overhead costs for managing the actual cash (in part, since the customer is already doing the debit transaction, the merchant is already taking the hit on the per transaction fee).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wars against bad things Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 15 Aug 2004 09:45:28 -0600"Gary A. Gorgen" writes:
possibly the largest production loosely-coupled operation in the late
70s was the HONE system.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hone
HONE was originally deployed in the US as support vehicle for all the
sales, field, and customer support people. It was then replicated at
numerous places around the world ... and in the late '70s the US HONE
datacenters were consolidated in california ... where we got to put
together a massive single-system operation configuration (single site
loosely coupled, load balancing and fall-over) with a large disk
farm. As possibly the largest vm-based time-sharing service
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
... it was pushing 40,000 userids (US sales, field, and customer support people).
in the early 80s, partially as a result of earthquake disaster scenarios, it had replicated operations installed in Dallas and Boulder ... with load-balancing and fall-over across the three site complex.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sun, 15 Aug 2004 21:42:43 -0600magstripe gift/pre-paid news (from the future: 16th):
mentions the current US giftcard market is worth $90b ($125b aust)
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Wars against bad things Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 07:45:28 -0600jmfbahciv writes:
A major HONE/APL application was the configurators .... you entered in what the customer wanted .... it might ask some additional questions ... and it came back with the exact specifications that the salesman were to put in the order form (there are an enormous number of detailed feature codes, co-dependency features, inter-dependency features, mutually exclusive features, etc).
Some number of the configurators frequently also had some level of performance specification (& even analytical models) ... messages per second, etc.
360s were starting to get complex enough for the salesman to correctly specify all the appropriate feature codes for a customer order. starting with 370s, it was requirement that HONE configurators be run for order preparation.
in part because of the APL environment ... a lot of HONE use was extremely CPU intensive operation.
another major use was customer proposals, bid responses, etc ... basicly document edit and preparation. originally HONE was cp/67 with CMS (and cms\apl) ... and then transitioned to VM/370 and CMS (with the various flavors of apl\cms, apl\sv, apl2, etc). Original CMS had SCRIPT ... with run-off like commands for document formating (soemwhat dating back to common heritage with CTSS). "G", "M", and "L" had invented GML (precursor to SGML, HTML, XML, etc) and early in vm/370 time-frame, script was extended with GML document formating capability (you could actually intermix GML tags and "dot" commands in the same document).
for the most part, hone
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hone
was a personal computing, time-sharing, application delivery platform
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
in part because of the cpu intensive APL operation ... the merged HONE cluster in cal. might only have a couple thousand simultaneous/concurrent users at any moment in time. during the 70s, (typically smaller) clones of the US HONE operation were replicated in many parts of the rest of the world.
in the early '80s, the marketing & sales division also started program of installing 4341 vm/370 systems, first in regional and then larger branch offices. this offloaded some amount of the more traditional interactive work (and non-configurator stuff) .... email, document editing, etc.
cp/67, cms, vm/370, internal network, cms\apl, GML, tightly-coupled
smp support, compare&swap instruction, a lof of HONE stuff, ... all
came out of 545 tech sq.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech
C&S instruction is the initial of the inventor at 545tech. misc. c&s and/or
smp references:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#smp
GML are the initials of the inventors at 545tech. misc. posts on
invention of GML at 545tech sq:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#sgml
internal network refs
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork#internalnet
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Losing colonies Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 09:50:33 -0600Bernd Felsche writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 13:18:36 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
i remember being told tales about various financial activities in the US during WW-II
boyd helped orchestrate an 18-page newsweek article in the early 80s
on military/industrial complex issues during the 60s & 70s
... misc boyd:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html#boyd
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html#boyd2
there was news article this morning about GAO evaluation of the new armored, rapid deployment vehicle .... which may have weight issues and problems being rapidly deployed.
does anybody remember the stories about $500 hammers and toilet seats?
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 14:34:39 -0600Morten Reistad writes:
however, the timesharing service at the science center
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech
first with cp/67 and then morphing to vm/370 .... had significant number of MIT, BU and other students with general logins ... and it also started remote cms\apl service for people from corporate hdqtrs where they loaded the most valuable and closely guarded corporate secrets and used the data in all sorts of business modeling applications. The student population were known for some number of exploit attempts ... but I know of no situation where corporate secrets leaked out via that avenue.
lots of the internet vulnerabilities have been
1) buffer related exploits specifically associated w/C-language characteristics
2) some number of production services grew out of student/university applications which were never designed from the standpoint of business critical dataprocessing; including extremely simple & trivial debug/testing features that allowed complete remote take-over of the application.
there were a significant number of secure cp/67 and then vm/370
operations. the platforms were used for general commercial
time-sharing service offerings ... where you might actually have
business competitors using the same platform with the possibility of
corporate secrets leaking if things weren't secure
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 17:45:02 -0600Brian Inglis writes:
the issue wasn't so much the language per se ... but the language conventions for length handling.
the PLI language supported length handling conventions that were explicit ... and interfaces used them as such.
by comparison cp/67 and vm/370 was all assembler language .... but they also had convention of everything having explicit lengths and some number of the standard functions all did validity checking on the explicit lengths as a matter of course. Explicit lengths were always carried and always used.
It is as much a system convention as a language thing ... since it would be possible to have assembler with totally different conventions.
in the 360 genre case ... it was carried into the hardware i/o interface. all input/output operations involved explicit lengths ... and completions indicated resididual counts (if any). the i/o routines as a matter convention tended to consistently pass the original length minus residual length as part of all input/output (i.e. input string carried with it the actual length read .... buffers tended to have max size of buffer and current actual length in buffer. in addition to explicit programming that was validating all the lengths appropriately, most of the library functions were also always explicitly validating operations with respect to length.
so technically .... it isn't c language per se .... it is standard c programming conventions, c programming libraries, c programming practices. it is somewhat like saying that cars don't cause automobile accidents ... people cause automobile accidents .... and if people would stop driving ... we would stop having traffic fatalities. however, I recently saw something about safer cars and possibly 40 some percent of traffic fatalities involve not having seatbelt on. i would assert that not having explicit lengths permeate the whole infrastructure is a lot like not wearing seatbelt.
one of the things we did when we started ha/cmp
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
was detailed vulnerability analysis of whole lot off issues. one of the things that we predicted was something like at least a two order magnitude increase in buffer related exploits/vulnerabilities than what we were use to in non-C-based implementations.
various postings related to the multics stuff
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#47 Multics_Security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#42 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#44 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#45 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#8 Backdoor in AES ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#10 Backdoor in AES ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#58 The next big things that weren't
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#78 Newsgroup cliques?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#6 unix permissions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#15 Multics on emulated systems?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#0 Disk drives as commodities. Was Re: Yamhill
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#59 grey-haired assembler programmers (Ritchie's C)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#4 A Dark Day
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#3 Ping: Anne & Lynn Wheeler
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#48 Who said DAT?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#19 Secure OS Thoughts
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#1 Password / access rights check
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#5 perfomance vs. key size
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#51 Using Old OS for Security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#20 Why does Windows allow Worms?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#2 Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Many engineers lack even a four-year degree Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 20:56:49 -0600More than one-fifth of U.S. science and engineering workers have less than a bachelor's degree, according to a new report from the National Science Foundation.
some past related threads in this n.g.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#1 More on Aging Legacy Workforce
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#41 How will current AI/robot stories play when AIs are real?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#48 Lisp Machines
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#28 Offshore IT
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#45 Offshore IT
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#33 [IBM-MAIN] NY Times editorial on white collar jobs going
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#2 The SOB that helped IT jobs move to India is dead!
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Many engineers lack even a four-year degree Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 21:13:26 -0600and a related article from last Dec.
