List of Archived Posts
2001 Newsgroup Postings (09/11 - 10/8)
- Are client certificates really secure?
- Are client certificates really secure?
- Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
- Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
- hot chips and nuclear reactors
- OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
- Is VeriSign lying???
- hot chips and nuclear reactors
- Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
- HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
- OT: almost lost LBJ tapes; Dictabelt
- OT: almost lost LBJ tapes; Dictabelt
- ESCON Channel Limits
- more old RFCs
- HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
- signature and other stuff.
- microsoft going poof [was: HP Compaq merger, here we go again.]
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
- 3270 protocol
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- Private key
- 3270 protocol
- A thought on passwords
- Newbie TOPS-10 7.03 question
- Newbie TOPS-10 7.03 question
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- 3270 protocol
- Newbie TOPS-10 7.03 question
- Newbie TOPS-10 7.03 question
- HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
- HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
- Why is UNIX semi-immune to viral infection?
- 3270 protocol
- SMP idea for the future
- 3270 protocol
- SMP idea for the future
- Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
- Why is UNIX semi-immune to viral infection?
- DEC midnight requisition system
- I-net banking security
- E-mail 30 years old this autumn
- SMP idea for the future
- I-net banking security
- intranet security and user authentication questions
- Defrag in linux? - Newbie question
- I-net banking security
- SMP idea for the future
- how to start write a Firewall authentication client software
- Programming in School (was: Re: Common uses...)
- SMP idea for the future
- SMP idea for the future
- SMP idea for the future
- Common uses of multiprogramming on mainframes computer? Help!! Please
- Programming in School (was: Re: Common uses...)
- Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
- Encryption + Error Correction
- HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
- Expanded Storage?
- Expanded Storage?
- Disappointed
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Are client certificates really secure?
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2001 17:06:08 GMT
"Tor Rustad" writes:
Well, protecting trust points (e.g. CA certificates) is an important issue.
Too many protocols and standards don't address this basic point.
Some tokens are just memory cards, they will export the private key outside
the token and do the cryptographic operations in an insecure environment.
Some tokens protect the cryptographic operations, but ignore protecting the
PIN and the display.
FINREAD address this, but the technology isn't really mature yet. When I
read the specs., I couldn't even see that the minimum size of the display
was specified... Grrr.
I've been playing with E4-high chips in various configurations for ECC
digital signatures ... as well as being at the most recent FINREAD
conference ... and using some terminals that exceed FINREAD standard
(whatever they are).
one of the issues looked at early in the X9.59 secure electronic
payment standard work (for all account based payments ... regardless
of type, credit, debit, point-of-sale, internet, etc) was not only is
a secure terminal a necessity ... but there needs to be proof that a
secure terminal was, in fact, used (in much the same way that there
was proof that a secure hardware token, was in fact, used). this led
to formulation in the x9a10 standards work group that the secure
terminal needed to sign every transaction (in addition to the secure
hardware token) ... in order to proove that such a terminal was used
(not just mandate that they exist, but also proove that they were
used).
there still exists the possible exploit that the hardware token was
used at some non-finread terminal at some time and the PIN-exposed.
However, subsequent finread terminal use would preclude trojen-horse
providing previously compromised PIN automagically to the hardware
token w/o the owner's knowledge ... the hardware token would have to
be in the hands of somebody fraudulently using the token.
The issue then is while the relying party can proove whether or not a
finread-like (or better) terminal was used (with the terminal also
signing the message) ... it is more difficult for the token owner to
know whether they are actually dealing with a finread-secure terminal.
misc. x9.59
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#privacy X9.59, Identify, Authenticate, Privacy
random finreads postings:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#57 Q: Internet banking
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#60 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#61 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#62 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#64 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#25 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#26 No Trusted Viewer possible?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Are client certificates really secure?
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2001 17:10:26 GMT
"Tor Rustad" writes:
The main problem with this type of autentication, is that it does not
provide intregrity of an important message (e.g. transaction). MITM can
alter the message without being detected.
An other thing with symmetric key systems, is risk management in the case
one secret is broken/known, its important that not the whole system breaks
down by this. Such systems can be build, and in real life we have POS and
ATM security which uses mainly symmertric key cryptography. These real-life
systems take care of both autentication and integrity, and in some cases
confidensiality by only using symmetric keys.