What's up, Doc? Not the number of science Ph.D.s
http://news.com.com/What%27s+up%2C+Doc%3F+Not+the+number+of+science+Ph.D.s/2100-7337_3-5113634.html?tag=nl
A sizable chunk of the science and engineering doctorates went to
non-U.S. citizens, according to the NSF. Of 23,152 doctorates awarded
to students whose citizenship was known, 8,839 went to
non-U.S. citizens. In engineering alone, foreign-born persons
receiving doctoral degrees last year represented more than 60 percent
of the total, according to the NSF. Between 1993 and 2002, foreign
citizens earned just more than 57 percent of all engineering
doctorates, the NSF said.
<snip>
and ten days ago:
Brain drain in tech's future?
http://news.com.com/Brain+drain+in+tech%27s+future%3F/2100-1008_3-5299249.html?tag=st.rn
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2004 07:34:25 -0600Brian Inglis writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A quote from Crypto-Gram Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2004 07:56:36 -0600Jeff Williams writes:
some number of the ones i worked on were designed as enhancements for operating system performance assists. the low-end machines typically had vertical mcode that typically is similar to familiar machine code programming paradigm. the high-end machines frequently were horizontal mcode ... wide words, where bits on/off activated specific machine functions like fetch to register. single instruction might activate several functions simulataneously ... although programming had to explicitly know about latencies in various functions .... i.e. fetching a value to register might take several machine word cycles and from the start of the fetch to the actual use of the value had to be separated by several instructions.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2004 09:56:39 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A quote from Crypto-Gram Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2004 10:27:06 -0600Michael Amling writes:
a similar ... but different tale (from 30+ years ago)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#45
except i manually flipped a bit in instruction from the front panel and voila no matter what you did ... it was treated as correctly authenticated. this isn't unlike the counterfeit yes cards that have started showing up (also referenced in above URL).
the trusted computing platform/module stuff had defined some number of protected secure hash locations that can be initialized. one is for the bios ... and on boot the secure processor calculates the secure hash on the bios and verifies against the saved value (to try and catch corruption).
this isn't unlike the tripwire methodology for periodically checking the integrity of files.
mainframes have tended to have various kinds of ECC (not the crypto kind) for recognizing microcode corruption (regardless of the source).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A quote from Crypto-Gram Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2004 10:52:20 -0600remember shugart's original invention of the floppy disk was for loading mcode into the 3830 disk controller. it was then also used for mcode loading on a number of mainframe machines ... in addition to other controllers
random shugart past posts
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#9 Computer of the century
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#17 index searching
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#50 IBM 2311 disk drive actuator and head assembly
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#5 The BASIC Variations
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 06:54:48 -0600Steve O'Hara-Smith writes:
in the late 90s ... there was a report that said that the majority of all exploit/vulnerabilities were buffer exploits (almost unique to the c language programming environment).
last year, i was on panel discussion with some fbi cyber forensic guy
who said that exploit/vulnerabilities they had been seeing were 1/3rd
buffer overflow, 1/3rd virus/trojanhorse/email, 1/3rd social
engineering. the social engineering issue has always been around. lots
of exploit & vulnerability related posts
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud
to some extent the virus/email it taking something that was pretty
much infrastructures that had original design point of stand-alone
(say running games on kitchen table) or small departmental groups
... and hooking them up to the internet environment that involve large
numbers of people with very different and diverse objectives. somewhat
the closest similar environment from earlier ages with diverse groups
with different objectives were some of the large commercial time-sharing
systems ....
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
also, note that to some extent the 1/3rd distribution numbers are probably specifically with respect to outsider attacks. in the past (before all the internet oriented attention) the frequent number was that 90 percent of the fraud involved insiders (not specified whether that was in terms of incidents or total dollar value). there is recent study that for identity theft fraud ... at least 77 percent of the incidents involved insiders.
as part of trying to add some more to the exploit & vulnerability
taxonomy that i've got in my merged security taxonomy & glossary ...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#glosnote
i've looked at the cve database to see what exploit & vulnerability structural information i could pull out of it. the entries and notes in the cve database are pretty free form ... so what i've mostly come up with is word count & word-pair counts on the entries.
in any case, if you have some number of environments (that range from machine language coding to very high level languages) where certain kind of exploit & vulnerability has almost never been known to occur ... and another specific environment ... where a specific kind of exploit & vulnerability is extremely pervasive .... one might come to believe that the difference is more than simply quality of the programming.
at this point ... one might believe that the infrastructure costs because of buffer exploit and vulnerability is significantly larger than any possible programming productivity that might come from implicit length paradigm ... which is somewhat unique characteristic of the c language environment ... compared to some number of other environments that have almost never seen a buffer exploit/vulnerability.
misc. posts related to cve database analysis
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#10 E-commerce attack imminent; Sudden increase in port scanning for SSL doesn't look good
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#43 security taxonomy and CVE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#20 Why does Windows allow Worms?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#2 Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))
misc. posts related to social engineering and other vulnerabilities
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#9 "Marginot Web" (SSL, payments, etc)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#32 An attack on paypal
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#33 An attack on paypal
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#35 The real problem that https has conspicuously failed to fix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#2 Electronic Safety and Soundness: Securing Finance in a New Age
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#7 The Digital Insider: Backdoor Trojans ... fyi
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#47 authentication and authorization ... addenda
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#58 Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech10 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss8 KISS for PKIX
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki3 Software for PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm8.htm#softpki7 Software for PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#235 Attacks on a PKI
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#82 Future architecture
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#40 Beginner question on Security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#1 Two-factor authentication with SSH?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#8 A Dark Day
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#2 S/360 Engineering Changes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#25 Microsoft Internet Patch
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#51 public key vs passwd authentication?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#9 Bank security question (newbie question)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#50 Pub/priv key security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#57 Pub/priv key security
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#30 Threat of running a web server?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#31 MITM attacks
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 06:59:40 -0600Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Methods of payment Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 12:37:23 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
the yes card exploits the fact that the (smartcard) offline (stored-valued, debit, credit, etc) environment is effectively peer-to-peer with business rules installed in the offline components ... once adequate authentication has been performed ... then both parties rely on the integrity of the business rules deployed in the offline units. the attack then is the offline authentication infrastructure with counterfeited devices and bogus implementation of the business rules.
the online magstripe-based systems (debit, credit, stored-value) effectively use the magstripe as a something you have authentication and share common online network. debit tends to do two-factor authentication, augmenting the magstripe something you have authenticaiton with a something you know PIN. the business rules are in the online transaction system.
the magstripe vulnerability is the readily available technology for counterfeiting magstripe. it is possible to use chipcards in an online system ... purely for authentication purposes (as opposed to combination of authentication and business rules needed in offline systems). use of pure authentication in a chip online environment is countermeasure to the ease of counterfeiting magstripe.
in theory, the same exact chips can be used in both an online authentication implementation as well as a offline authentication plus business rule implementation ... which would lead to the conclusion that the costs to compromise a single chip is approximately the same (at least for some specific types of compromise).
the issue is that well designed chip implementation can require physical possession and destruction of the chip ... which is a time-consuming processing. the countermeasure in the online case is a lost/stolen report that deactives that specific chip ... potentially in much shorter time than it takes to do a physical chip compromise (which could mean that there would be no fraud). The offline issue is that deactivation can be quite difficult, if provided for at all (leading to much larger fraud opportunities).
somewhat related is
Are Merchant-controlled debit networks the next big thing?
http://www.banktech.com/story/enews/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=HD4GXYY53MC32QSNDBCCKHY?articleID=29100853
from purely technical standpoint ... the merchant end of the infrastrucutre supporting credit, debit and magstripe stored-value is effectively the same (same kind of card, same terminal, same communication connection, etc).
misc. past yes card references
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#25 WYTM?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#13 A combined EMV and ID card
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#25 Single Identity. Was: PKI International Consortium
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#42 Article on passwords in Wired News
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#20 RPOW - Reusable Proofs of Work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#37 Security of Oyster Cards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#45 command line switches [Re: [REALLY OT!] Overuse of symbolic constants]
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#12 US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#13 US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#14 US fiscal policy (Was: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII,Invento
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#35 A quote from Crypto-Gram
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Many engineers lack even a four-year degree Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 12:41:36 -0600somewhat related to the various referenced earlier posts
High School graduation tests have little tie to college,
report finds.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2004-08-18-tests_x.htm
.... With 20 states now withholding diplomas from students who don't
pass tests in English and math, if not other subjects, the common
assumption is that the tests measure college readiness, said Keith
Gayler, the lead author of the report. That's wrong, he said.