The main advantages with asymmetric key systems, is for off-line processing
and the less demand on number of keys (don't need one key per zone).
shared-secret biometric systems have similar type of problems to
shared-secret pin/password/symmetric-key systems ... with one
additional disturbing aspect; if shared-secret
pin/password/symmetric-key gets compromised, it is possible to do some
remediation and issue new pin/password/symmetric-key. Given current
state of the art, it is somewhat more difficult to issue a new
fingerprint in the case of an electronic fingerprint pattern being
compromised.
some random biometric postings
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#privacy Identification and Privacy are not Antinomies
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#stall EU digital signature initiative stalled
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#straw AADS Strawman
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech4 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech5 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech12 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss2 Common misconceptions, was Re: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-00.txt))
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss9 KISS for PKIX .... password/digital signature
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock2 revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#bioinfo1 QC Bio-info leak?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#biosigs biometrics and electronic signatures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#biosigs2 biometrics and electronic signatures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#passwords Passwords don't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#x959risk3 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay4.htm#nyesig e-signatures in NY
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#cacr7 7th CACR Information Security Workshop
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#157 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#160 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#165 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#166 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#168 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#170 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#172 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#189 Internet Credit Card Security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#235 Attacks on a PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#57 RealNames hacked. Firewall issues.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#60 RealNames hacked. Firewall issues.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#1 Why trust root CAs ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#4 Why trust root CAs ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#7 Why trust root CAs ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#30 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#39 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#42 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#60 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#11 FREE X.509 Certificates
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#38 distributed authentication
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#7 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#25 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#36 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#44 Does "Strong Security" Mean Anything?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#52 Are client certificates really secure?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2001 19:34:01 GMT
Eric Smith <eric-no-spam-for-me@brouhaha.com> writes:
From personal conversations with some of the engineers and managers
involved, it is definitely the case that some of the company thought
that the 432 was either not going to succeed, or not going to be
competitive at the low-end to midrange market, and those people expected
the 8086 to fill that market. Others thought that the 432 would
succeed, but that it would take a while, and they needed to stay
competitive until the 432 displaced things, so they viewed the 8086 as
a stopgap measure.
a late '70s? sigops at asilomar there was talk on 432 ... big
unresolved issue was how to apply fixes ... the "code/algorithms/ideas"
that had been sunk into silicon was significant ... as were the
associated bugs that were being found. unresolved 432 issue was how
to fix silicon (software downloads didn't work) ...
random past 432 threads
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#57 iAPX-432 (was: 36 to 32 bit transition
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#62 iAPX-432 (was: 36 to 32 bit transition
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#6 Ridiculous
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#48 Famous Machines and Software that didn't
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#36 What was object oriented in iAPX432?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 14:17:05 GMT
jmfbahciv writes:
There is something you've overlooked. Take a look at any TOPS-10
SMP implementation; it will be version 7.nn. Actually take
a look at any PDP-10 implementation especially TOPS-10 or
TOPS-20. They knew how to take prioritized interrupts, do
the minimal necessary and be ready for the next one.
There was a trade-off in CP/67 and the revision of the "CP" kernel for
VM/370. In CP/67, it would handle I/O interrupt up-thru "channel
level" processing (i.e. things specific to channel level operation,
i/o operations tended to be viewed as hierarchy: channel, control
unit, device) and then flag things clear and be ready for next
interrupt (and/or another processor could do some things). In VM/370,
processing went thru until device-level processing was complete
... there were some increased CPU pathlength overhead issues in CP/67
allowing the earlier processing (namely the processing emboddied in
the "CHFREE" macro ... aka channel free ... which disappeared in
VM/370).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: hot chips and nuclear reactors
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 18:14:12 GMT
cruff@ucar.edu (Craig Ruff) writes:
I have no direct experience with the Cray 2 systems, but our Cray 1,
Cray X-MP, Cray Y-MP and Cray C90 systems all used chiled water to
cool the systems indirectly via a heat exchanger to a chilled freon
loop.
the large 370s, 308x, 3090, etc used closed (distilled) water inner loop
with heat exchange to external chilled water cooler.
there was a thermal sensor on the inner loop ... however, at one
customer they lost flow on the external chilled water side ... and by
the time the (internal) thermal sensor was tripped ... there was enuf
latent heat and so little reserve capacity in the inner loop that the
machine fried.
Subsequently, flow sensors on the external chilled water side were
installed.
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#36
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#37
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#38
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main,comp.lang.cobol,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2001 18:31:55 GMT
James Johnson writes:
Pure MIPs have never really been the basis for deciding if it is a mainframe. A
good interpretation would be a fair amount of processing power combined with a
hugely large I/O, or in another words, its moves a lot!!!!!!!!!! of bits.
Supercomputers far outstrip mainframes as far as computational power in
calculation intensive operations, but they don't have the I/O bandwith of a
business mainframe.
actually a lot of "cluster" supercomputers started to significantly
exceed mainframe i/o capacity by the early '90s ... however they
tended to be configured for enormous amounts of disk sequential
transfer as well as enormous amounts of low-latency inter-processor
communication (i.e. in some cases tens of giga-byte channels, not
giga-bit; large numbers 32+8 disk arrays using 10mbyte/sec disks for
individual 320mbyte/sec data transfers, etc).
part of related discussion in this n.g. 18monts ago
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#38
also part of the reason that some of the DB2 people claimed that what
my wife and I had done with fiber-channel cluster scale-up and
distributed lock manager was possibly five years ahead of where they
were at.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#13 SSA
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#15 tcp/ip
but notice that nothing prevented them for being configured with lots
of disks for individual transaction processing as opposed to parallel
sequential processing ... in fact, lots of mainframes now have adopted
such installations (i.e. configured with lots of small disks in
various kinds of mirroring &/or raid configurations ... something
picked up from this other market segment).
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#41 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#43 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#52 misc loosely-coupled, sysplex, cluster, supercomputer, & electronic commerce
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#16 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#23 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#43 Disaster Stories Needed
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#45 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Is VeriSign lying???
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 04:39:13 GMT
Bernd Eckenfels writes:
This depends on the level of verification they offer. In case of Class 1
Certificates (or "Free" or "E-Mail based" or however you call it), all it
takes is a reply-able E-Mail address. Since most other certificates which
have a paper baes process are not more secure (I dont think a american or
south africa based company is able to verifiy the exisitence of a german
company by receiving some faxes), I think the process with the E-Mail or a
Web of Trust is good enough mor most purpose. As a comapny doing serious
business wth SSL you have to send the Fingerprint to your custoemrs anyway.
typically it means that for the type of information in the certificate
... they have checked with the authoritative agency(s) for that
particular type of information ... and then effectively certify that
the information in the certificate passed that particular agency
check.
for SSL domain name certificates ... it means that they checked with
the authoritative agency for domain name ownership ... the domain name
infrastructure.
note that the basic justification for SSL domain name certificates
boils down to integrity questions regarding the domain name
infrastructure ... the very same infrastructure that is the
authoritative agency for domain name ownership questions (which the
certification authorities have to check with, with regard to
certifying domain name ownership).
... for what ever information that is being certified in a
certificate, the level of trust is dependent on 1) the process used to
check with the authoritative agency responsible for that information
and 2) the process used by that authoritative agency for accurately
keeping that information (aka frequently the certification authority,
certifying and manufacturing certificates ... is not the same as the
agency responsible as the final authority regarding the accuracy of
the information being certificates).
for instance, identity theft where valid driver licenses and other
documents are obtained ... undermines the ability in what a
certificate authority can do in the certification process where
"identity" is certified (aka traditional x.509 certificates are
nominally couched in terms of identity certificates). that is totally
aside from the issue of identity certificates representing a
significant privacy problem.