... snip ...
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 18:10:50 -0600Peter Flass writes:
the original URL went 404:
http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers/FDEFBEBC9DD3E35485256C2C004B0F0D/$File/RC22534.pdf
but the paper was being presented at acsac meeting
http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics.pdf
your referenced watson url is title & authors
http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers?SearchView&Query=(multics)&SearchMax=10
that points to abstract
http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/1e4115aea78b6e7c85256b360066f0d4/fdefbebc9dd3e35485256c2c004b0f0d?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,multics
some topic drift ... during a lot of that era ... multics was on 5th
floor, 545 tech sq .... i was at the cambridge science center on the
4th floor of the same bldg.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech
there was some cross-fertilization in both directions ... &/or some number of people on both 4th and 5th floors had all worked on ctss as common ancestor. there was sometimes even friendly rivalry at the bar (after work) on the first floor.
the work on the 4th floor not only showed up at some accounts with
some pretty stringent integrity requirements (similar to multics) but
also showed up in commerical time-sharing services
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#timeshare
where you could have a mix of different customers with totally different and possibly even conflicting objectives (something that didn't happen with multics that i'm aware of).
while multics was primarily pli (with some stuff recoded in assembler for performance), cp/67, vm/370, cms and large percentage of the applications were all assembler.
another multics security item from earlier in 2002 that was
cross-posted to both a.f.c. and alt.os.multics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#47
total topic drift ... the 9.0.0.0 class-a subnet was obtained at SJR
well before interop '88 ... minor thread drifts:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/internet.htm
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork.html#interop
sometime later some of the other sites obtained their own class-b subnet addresses.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 18:39:02 -0600Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Methods of payment Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 20:18:52 -0600Giles Todd writes:
things like the starbucks magstripe stored-value card still appears to be quite popular. in talking to the people behind the counter, the slight difference (from cash) ... is that there tends to be fewer tips when somebody is paying with the stored-value card than if they paid with cash.
as previously mentioned, the first (magstripe, online) one that i was aware of in the states was a program for blockbuster.
They are frequently also being used in place of store coupons or promotions ... get a promotion $50 stored value card for use at some fancy restaurant (cuts manual processing costs at point-of-sale compared to coupon ... also may provide better tracking of incentive program use, in theory they could code the promotion card identifier with the address it was mailed to).
quicky use of google on stored value cards turns up
http://www.paymentech.com/sol_stovalcar_page.jsp
http://www.discoverbiz.com/merchant/resources/data/GiftCards_splash.html
i had previously posted references to new kind that i believe was
pioneered for temporary US census workers for the year 2000 census
where it is also good for getting cash at ATM machines ... which
then starts to take on more of the characteristics of debit card.
another of these expanded function programs (some additional references
turned up with search engine):
http://www.dhs.state.mn.us/main/groups/children/documents/pub/dhs_id_001413.hcsp
http://corp.ecount.com/pr/press04_21_04.html
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Methods of payment Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 20:28:50 -0600Giles Todd writes:
the yes cards have the business rules (supposedly) correctly implemented in the chip ... and will correctly debit and manage value. In the counterfeit, yes card case, the business rules are bogus and the card always has sufficient funds (and never runs out of value).
the is another kind of stored-value chip card that is more characteristic of transit systems. these are effectively purely memory cards ... where the value stored in the chip is read-out, decrypted, updated, re-encrypted and rewritten back to the chip by highly secure terminals. basically the whole infrastructure has a common shared-secret encryption key that has been preloaded into all terminals.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: A quote from Crypto-Gram Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 07:43:04 -0600"David Eather" writes:
1) apl assist ... back in the early 70s, one of the guys in the palo alto science center implemented apl microcode for the 145 ... where apl programs on the 370/145 would ran approximately as fast as on 370/168 (unassisted)
2) thru-out the 70s there were a whole series of new microcode performance assists for virtual machine operation ... which depending on the situation would change how the execution of various instructions behaved.
3) for "ECPS" what we did was examine the highest frequency used 6k bytes of kernel instruction execution ... and re-implemented those instruction sequences in custom microcode. then there was some dynamic boot code that would test if the kernel was running on a processor with the ECPS microcode ... and patch strategic kernel instructions "on the fly" to activate the ECPS microcode operation options (as opposed to the normal instruction options).
4) most machines tended to have microcode loaded into fixed storage. when the 3081 came out the total amount of possible microcode exceeded the available fixed storage. the 3081 had a service processor and its own operating system and hard disk. they used this to implement pageable microcode. for some less frequently used microcode ... it might not exist on in fixed memory and the 3081 would indicate to the service processor that it needed to be paged in from the service processor's fixed disks.
5) current generation of mainframes have a greatly expanded implementation of #2 ... where they implement virtual machines called "logical partitions". The machine microcode can be configured such that there is a single execution entity that maps all the real hardware. However, it is also possible to set-up the microcode to partition the machine into multiple logical machines or partitions. Some number of the instructions will operate differently in logical machine mode ... in part to enforce the partitioning/separation of different operating systems running in the different partitions. The microcode not only includes modified instruction execution, primarily to preserve partition boundaries ... but also things like a microcode dispatcher and time-slicing ... in order to share processor execution between partitions. In that sense the microcode implements sort of mini-kernel monitor for sharing processor(s) between partitions. The real machine have 8 real processors, and there might be 8-10 logical partitions (or virtual machines) ... where each logical partition is defined as having one to eight virtual processors ... and some target percentage of total processing power per unit time.
6) it would appear that some of the virtual machine partitioning logic is starting to bleed into other processor lines .... having hardware/microcode support for logical machine partitioning. In some number of such cases, the actual execution of some instructions are different whether the processor complex is operating in non-partitioned or partitioned mode.
7) some of this support for virtual machine mode can be seen in
various of the software virtual machine support offerings; where the
code executing in the virtual machine kernel logically becomes the
"micrcode" for the virtual machine; aka the virtual machine kernel
implementation (aka like vmware) is transparently modifying how
various instructions in the virtual machine execute (with the
objective of preserving the partitioining transparency).
http://www.vmware.com/
A trivial exercise is to work out modifications to the vmware software that conditionally changes how execution of certain instruction sequences in the virtual machine happens. Then see if it is possible to modify bios &/or microcode of the real machine to accomplish the same thing.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 10:07:10 -0600Alan Balmer writes:
if there is an upside to just cranking code as fast as possible with not a lot of downside to penalty/costs related to exploits from that code .... then there is little economic incentive to turn out code w/o buffer exploits.
i once wrote a short piece about the coalition that opposed the ten mile new section of 101 between bernel and cochran being six lanes ... so it was only built as four lanes ... while the rest of the new 101 construction was six lanes (both north and south). as a result there were horrible rush hour traffic jams both in the morning and the evening when the traffic flow went from six to four lanes. It possibly added something like 30 minutes per day for commuting for possibly ten thousand people ... or about 5,000 person hrs/day, or something over 14,000 person days per month. So in theory, with responsibility accounting .... even at $5/hr ... that would imply that the coalition should be billed $25,000/day ... little over half million per month for being accountable for being directly responsible for the communters loss of time.
so another issue is whether or not buffer problems .... accounting for the majority of all exploits in the 90s ... and at least 1/3rd of all exploits currently ... might be considered real bugs; especially when it has been repeatedly demonstrated that non-C-based implementations have not been subject to similar rate of buffer exploit problems (it isn't impossible to have written code with buffer problems in these other environments ... it just is that it has possibly been two orders of magnitude less likely).