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#privacy
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: hot chips and nuclear reactors
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 13:56:09 GMT
"del cecchi" writes:
The TCM was the Thermal Conduction Module in which aluminum pistons
contacted the chips which were mounted face down flip chip to a
multilayer ceramic substrate. It was developed as a replacement for the
LEM Liquid Encapsulated Module in which the module was filled with a
coolant fluid. The LEM proved to not be reliable.
a quick query on alta-vista yields
http://laws.lp.findlaw.com/getcase/3rd/case/940801p.html
http://www.chips.ibm.com/micronews/vol6_no1/wargo.html
http://www.mcs.vuw.ac.nz/comp/Courses/473/1997/Lect3/sld010.htm
http://searchpdf.adobe.com/proxies/2/42/32/76.html
http://ecs.electrochem.org/sc/pack.html
http://domino.int-evry.fr/IntranetDSI/EuroFret/ibm3090.htm
http://www.fr.com/publis/antitrustcom.html
the first ref is legal case about TCM introduction in 3081s impacting
some after-market business (contains summary of gov. anti-trust case
against ibm).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2001 17:14:44 GMT
mirian@trantor.cosmic.com (Mirian Crzig Lennox) writes:
None of those instructions is MP-atomic per se. What I think you may be
referring to is the LOCK prefix. It's a kludge from a hardware design
standpoint, because the x86 was not really architected with MP in mind,
and the LOCK prefix (which came about as late as the 486, IIRC), just
engages an external mechanism not actually specified in the x86
architecture. Also, they make your code non-portable to 386-and-before,
which means realistically you need separate binaries for MP and non-MP.
In contrast, the VAX interlocked instructions have rigidly specified
behavior as part of the CPU architecture, which is guaranteed to work
consistenly in both UP and MP modes, and on any VAX.
as an outgrowth of the 360 test&set (TS) atomic instruction for MP
operation, Charlie invented atomic compare&swap (aka CAS are charlie's
inititals). The architecture/POP group in POK (namely Padegs & Ron
Smith) said to get it into 370 architecture, it needed to have a
non-MP programming paradigm defined for it ... giving rise to the POP
programming notes for C&S operation in non-MP world (serializing
multi-threaded, not necessarily MP, applications).
370 also had some privileged instructions that were also defined for
serialized operation in MP environment ... namely PTLB, IPTE, ISTE, &
ISTO (for managing virtual memory tables). When 370m165 engineers said
that it would take an extra six months to design/build support for
IPTE, ISTE, & ISTO for virtual memory hardware retro-fit to 165, all
but PTLB was dropped.
PTLB - purge table lookaside buffer (on all processors)
IPTE - invalidate page table entry (and any associated TLB entries)
ISTE - invalidate segment table entry (and any associate TLB entries)
ISTO - invalidate segment table (origin) (and any associate TLB entries)
later for the 3033, the IPTE selective invalidate was (re-)introduced.
for aix (rios/power, non-mp & power/pc) defined a C&S macro for
uniprocessor operation was defined ... however, this just generated an
svc interrupt and executed some "disabled" code in the FLIH that
simulated a C&S instruction. This was to support non-kernal,
multi-threaded application serizlization operation (i.e. the original
stuff that was done in cambridge for the POP programming notes to get
C&S accepted for 370).
misc ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#smp
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#0 360/67, was Re: IBM's Project F/S ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#14 S/360 addressing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#28 370 ECPS VM microcode assist
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#70 Series/1 as NCP (was: Re: System/1 ?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#204 Core (word usage) was anti-equipment etc.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#16 360/370 instruction cycle time
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#32 Multitasking and resource sharing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#63 Are the L1 and L2 caches flushed on a page fault ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#64 Are the L1 and L2 caches flushed on a page fault ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#37 John Mashey's greatest hits
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#7 LINUS for S/390
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#87 "Bootstrap"
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#42 IBM was/is: Imitation...
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#73 CS instruction, when introducted ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#41 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#61 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#69 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#70 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#73 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#74 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#75 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#76 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#4 Extended memory error recovery
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#8 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#9 Test and Set (TS) vs Compare and Swap (CS)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#17 IBM 9020 FAA/ATC Systems from 1960's
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#2 Most complex instructions (was Re: IBM 9020 FAA/ATC Systems from 1960's)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#34 IBM OS Timeline?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms
Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2001 14:54:21 GMT
jeffreyb@gwu.edu (Jeffrey Boulier) writes:
HP does, or did resell Stratus' fault tolerant boxes, which probably
explains the confusion. Stratus had moved from the i860 to the PA-RISC. It
sells their own HP-UX systems, along with their proprietary VOS (which has
some similarities to Multics), FTX, a fault tolerant Unix (well, it used
to sell them; I think FTX is now dead), and lately Windows NT/2000
systems.