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 10:43:31 -0600Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
an axample is tale from the multicians web site about cp/67 system at
the mit urban systems lab. there were four bldgs. in tech
sq. ... polaroid two story that had land's office and three 8-9(?)
story bldgs. 545 was closest to kendall sq., i recollect the urban
system lab being across the court ... harvard trust was on the first
floor of that bldg.
http://www.multicians.org/thvv/360-67.html
the particular story is about cp/67 crashed 27 times in one day.
the problem was that as an undergraduate i was playing around a lot
with terminals and other stuff ... and added the tty/ascii terminal
support to cp/67 ... also playing around with terminal stuff
eventually resulted in the plug compatible controller stuff
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#360pcm
however, the tty/ascii terminal stuff that i did was picked up and deployed in the standard product. since the longest length stuff that tty devices could do was 80 bytes .... i did a couple of the length operations using one byte. so the way i remember it, a tty graphics device was hooked up and some (cp/67) system tables modified to indicate something like max of 1200 bytes transfers (or some such).
in any case, the longer lines broke my one byte stuff involved in length calculations ... resulting in really incorrect buffer length calculations.
so the post script in the above ... from the above URL ...
But on that day, a user at Harvard School of Public Health had
connected a plotter to a TTY line and was sending graphics to it, and
every time he did, the whole system crashed. (It is a tribute to the
CP/CMS recovery system that we could get 27 crashes in a single
day; recovery was fast and automatic, on the order of 4-5
minutes. Multics was also crashing quite often at that time, but each
crash took an hour to recover because we salvaged the entire file
system. This unfavorable comparison was one reason that the Multics
team began development of the New Storage System.)
http://www.multicians.org/nss.html
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Losing colonies Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 12:35:34 -0600Steve O'Hara-Smith writes:
Language may shape human thought
http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99996303
... Experts agree that the startling result provides the strongest
support yet for the controversial hypothesis that the language
available to humans defines our thoughts. So-called linguistic
determinism was first proposed in 1950 but has been hotly debated
ever since.
... snip ...
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Losing colonies Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 13:12:44 -0600re:
slightly related .... boyd had conversational mode
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html#boyd
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subboyd.html#boyd2
that i've characterized as carrying on several simulataneously viewpoints & threads .... somewhat analogous to some of his OODA-loop analogies attempting to simultaneously view a subject from a large number of different perspectives (including attempting to compress the time dimension in attempt to obtain multiple nearly simultaneous views/perspectives).
he wouldn't necessarily give any cues when the words being spoken switched between threads/viewpoints ... any extended one-on-one discussions with him could be challenging since you frequently had to infer the specific thread.
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: SSL question 128bit, 1024,2048 key lengths? Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 13:35:12 -0600"G Libc" <no-spam@sbfleury.fastmail.fm> writes:
because public key encryption is so expensive ... and because there is process problem exchanging symmetric keys .... a session symmetric key is generated which is used to encrypt the actual data ... and the public key is just used to encrypt the symmetric key (for key exchange).
supposedly the key size of the symmetric key is basically chosen proportional to the required security data ... then it is desireable to have a public keys that has at least as strong security as the chosen symmetric key (since the public key operations are protecting the symmetric key ... which protects the actual data).
reference to ietf document (determining strengths for public keys
used for exchanging symmetric keys) that gives numbers of approximate
equivalent security strength
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#11
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Looking for pointers to get started with e-signature Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 15:03:48 -0600daaa@rock.com (DaaaDaaa) writes:
at its basics digital signatures are a process based on asymmetric cryptography for authenticating a message or document hasn't been tampered with (possibly in transit).
e-signatures tend to involve an electronic environment where there has been some process that demonstrates human intent with respect to agreeing and/or approving the meaning of some document or transaction (i.e. trying to approach the concept and meaning of a physical, manual, human signature).
there are a number of instances where you may have digital signatures being used in authentication protocols .... w/o any requirement that a human has seen, read, understood, agrees, approves, and/or authorizes the contents of what was digitally signed. a lot of digital signature technology has to do with authentication ... and possibly little or nothing to doing with agreeing and/or approving.
it is possible to have an e-signature infrastructure .... demonstrating intent, agrees, approves, and/or authorizes ... w/o involving any digital signature technology.
there sometines has been confusion about the two possibly distinctly different operations .... possibly because the term "digital signature" includes the word "signature" ... even tho "digital signature" can have absolutely nothing to do with traditional human signature process.
some random past postings mentioning e-signature
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#2 German federal employees get digital signatures
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#7 UNCITRAL Electronic Contracting Project
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#19 Misc. payment, security, fraud, & authentication GAO reports (long posting)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#71 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#72 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#73 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#74 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#75 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#76 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#77 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#80 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#84 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#59 e-Government uses "Authority-stamp-signatures"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#64 Invisible Ink, E-signatures slow to broadly catch on (addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#12 Antwort: Re: Real-time Certificate Status Facility for OCSP - (RTCS)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#43 PKI "not working"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#47 UK: PKI "not working"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#32 VS: On-line signature standards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#33 VS: On-line signature standards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#34 VS: On-line signature standards (slight addenda)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#35 VS: On-line signature standards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#36 VS: On-line signature standards
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#38 FAQ: e-Signatures and Payments
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#39 FAQ: e-Signatures and Payments
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#40 FAQ: e-Signatures and Payments
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#1 FAQ: e-Signatures and Payments
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#25 Root certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#57 Q: Internet banking
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#60 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#61 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#7 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#69 Digital signature
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004i.html#17 New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#1 New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Losing colonies Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 20:12:39 -0600Larry Elmore <ljelmore_@_comcast_._net> writes:
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: history books on the development of capacity planning (SMF and RMF) Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main,alt.folklore.computers Date: Thu, 19 Aug 2004 22:39:47 -0600"John F. Regus" writes:
there was quite a bit of work an dynamic adaptive performance management algorithms ... but there were also extensive monitoring data from possibly thousands of systems. this was used to characterize workloads and configurations ... and a great deal of work was done on workload profiling and synthetic workloads for performance validation. We had collected relatively detailed workload and operational activity data on tens and then hundreds of a wide-variety of mostly interactive, batch, and mixed-mode batch/interactive systems. profiles of operational charateristics were built of from this detailed activity data ... which was used to characterize operations .... like peak observed activity under a broad range of different characteristics. a lot of this was in the early to mid 70s time-frame.
in conjunction with this an analytical model was developed in APL that eventually evolved into a sales & marketing tool on HONE.
HONE was the online, interactive system that supported world wide sales & marketing ... and the majority of the applications were implemented in CMS\APL and then later APL\CMS. Many of the earliest applications were "configurators" (apl was being used for a lot of applications that you see done today with spreadsheets). For 360s, a salesman could still fill out the order form ... but with 370s, the multitude of feature codes (and their interdependencies)for processors, controllers, etc ... got so complex that salesman needed to use a HONE configurator application for completing order specifications. Some number of the configurators included some ability to specify some amount of thruput information ... especially for some of the controllers ... like the 3705 terminal controller.
however, the much more detailed processor & workload analytical model developed and made available on HONE was called the performance predictor. marketing people could enter existing configuration, workload, and even performance information ... and then ask what-if questions .... aka what is the effect of adding more memory, disks, processors, .... and/or what is the effect of increasing and/or changing workload characteristics.
Nore recently, I've run into an extremely sophisticated system configuration and thruput modeling application. The claim was that the person had obtained the rights to the IBM apl performance model in the early 90s and ran it thru an APL to c-language converter and then subsequently made numerous enhancements.
much of this early work was done at the cambridge science center;
random past posts about science center
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech
random past posts about HONE
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hone
some past posts about some of the benchmarking and workload profiling
done at the science center
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/submain.html#bench
for the calibration of the resource manager product .... we took all of the workload and configuration characterization information and defined a series of approximately (automated) 1000 benchmarks that had statistical coverage of most observed workload and operational characteristics. the analytical model was then modified to specify variations on workload and operational characteristics ... and the first 1000 benchmarks results were fed in ... and the whole thing automated .... with the model picking the workload and operational characteristics for approximately another 1000 benchmarks (iteratively, select a benchmark workload & configuation, run it, get the results, select the next). In total there were approximately 2000 benchmarks (taking 3 months elapsed time) done as part of preparing the resource manager for product release.
some discussions about pieces of the dynamic adaptive resource manager
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#fairshare
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#wsclock
some early articles by yon bard who had done a lot of the (apl & other)
performance modeling at cambridge
Performance criteria and measurement for a time-sharing system, Y. Bard,
IBM Systems Journal, v10n3, 1971
Experimental evaluation of system performance, Y. Bard, IBM
Systems Journal, v12n3, 1973
IBM Contributions to Computer Performance Modeling, Y. Bard, C. Sauer,
IBM Journal R&D, 25th annv. issue, v25n5, 1981
this is a posting discussing an old comparison of 3725s and series/1s
for large network configurations .... that used hone configurators to
get performance, thruput, and costs for the two boxes:
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#67
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Losing colonies Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2004 07:50:56 -0600Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
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Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: history books on the development of capacity planning (SMF and RMF) Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main,alt.folklore.computers Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2004 17:22:19 -0600"John F. Regus" writes:
I don't know of anything comparable at the other vendors at that time frame.
I mentioned running into somebody in the past couple years that had acquired rights to the detailed APL system & performance model sometime in the early 90s ... and converted it to C and enhanced it. He said that he had done various performance analysis for very large datacenter operations ... initially in Europe and then many other countries ... and it was generalized to handle more than IBM processors.
some of the others that hang out in a.f.c. n.g. may have some knowledge of the other vendors ... in the late 60s and early 70s.
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: RFCs that reference MD5 Newsgroups: sci.crypt Date: Sat, 21 Aug 2004 00:14:35 -0600I've made a number of updates to my rfc index.
if you go to the main url
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
you'll see a new note about list of RFCs that have some MD5 references in their text (i.e. greped on "md5" with some number of eliminations)
the display is my standard summary format; if you click on the ".txt=nnnn" field it retrieves the actual RFC
removed from the list are Obsoleted and/or Historic RFCs.
In the past, you could select Term (term->RFC#) in the RFCs listed by section; then select "MD5" in the Acronym fastpath. That got you all RFCs that had MD2, MD4, MD5, and/or "message digest" in the title or abstract.
I've have also tried to add References & ReferenceBy information. I've scanned (actually some gawk) all the RFCs attempting to recognize any References section and pull out list of referenced RFCs.
That information is now added to the RFC summary listings ... in manner similar to the obsoletes/obsoletedby and updated/updatedby fields ... i.e. RFCs that are referenced by other RFCs now show the list of "Ref'ed By").
the summary listing for 1321 now looks like:
1321 I
The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, Rivest R., 1992/04/16 (21pp)
(.txt=35222) (Refs 1320) (Ref'ed By 1320, 1334, 1352, 1423, 1446,
1479, 1544, 1751, 1828, 1910, 1964, 1994, 2002, 2025, 2040, 2058,
2059, 2065, 2069, 2085, 2104, 2107, 2110, 2138, 2139, 2165, 2178,
2202, 2246, 2264, 2274, 2286, 2311, 2328, 2385, 2403, 2409, 2444,
2537, 2557, 2570, 2574, 2617, 2630, 2693, 2748, 2777, 2792, 2801,
2802, 2803, 2831, 2845, 2865, 2866, 2898, 2924, 2938, 2945, 2961,
3012, 3036, 3041, 3075, 3110, 3161, 3174, 3208, 3220, 3224, 3230,
3259, 3261, 3275, 3315, 3344, 3410, 3414, 3451, 3452, 3520, 3550,
3576, 3579, 3580, 3631, 3652, 3723, 3797)
note that the RFCs mentioning md5 are more than the ones that include
RFC 1321 in their references section (and/or I wasn't able to
correctly recognize some references sections).
I was prompted to do this by one of the people at Crypto 2004 ... who was wondering all the possible internet RFCs that might be affect by the new hash exploits (some number of papers and talks about attacks on hash algorithms).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Monster(ous) sig (was Re: Vintage computers are better ... Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 21 Aug 2004 12:49:33 -0600"Jack Peacock" writes:
VAXes and 4341s got explosive growth out of the emerging departmental and distirbuted computing environments (in several cases 4341s were sold hundreds at a time) ... VAXes and 4341s then became vulnerable (in the market segment) to higher end workstations and PCs.
random past 4341 &/or departmental server posts
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#3 What is an IBM 137/148 ???
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#1 360/370
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#34 ... cics ... from posting from another list
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#49 Edsger Dijkstra: the blackest week of his professional life
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#7 IBM S/360
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#36 why is there an "@" key?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#110 OS/360 names and error codes (was: Humorous and/or Interesting Opcodes)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#112 OS/360 names and error codes (was: Humorous and/or Interesting Opcodes)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#123 Speaking of USB ( was Re: ASR 33 Typing Element)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#29 Operating systems, guest and actual
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#90 Ux's good points.
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#37 How to learn assembler language for OS/390 ?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#76 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#83 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#0 Is a VAX a mainframe?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#7 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#9 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#10 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#11 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#12 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#13 4341 was "Is a VAX a mainframe?"
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#20 S/360 development burnout?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#82 "all-out" vs less aggressive designs (was: Re: 36 to 32 bit transition)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#52 Why not an IBM zSeries workstation?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#53 Why not an IBM zSeries workstation?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#57 Why not an IBM zSeries workstation?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#21 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#22 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#69 Z/90, S/390, 370/ESA (slightly off topic)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#63 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#65 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#67 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#9 MIP rating on old S/370s
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#33 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#44 Wired News :The Grid: The Next-Gen Internet?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#3 YKYGOW...
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#20 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#32 mainframe question
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#12 Multics Nostalgia
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#15 departmental servers
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#39 195 was: Computer Typesetting Was: Movies with source code
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#11 The demise of compaq
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#0 Microcode?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#7 IBM Mainframe at home
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#46 What goes into a 3090?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#75 Computers in Science Fiction
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#8 Is AMD doing an Intel?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#44 ibm icecube -- return of watercooling?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#52 Bettman Archive in Trouble
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#7 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#19 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#22 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#23 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#27 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#29 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#30 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#37 IBM was: CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#43 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#4 HONE, ****, misc
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#7 HONE, ****, misc
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#67 Total Computing Power
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#1 misc. old benchmarks (4331 & 11/750)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#3 misc. old benchmarks (4331 & 11/750)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#4 misc. old benchmarks (4331 & 11/750)
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#58 IBM S/370-168, 195, and 3033
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#59 IBM S/370-168, 195, and 3033
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#63 Help me find pics of a UNIVAC please
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#51 E-mail from the OS-390 ????