wasn't HP also trying to sell sequoia ft in the early '90s. ibm was
marketing s/88 during this period ... a logo'ed stratus.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 19:37:40 GMT
"Bill Todd" writes:
But they don't in general offer the same level of reliability, because
they don't guard against undetected hardware faults that allow a node to
continue running but produce incorrect results. The Stratus and Tandem
approaches, which compare the results generated by replicated hardware
before allowing them to become externally visible, do protect against such
faults.
however, at the time we were doing ha/cmp and talking to the people at
1-800 number system, stratus (& s/88) boxes still required scheduled
system downtime for system maint. ... and the 1-800 number system is
spec'ed at 5-nines availability (which stratus/s/88 couldn't meet
... one system maint. period exceeded several years allowed
downtime).
the status/s/88 approach was then to cluster (i.e. two) the machines
... but then there was essentially no measurable availability
difference between a stratus cluster & a ha/cmp cluster ... but there
was significant cost difference.
misc. ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#20 Is Al Gore The Father of the Internet?^
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#69 TSS ancient history, was X86 ultimate CISC? designs)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#56 Need explaination of PKI and Kerberos
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#48 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#49 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms
Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 19:31:17 GMT
jeffreyb@gwu.edu (Jeffrey Boulier) writes:
Forgot about the s/88. I've heard about them, but know next to nothing.
What operating system did they run?
it was a straight stratus system that had been logo'ed by ibm and called the s/88.
i believe there were some issues with stratus (& other) salesmen
competing with ibm salesman for the same customers with essentially
the same machine ... and then whether it was a "stratus" machine that
went in or a "s/88" machine that went in and which salesmen got
credit.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 19:44:23 GMT
Terje Mathisen writes:
Not only was LOCK part of the original x86 architecture, the XCHG
reg,[mem] opcode was specified to have an implied LOCK prefix, i.e.
there was no way to use that opcode in a non-atomic manner, even on cpus
that didn't support SMP.
It could still be useful in a system which had DMA or some other form of
assymetric MP.
note that one of the uses of the atomic compare&swap work (from the
late '60s and early '70s resulting in CAS going into system/370) was
to support multi-threaded, pre-emptable application code (i.e. enabled
for interrupts, non-kernal, etc). the MP barrier semantics from the
'60s (and earlier?) with test & set type instruction had non-atomic
type operations (set barrier, do whatever, clear barrier) which
implied non-pre-emptable execution (unless you were very, very, very
careful).
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#smp
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2001 03:50:15 GMT
"Bill Todd" writes:
Triple-modular redundancy ('TMR' - the Tandem 'Integrity' platform approach,
which is operationally similar to the 'pair and spare' quad-redundant
approach used by Stratus) really has little in common with VMS clustering,
HSC or otherwise.
I think that as early as the mid-80s there was something about 90-95+
percent of system outages had nothing at all to do with hardware
failures ... aka non-FT hardware (except maybe in the PC market) was
becoming significantly more robust (fault tolerant?).
issues were becoming things like scheduled downtime, software
failures, operator mistakes, disaster&geographic survivability (terms
we had coined when we were doing ha/cmp).
misc. ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
and
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#71 High Availability on S/390
to repeat a quote from the above ... one of the large financial settlement
infrastructures credited the two primary things contributing to them having
100 percent availability for the last six years were
1) ims hot standby
2) automated operator
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2001 04:12:46 GMT
Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
1) ims hot standby
2) automated operator
that should have been automated operator (contributing significantly
to 100 percent availability for the previous six years) ... but in
general, implies automated operations.
from past threads ... & slightly related ... that batch paradigm
derived platforms and interactive/online paradigm derived platforms
tend to have some amount of different perspective.
interactive/online paradigm derived platforms frequently assume that
the computer/program/application is interacting with a human and
involve implementations based on that assumption.
batch paradigm derived platforms tend to not assume that humans are
involved and also tend to have evolved much more sophisticated
infrastructure for automagically dealing with exceptions and
anomolies.