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#74 They Got Mail: Not-So-Fond Farewells
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#48 Linux paging
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002q.html#27 Beyond 8+3
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#10 Mainframe System Programmer/Administrator market demand?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#14 vax6k.openecs.org rebirth
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#15 vax6k.openecs.org rebirth
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#67 3745 & NCP Withdrawl?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#29 360/370 disk drives
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#17 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#19 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#23 difference between itanium and alpha
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#71 Tubes in IBM 1620?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#77 COMTEN- IBM networking boxes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#79 COMTEN- IBM networking boxes
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#0 big buys was: Tubes in IBM 1620?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#33 Why only 24 bits on S/360?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#35 Why only 24 bits on S/360?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#61 Another light on the map going out
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#64 IBM was: VAX again: unix
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#56 Reviving Multics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#65 801 (was Re: Reviving Multics
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#48 Alpha performance, why?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#50 Alpha performance, why?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#56 ECPS:VM DISPx instructions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#22 303x, idals, dat, disk head settle, and other rambling folklore
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#5 Name for this early transistor package?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#9 IBM system 370
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#2 Fix the shuttle or fly it unmanned
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#26 Microkernels are not "all or nothing". Re: Multics Concepts For
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#31 IBM Manuals from the 1940's and 1950's
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#40 Cray to commercialize Red Storm
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#38 Mainframe Emulation Solutions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#46 DE-skilling was Re: ServerPak Install via QuickLoad Product
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#64 System/360 40 years old today
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#66 System/360 40 years old today
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#75 DASD Architecture of the future
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#29 [Meta] Marketplace argument
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#39 Who said "The Mainframe is dead"?
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#20 Infiniband - practicalities for small clusters
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#24 |d|i|g|i|t|a|l| questions
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004j.html#25 Wars against bad things
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap ! Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers Date: Sat, 21 Aug 2004 15:48:02 -0600cstacy@news.dtpq.com (Christopher C. Stacy) writes:
as previously mentioned ... analysis of cve descriptions earlier this year ... didn't turn up any particular structural consistency ... but in the free form descriptions ...
520 mentioned overflow
105 of the overflow also had "denial of service"
76 of the overflow also had "gain root"
original post
https://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#43 security taxonomy and CVE
this is sample from that investigation where the descriptions actually start with the charcter string Buffer overflow (as opposed to having buffer &/or length problem be described in some other way, may be somewhat biased since we had predicted this 15-some years ago):
Buffer overflow and denial of service in Buffer overflow in /usr/bin/cu in Solari Buffer overflow in AIX and Solaris ""get Buffer overflow in AIX dtterm program fo Buffer overflow in AIX ftpd in the libc Buffer overflow in AIX lchangelv gives r Buffer overflow in AIX lquerylv program Buffer overflow in AIX rcp command allow Buffer overflow in AIX writesrv command Buffer overflow in AIX xdat gives root a Buffer overflow in AOL Instant Messenger Buffer overflow in AOL Instant Messenger Buffer overflow in AOLserver 3.0 allows Buffer overflow in ASP Server-Side Inclu Buffer overflow in ASP.NET Worker Proces Buffer overflow in Accept command in Net Buffer overflow in Analog before 4.16 al Buffer overflow in AnalogX SimpleServer: Buffer overflow in AnalogX SimpleServer: Buffer overflow in AnalogX SimpleServer: Buffer overflow in AspUpload.dll in Pers Buffer overflow in AuthFilter ISAPI filt Buffer overflow in AuthFilter ISAPI filt Buffer overflow in BEA WebLogic server p Buffer overflow in BFTelnet allows remot Buffer overflow in BIND 8.2 via NXT reco Buffer overflow in BNC IRC proxy allows Buffer overflow in BNU UUCP daemon (uucp Buffer overflow in BSD and linux lpr com Buffer overflow in BSD line printer daem Buffer overflow in BSD-based lpr package Buffer overflow in BSD-based telnetd tel Buffer overflow in Berkeley automounter Buffer overflow in BitchX IRC client all Buffer overflow in CDE Calendar Manager Buffer overflow in CProxy 3.3 allows rem Buffer overflow in CSAdmin module in Cis Buffer overflow in CSM mail server allow Buffer overflow in CamShot WebCam HTTP s Buffer overflow in Canna input system al Buffer overflow in Cisco 7xx routers thr Buffer overflow in Cisco TACACS+ tac_plu Buffer overflow in CiscoSecure ACS Serve Buffer overflow in Common Desktop Enviro Buffer overflow in CommuniGatePro via a Buffer overflow in Compaq Management Age Buffer overflow in CrackLib 2.5 may allo Buffer overflow in Dalnet IRC server 4.6 Buffer overflow in Darxite 0.4 and earli Buffer overflow in Dosemu Slang library Buffer overflow in EFTP allows remote at Buffer overflow in EFTP allows remote at Buffer overflow in Elm 2.5.5 and earlier Buffer overflow in Embedded Support Part Buffer overflow in Eterm of Enlightenmen Buffer overflow in Exim allows local use Buffer overflow in Flash OCX for Macrome Buffer overflow in FreeBSD angband allow Buffer overflow in FreeBSD fts library r Buffer overflow in FreeBSD libmytinfo li Buffer overflow in FreeBSD lpd through l Buffer overflow in FreeBSD setlocale in Buffer overflow in FreeBSD xmindpath all Buffer overflow in Frox transparent FTP Buffer overflow in Fujitsu Chocoa IRC cl Buffer overflow in FuseMAIL POP service Buffer overflow in Getkey in the protoco Buffer overflow in Gnomelib in SuSE Linu Buffer overflow in GoodTech Telnet Serve Buffer overflow in GuildFTPd Server 0.97 Buffer overflow in HP Openview Network N Buffer overflow in HP-UX newgrp program Buffer overflow in HPUX passwd command a Buffer overflow in HTML parser of the Lo Buffer overflow in HTTP Proxy for Symant Buffer overflow in Half Life dedicated s Buffer overflow in Hilgraeve, Inc. Hyper Buffer overflow in HylaFAX faxgetty befo Buffer overflow in IBM HomePagePrint 1.0 Buffer overflow in IBM Net.Data db2www C Buffer overflow in IBM WebSphere web app Buffer overflow in ICQ before 2001B Beta Buffer overflow in IIS 4.0 allows remote Buffer overflow in IMAP server in Netsca Buffer overflow in INN 2.2.1 and earlier Buffer overflow in INN inews program. Buffer overflow in IPSEC authentication Buffer overflow in IPSwitch IMail SMTP s Buffer overflow in ISAPI extension (idq. Buffer overflow in ISS BlackICE Defender Buffer overflow in ITHouse mail server 1 Buffer overflow in InetServ 3.0 allows r Buffer overflow in Infopulse Gatekeeper Buffer overflow in Infoseek Ultraseek se Buffer overflow in Intel InBusiness eMai Buffer overflow in Internet Explorer 4.0 Buffer overflow in Internet Explorer 4.0 Buffer overflow in Internet Explorer 5 a Buffer overflow in Internet Explorer 5 d Buffer overflow in Internet Information Buffer overflow in Internet Mail Connect Buffer overflow in Internet Mail Service Buffer overflow in Internet Printing ISA Buffer overflow in IrDA driver providing Buffer overflow in KDE Kmail allows a re Buffer overflow in KDE kdesud on Linux a Buffer overflow in Kerberos 4 KDC progra Buffer overflow in Kermit communications Buffer overflow in Korn Shell (ksh) suid Buffer overflow in L0pht AntiSniff allow Buffer overflow in Linux Slackware crond Buffer overflow in Linux cdrecord allows Buffer overflow in Linux mount and umoun Buffer overflow in Linux splitvt 1.6.3 a Buffer overflow in Linux splitvt command Buffer overflow in Linux xinetd 2.1.8.9p Buffer overflow in Lotus Domino HTTP ser Buffer overflow in Lotus Domino Mail Ser Buffer overflow in Lotus Notes LDAP (NLD Buffer overflow in Lynx 2.x allows remot Buffer overflow in MDBMS database server Buffer overflow in MDaemon POP server al Buffer overflow in MERCUR SMTP server 3. Buffer overflow in Mediahouse Statistics Buffer overflow in Mercury MTA POP3 serv Buffer overflow in Microsoft Clip Art Ga Buffer overflow in Microsoft FrontPage S Buffer overflow in Microsoft Index Serve Buffer overflow in Microsoft MSN Chat Ac Buffer overflow in Microsoft Outlook and Buffer overflow in Microsoft Phone Book Buffer overflow in Microsoft Phone Diale Buffer overflow in Microsoft Rich Text F Buffer overflow in Microsoft Telnet clie Buffer overflow in Microsoft Terminal Se Buffer overflow in Microsoft Visual Stud Buffer overflow in Microsoft Windows Med Buffer overflow in Microsoft Windows Med Buffer overflow in Microsoft Windows Med Buffer overflow in Microsoft command pro Buffer overflow in Multiple UNC Provider Buffer overflow in NCSA HTTP daemon v1.3 Buffer overflow in NFS mountd gives root Buffer overflow in NFS server on Linux a Buffer overflow in NIS+, in Sun's rpc.ni Buffer overflow in NLS (Natural Language Buffer overflow in NetMeeting allows den Buffer overflow in NetScreen Firewall We Buffer overflow in Netscape Communicator Buffer overflow in Netscape Communicator Buffer overflow in Netscape Directory Se Buffer overflow in Netscape Enterprise S Buffer overflow in Netscape Enterprise S Buffer overflow in Netsnap webcam HTTP s Buffer overflow in Netwin WebNews CGI pr Buffer overflow in Norton Antivirus for Buffer overflow in Novell GroupWise 6.0. Buffer overflow in Novell iManager (eMFr Buffer overflow in OSF Distributed Compu Buffer overflow in OmniHTTPd CGI program Buffer overflow in OpenBSD ping. Buffer overflow in OpenBSD procfs and fd Buffer overflow in OpenLink 3.2 allows r Buffer overflow in OpenSSH before 2.9.9, Buffer overflow in Oracle9iAS Web Cache Buffer overflow in OverView5 CGI program Buffer overflow in PHP cgi program, php. Buffer overflow in POP servers based on Buffer overflow in PerlIS.dll in Actives Buffer overflow in Platinum Policy Compl Buffer overflow in Pragma Systems Telnet Buffer overflow in Qpopper (popper) 4.0. Buffer overflow in RSAREF2 via the encry Buffer overflow in Real Networks RealPla Buffer overflow in RealJukebox 2 1.0.2.3 Buffer overflow in RealNetworks RealServ Buffer overflow in RegAPI.DLL used by Wi Buffer overflow in Remote Access Service Buffer overflow in Remote Access Service Buffer overflow in SCO scohelp program a Buffer overflow in SGI IRIX mailx progra Buffer overflow in SLmail 3.x allows att Buffer overflow in SMTP service of Lotus Buffer overflow in SNMP daemon (snmpd) o Buffer overflow in Samba smbd program vi Buffer overflow in SeaNox Devwex allows Buffer overflow in Sendmail before 8.12. Buffer overflow in Serv-U FTP 2.5 allows Buffer overflow in Serv-U FTP server whe Buffer overflow in Simple Network Time S Buffer overflow in Skyfull mail server v Buffer overflow in Small HTTP Server all Buffer overflow in SmartDesk WebSuite al Buffer overflow in SmartMax MailMax POP3 Buffer overflow in Solaris 7 lp allows l Buffer overflow in Solaris dtprintinfo p Buffer overflow in Solaris fdformat comm Buffer overflow in Solaris getopt in lib Buffer overflow in Solaris kcms_configur Buffer overflow in Solaris lpset program Buffer overflow in Solaris netpr program Buffer overflow in Solaris sadmind allow Buffer overflow in Solaris snmpXdmid SNM Buffer overflow in Solaris snoop allows Buffer overflow in Solaris snoop program Buffer overflow in Solaris x86 mkcookie Buffer overflow in Source Code Browser P Buffer overflow in StarOffice StarSchedu Buffer overflow in Sun ONE / iPlanet Web Buffer overflow in Sun's ping program ca Buffer overflow in SunFTP build 9(1) all Buffer overflow in SunOS/Solaris ps comm Buffer overflow in SysVInit in Red Hat L Buffer overflow in TNS Listener for Orac Buffer overflow in TT_SESSION environmen Buffer overflow in Thomas Boutell's cgic Buffer overflow in Tinyproxy HTTP proxy Buffer overflow in ToxSoft NextFTP clien Buffer overflow in Trend Micro Virus Bus Buffer overflow in Trivial HTTP (THTTPd) Buffer overflow in TrollFTPD 1.26 and ea Buffer overflow in Universal Plug and Pl Buffer overflow in University of Minneso Buffer overflow in University of Washing Buffer overflow in University of Washing Buffer overflow in University of Washing Buffer overflow in UnixWare i2odialogd d Buffer overflow in UnixWare ppptalk comm Buffer overflow in UnixWare rtpm program Buffer overflow in UnixWare xauto progra Buffer overflow in VB-TSQL debugger obje Buffer overflow in VDO Live Player allow Buffer overflow in VMWare 1.0.1 for Linu Buffer overflow in VMware Authorization Buffer overflow in Van Dyke SecureCRT SS Buffer overflow in Vixie Cron library up Buffer overflow in Vixie Cron on Red Hat Buffer overflow in Vixie cron 3.0.1-56 a Buffer overflow in Voyager web administr Buffer overflow in WFTPD FTP server allo Buffer overflow in WS_FTP FTP Server 3.1 Buffer overflow in WU-FTPD and related F Buffer overflow in WU-FTPD and related F Buffer overflow in War FTP allows remote Buffer overflow in War FTPd 1.6x allows Buffer overflow in WebActive HTTP Server Buffer overflow in WebBBS 1.15 allows re Buffer overflow in WebShield SMTP 4.5.44 Buffer overflow in Webfind CGI program i Buffer overflow in Webstar HTTP server a Buffer overflow in WinZip 8.0 allows att Buffer overflow in Winamp 2.64 and earli Buffer overflow in WindowMaker (aka wmak Buffer overflow in Windows 2000 event vi Buffer overflow in Windows NT 4.0 help f Buffer overflow in Windows Shell (used a Buffer overflow in Winhlp32.exe allows r Buffer overflow in X server (Xsco) in Op Buffer overflow in X11 dissector in Ethe Buffer overflow in XFree86 3.3.x allows Buffer overflow in Xi Graphics Accelerat Buffer overflow in Xshipwars xsw program Buffer overflow in Xsun X server in Sola Buffer overflow in Xsun in Solaris 8 and Buffer overflow in Xt library of X Windo Buffer overflow in Yamaha MidiPlug via a Buffer overflow in ZBServer Pro allows r Buffer overflow in a legacy ActiveX cont Buffer overflow in a system function tha Buffer overflow in aVirt Rover POP3 serv Buffer overflow in arp command in Solari Buffer overflow in bash 2.0.0, 1.4.17, a Buffer overflow in bftp daemon (bftpd) 1 Buffer overflow in bing allows remote at Buffer overflow in bootpd 2.4.3 and earl Buffer