I remember trying to deploy some production web-oriented platforms in
the '95/'96 time-frame and having to deal with little things like when
space was exausted standard svid unix sort (i.e. interactive paradigm
derived platform) just continued with output of (truncated) data that
it was able to process. there was no obvious programming paradigm to
automagically recognized and recover from filespace full scenerio
(that is frequently part of many mainframe production operations).
ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#27 Mainframes & Unix
some disk engineering related refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#disk
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#197 Computing As She Really Is. Was: Re: Life-Advancing Work of Timothy Berners-Lee
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#83 Ux's good points.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#44 WHAT IS A MAINFRAME???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#43 Life as a programmer--1960, 1965?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#70 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2001 14:44:42 GMT
"Stephen Fuld" writes:
Jim Gray, when he was at Tandem, did a study on the causes of downtime. HW
failure was way down the list. I don't know if the paper is online
anywhere, but I think I have a paper copy I can try to dig out if people are
interested.
totally random refs:
http://www.hdcc.cs.cmu.edu/may01/schedule.html Second High Dependability Computing Consortium Workship
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#5 New IBM history book out
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#6 New IBM history book out
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#7 New IBM history book out
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#31 Title Inflation
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Minimalist design (was Re: Parity - why even or odd)
Newsgroups: comp.arch,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 14:42:11 GMT
Konrad Schwarz writes:
Are the 370 Principles of Operation still available on the net?
(I know this has been discussed before...but I can't find
it via IBM's search or via Google.)
now "390" pop ...
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com:80/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9AR004/CCONTENTS
appendix has differences:
D.0 Appendix D. Comparison between ESA/370 and ESA/390
D.1 New Facilities in ESA/390
D.1.1 Access-List-Controlled Protection
D.1.2 Branch and Set Authority
D.1.3 Called-Space Identification
D.1.4 Checksum
D.1.5 Compare and Move Extended
D.1.6 Concurrent Sense
D.1.7 Immediate and Relative Instruction
D.1.8 Move-Page Facility 2
D.1.9 PER 2
D.1.10 Perform Locked Operation
D.1.11 Set Address Space Control Fast
D.1.12 Square Root
D.1.13 Storage-Protection Override
D.1.14 String Instruction
D.1.15 Subspace Group
D.1.16 Suppression on Protection
D.2 Comparison of Facilities
E.0 Appendix E. Comparison between 370-XA and ESA/370
E.1 New Facilities in ESA/370
E.1.1 Access Registers
E.1.2 Compare until Substring Equal
E.1.3 Home Address Space
E.1.4 Linkage Stack
E.1.5 Load and Store Using Real Address
E.1.6 Move Page Facility 1
E.1.7 Move with Source or Destination Key
E.1.8 Private Space
E.2 Comparison of Facilities
E.3 Summary of Changes
E.3.1 New Instructions Provided
E.3.2 Comparison of PSW Formats
E.3.3 New Control-Register Assignments
E.3.4 New Assigned Storage Locations
E.3.5 New Exceptions
E.3.6 Change to Secondary-Space Mode
E.3.7 Changes to ASN-Second-Table Entry and ASN Translation
E.3.8 Changes to Entry-Table Entry and PC-Number Translation
E.3.9 Changes to PROGRAM CALL
E.3.10 Changes to SET ADDRESS SPACE CONTROL
E.4 Effects in New Translation Modes
E.4.1 Effects on Interlocks for Virtual-Storage References
E.4.2 Effect on INSERT ADDRESS SPACE CONTROL
E.4.3 Effect on LOAD REAL ADDRESS
E.4.4 Effect on TEST PENDING INTERRUPTION
E.4.5 Effect on TEST PROTECTION
F.0 Appendix F. Comparison between System/370 and 370-XA
F.1 New Facilities in 370-XA
F.1.1 Bimodal Addressing
F.1.2 31-Bit Logical Addressing
F.1.3 31-Bit Real and Absolute Addressing
F.1.4 Page Protection
F.1.5 Tracing
F.1.6 Incorrect-Length-Indication Suppression
F.1.7 Status Verification
F.2 Comparison of Facilities
F.3 Summary of Changes
F.3.1 Changes in Instructions Provided
F.3.2 Input/Output Comparison
F.3.3 Comparison of PSW Formats
F.3.4 Changes in Control-Register Assignments
F.3.5 Changes in Assigned Storage Locations
F.3.6 Changes to SIGNAL PROCESSOR
F.3.7 Machine-Check Changes
F.3.8 Changes to Addressing Wraparound
F.3.9 Changes to LOAD REAL ADDRESS
F.3.10 Changes to 31-Bit Real Operand Addresses
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 17:00:33 GMT
hack@watson.ibm.com (hack) writes:
The project was stopped, unfortunately. I can imagine no-downtime software
upgrades by building a new checkpoint boot image offline (for a new AIX), and
by maintaining a compatible application checkpoint structure when rolling in
a new version of the primary application.