overflow in calserver in SCO Open Buffer overflow in catopen() function in Buffer overflow in cb_reset in the Syste Buffer overflow in cfingerd allows local Buffer overflow in chkey in Solaris 2.5. Buffer overflow in cmctl program in Orac Buffer overflow in cpr for the eoe.sw.cp Buffer overflow in curl earlier than 6.0 Buffer overflow in dc20ctrl before 0.4_1 Buffer overflow in digest command in IBM Buffer overflow in dlvr_audit for Calder Buffer overflow in dmplay in IRIX 6.2 an Buffer overflow in dsh in dqs 3.2.7 in S Buffer overflow in dtterm in HP-UX 11.0 Buffer overflow in dvtermtype in Tridia Buffer overflow in eDonkey 2000 35.16.60 Buffer overflow in eeprom in Solaris 2.5 Buffer overflow in efingerd 1.5 and earl Buffer overflow in enq command in IBM AI Buffer overflow in exrecover in Solaris Buffer overflow in fdmount on Linux syst Buffer overflow in ffbconfig in Solaris Buffer overflow in free internet chess s Buffer overflow in glob function of glib Buffer overflow in gnuplot in Linux vers Buffer overflow in healthd for FreeBSD a Buffer overflow in httpGets function in Buffer overflow in hybrid-6 IRC server c Buffer overflow in iMesh 1.02 allows rem Buffer overflow in imwheel allows local Buffer overflow in index.cgi administrat Buffer overflow in innd 2.2.2 allows rem Buffer overflow in ippRead function of C Buffer overflow in ircII 4.4 IRC client Buffer overflow in ja-xklock 2.7.1 and e Buffer overflow in jaZip Zip/Jaz drive m Buffer overflow in kdc_reply_cipher of l Buffer overflow in krb425_conv_principal Buffer overflow in krb_rd_req function i Buffer overflow in krshd in Kerberos 5 a Buffer overflow in ksu in Kerberos 5 all Buffer overflow in libi18n library in IB Buffer overflow in licq 1.0.4 and earlie Buffer overflow in line printer daemon ( Buffer overflow in linuxconf 1.11r11-rh2 Buffer overflow in listmanager earlier t Buffer overflow in listserv allows arbit Buffer overflow in logging functions of Buffer overflow in login in various Syst Buffer overflow in lpstat in IRIX 6.2 an Buffer overflow in lukemftp FTP client i Buffer overflow in mail command in Solar Buffer overflow in mail included with Su Buffer overflow in mailx in Solaris 8 an Buffer overflow in man program in various Buffer overflow in mana in OpenServer 5. Buffer overflow in mhshow in the Linux n Buffer overflow in micq client 0.4.6 and Buffer overflow in mopd (Maintenance Ope Buffer overflow in mtr 0.46 and earlier, Buffer overflow in mutt mail client allo Buffer overflow in ncurses 5.0, and the Buffer overflow in ndcfg command for Uni Buffer overflow in newt.c of newt window Buffer overflow in nftp FTP client versi Buffer overflow in nnrpd program in INN Buffer overflow in nslookupComplain func Buffer overflow in nss_nisplus.so.1 libr Buffer overflow in ntpd ntp daemon 4.0.9 Buffer overflow in ntping in scotty 2.1. Buffer overflow in otrcrep in Oracle 8.0 Buffer overflow in pam_localuser PAM mod Buffer overflow in ping in AIX 4.2 and e Buffer overflow in piobe command in IBM Buffer overflow in pioout command in IBM Buffer overflow in pks PGP public key we Buffer overflow in ppp program in FreeBS Buffer overflow in procmail before versi Buffer overflow in ptexec in the Sun Val Buffer overflow in qpopper (aka qpop or Buffer overflow in remote web administra Buffer overflow in rpc.yppasswdd (yppass Buffer overflow in rpc.yppasswdd allows Buffer overflow in rwcgi60 CGI program f Buffer overflow in sccw allows local use Buffer overflow in search.cgi in mnoGoSe Buffer overflow in setclock command in I Buffer overflow in setsenv command in IB Buffer overflow in ssh 1.2.26 client wit Buffer overflow in sshd in OpenSSH 2.3.1 Buffer overflow in ssinc.dll in IIS 5.0 Buffer overflow in statd allows root pri Buffer overflow in strong.exe program in Buffer overflow in su in Tru64 Unix 5.x Buffer overflow in sudo earlier than 1.6 Buffer overflow in suidperl (sperl), Per Buffer overflow in syslog utility allows Buffer overflow in tab expansion capabil Buffer overflow in telnet daemon tgetent Buffer overflow in telnet server in Wind Buffer overflow in the ""Super"" utility Buffer overflow in the ASP data transfer Buffer overflow in the AddSuLog function Buffer overflow in the CyberPatrol daemo Buffer overflow in the ESMTP service of Buffer overflow in the FTP client in the Buffer overflow in the GUI authentication Buffer overflow in the HTML interpreter Buffer overflow in the HTML library used Buffer overflow in the HTML parser for N Buffer overflow in the HTML parsing code Buffer overflow in the HTTP proxy server Buffer overflow in the ISAPI DLL filter Buffer overflow in the InterAccess telne Buffer overflow in the LDAP component of Buffer overflow in the Linux binary comp Buffer overflow in the Linux mail progra Buffer overflow in the Mail-Max SMTP ser Buffer overflow in the NetWare remote we Buffer overflow in the NetWin DSMTP 2.7q Buffer overflow in the Office Web Compon Buffer overflow in the OpenDataSource fu Buffer overflow in the POP server POProx Buffer overflow in the SHTML logging fun Buffer overflow in the SMTP gateway for Buffer overflow in the SQLXML ISAPI exte Buffer overflow in the Still Image Servi Buffer overflow in the System Monitor Ac Buffer overflow in the Transact-SQL (T-S Buffer overflow in the Web Archives comp Buffer overflow in the Web Messaging dae Buffer overflow in the Window.External f Buffer overflow in the Xview library as Buffer overflow in the automatic mail ch Buffer overflow in the chunked encoding Buffer overflow in the chunked encoding Buffer overflow in the client connection Buffer overflow in the conversion utilit Buffer overflow in the dump utility in t Buffer overflow in the dvwssr.dll DLL in Buffer overflow in the huh program in th Buffer overflow in the implementation of Buffer overflow in the ism.dll ISAPI ext Buffer overflow in the kcsSUNWIOsolf.so Buffer overflow in the kdc_reply_cipher Buffer overflow in the libauth library i Buffer overflow in the line printer daem Buffer overflow in the logging feature o Buffer overflow in the man program in Li Buffer overflow in the parsing mechanism Buffer overflow in the pop-2d POP daemon Buffer overflow in the preprocessor in g Buffer overflow in the web administratio Buffer overflow in the web archive compo Buffer overflow in the web interface for Buffer overflow in the web interface for Buffer overflow in the web server for No Buffer overflow in the wmcdplay CD playe Buffer overflow in traffic_manager for I Buffer overflow in transaction signature Buffer overflow in ufsrestore in Solaris Buffer overflow in uidadmin in Caldera O Buffer overflow in ultimate_source funct Buffer overflow in uuq in AIX 4 could al Buffer overflow in various Microsoft app Buffer overflow in various decoders in E Buffer overflow in vchkpw/vpopmail POP a Buffer overflow in vqSoft vqServer 1.4.4 Buffer overflow in w3-msql CGI program i Buffer overflow in w3m 0.2.1 and earlier Buffer overflow in wconsole.dll in Rockl Buffer overflow in webd in Network Fligh Buffer overflow in wmcube-gdk for WMCube Buffer overflow in ximp40 shared library Buffer overflow in xlib in XFree 3.3.x p Buffer overflow in xlock program allows Buffer overflow in xlockmore xlock progr Buffer overflow in xmcd 2.0p12 allows lo Buffer overflow in xpilot-server for XPi Buffer overflow in ypbind 3.3 possibly a Buffer overflow in ypserv in Mandrake Li Buffer overflow of rlogin program using Buffer overflows in (1) php_mime_split i Buffer overflows in HP Software Distribu Buffer overflows in Linux cdwtools 093 a Buffer overflows in Mars NetWare Emulati Buffer overflows in Sun libnsl allow roo Buffer overflows in Windows NT 4.0 print Buffer overflows in lpspooler in the fil Buffer overflows in muxatmd in AIX 4 all Buffer overflows in ntop running in web Buffer overflows in wuarchive ftpd (wu-f--