i once did something similar but at the application level for airline
res application .. i.e. prebuilt a large part of the image AND also
did rolling cluster cut-over (one of the ten "impossible" things that
was suppose to be addressed was existing several hour cut-over time).
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#29 Mainframes & Unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#31 Mainframes & Unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#136a checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#153 Uptime (was Re: Q: S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#61 64 bit X86 ugliness (Re: Williamette trace cache (Re: First view of Willamette))
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#20 Competitors to SABRE?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#69 Block oriented I/O over IP
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#74 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
Newsgroups: comp.arch,comp.sys.dec,comp.os.vms,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 18:25:25 GMT
Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
1) ims hot standby
2) automated operator
common term (at least in mainframe) has been RAS ... reliability,
availability, and serviceability. As RAS of core technology has
significantly improved over the last 30-40 years ... attention to
outages has shifted to monitoring, service level aggreements,
geographic disaster survivability (i.e. replicated clustering at
geographic distances) and people mistakes (aka automated operator &
operations).
in the area of monitoring & SLAs ... all errors and outages are
actually monitored in detail, (industry) reports generated, and
contracts based on such features are standard.
One indication of whether something is interesting technology RAS
feature and/or really part of nuts & bolts business is whether there
is industry-wide monitoring and reports of RAS information (as well as
people paying serious attention to the reports).
One example I know about involved some software I wrote once. One of
the new mainframes had been out for a year ... and there is this
industry wide service that gathers from customers the RAS/(LOGREC)
files and publishes reports. For this new mainframe they expected that
there would be something like 3-5 total errors of a particular kind
across all machines for all customers over a period of a year. The
industry reports showed that there was in fact a total of 15 errors of
this particular kind across all machines for all customers for a
period of a year (not per machine & not per customer ... all
machines at all customers).
Turns out that sometime in the past I had written some software
simulation support for doing "channel I/O extension" of mainframe I/O
over telco links. When certain types of uncorrected telco transmission
errors occured, the software simulation would emulate this particular
kind of error. They were able to track down some customers that were
running channel I/O extension software and account for the extra 10-12
errors that had shown up in the industry reports. Also, the software
simulation code was changed to report a different kind of emulated
error condition.
random ras references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#7 Why Do Mainframes Exist ???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#8 Why Do Mainframes Exist ???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#16 middle layer
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#18 IBM 4381 (finger-check)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#27 Mainframes & Unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#28 Mainframes & Unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#33 Mainframes & Unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/97.html#14 Galaxies
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#23 Fear of Multiprocessing?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#16 Old Computers
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#34 why is there an "@" key?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#38 1968 release of APL\360 wanted
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#87 1401 Wordmark?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#145 Q: S/390 on PowerPC?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#155 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#184 Clustering systems
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#207 Life-Advancing Work of Timothy Berners-Lee
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#64 distributed locking patents
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#83 Ux's good points.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#77 write rings
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#58 360 Architecture, Multics, ... was (Re: X86 ultimate CISC? No.)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#15 360/370 instruction cycle time
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#16 360/370 instruction cycle time
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#27 Could CDR-coding be on the way back?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#22 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#26 Disk caching and file systems. Disk history...people forget
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#33 Where do the filesystem and RAID system belong?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#41 Where do the filesystem and RAID system belong?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#42 Where do the filesystem and RAID system belong?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#19 FW: History Lesson
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#20 HELP
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#25 what is interrupt mask register?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#46 anyone have digital certificates sample code
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#41 Where are IBM z390 SPECint2000 results?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#15 Medical data confidentiality on network comms
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#4 Extended memory error recovery
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#44 The Alpha/IA64 Hybrid
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#45 Did AT&T offer Unix to Digital Equipment in the 70s?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#46 The Alpha/IA64 Hybrid
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#52 Compaq kills Alpha
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#63 Blinkenlights
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#41 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#43 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#52 misc loosely-coupled, sysplex, cluster, supercomputer, & electronic commerce
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#16 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#23 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#43 Disaster Stories Needed
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#45 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#5 OT - Internet Explorer V6.0
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#13 HP-UX will not be ported to Alpha (no surprise)exit
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 17 Sep 2001 20:08:06 GMT
schaef@io.com (MSCHAEF.COM) writes:
as it apparantly did. For two largely one-product companies they apparantly didn't
think through their approach to Windows very well. Some form of Windows contingancy
plan would have been nice, especially considering the money they were both sinking
into Unix, Macintosh, NeXTStep, etc.
not to mention efforts going into SAA mainframe version(s).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: OT: almost lost LBJ tapes; Dictabelt
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 14:24:28 GMT
jcmorris@mitre.org (Joe Morris) writes:
One of the points that we stressed to budding speakers was that handouts
are almost always a Good Thing, and one of the reasons for that is exactly
what your lecturer recognized: if the listener already has in hand printed
material that contains the structure of the presentation as well as all of
the critical information (including equations, tabular data, and the like),
then the audience can actually think about what is being said and needs
to write only brief notes to flesh out what's printed. (Of course, this
assumes that the handouts are available before the presentation begins.
The value is far less if they are handed out only at the end of the
session.)
I once did a Performance History presentation at European Share; SEAS,
held that year on the isle of Jersey ... misc. ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#4
I had about about 30 overheads/handouts for a one hr talk; relatively
sparse ... not like some of boyd's
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#boyd
at the end of the hr, i had finished 2-3 overheads ... so they
scheduled a room right off the ballroom for BOF (birds of feather) to
finish the talk. The evening ballroom was typically where SCIDS
(society for continuous inebriation during share) was held (part of
the reason for SCIDS function dated from TJW when alcohol wasn't a
permitted corporate activity, and you couldn't turn in travel expenses
for alcohol ... so the SCIDS event was open bar covered under the
general SHARE registration fee). Anyway, the talk lasted from 6pm to
12pm ... with several intermissions for periodic refreshments out in
the main ballfoom (which i thot contributed to the general quality of
the talk).
one of my first share presentations (done while an undergraduate)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#18
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: OT: almost lost LBJ tapes; Dictabelt
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 03:02:00 GMT
Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
I once did a Performance History presentation at European Share; SEAS,
held that year on the isle of Jersey ... misc. ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#4
same month i gave presentation in Raleigh to the SNA architecture review
board (ARB) about a project we were working on to replace 37xx & NCP
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#21
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#31
just about anyway you sliced it, it was significantly better
System verses 3725NCP System:
Higher availability
More reliable
More function
Improved Useability
Non-IBM Host Support
Much better connectivity
Much better performance
Fewer components
Easier to tune
Easier to tailor
Easier to manage
Less expensive
course as previously noted, I've also been blamed for originating the
ibm pcm control unit business (which may have provided some of the
motivation for the original 3705/ncp design).
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#360pcm
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#networking
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: ESCON Channel Limits
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2001 19:32:29 GMT
JO.Skip.Robinson@SCE.COM (Skip Robinson) writes:
The main problem seems to be the synchronous nature of ESCON protocol. Only
one I/O to a control unit can be active on an ESCON CHPID at one time. If
CHPID activity is delayed because of distance--that old speed of light
thing--the next I/O is held up until a response is received from the
previous one. This makes the CHPID look 100% busy even though the actual
data flowing across it is only a tiny fraction of 'native' capacity.
FICON protocol on the other hand is asynchronous, allowing multiple I/Os to
flow down the pike concurrently. Hence the response time for each I/O
should not take such a toll on throughput. This is still conjectural on our
part.
there was a lot of heat & churn in 90/91 time-frame in the FCS
standards process ... which might be described as trying to define a
half-duplex ESCON emulation for fiber channel.
misc. fcs standard ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#56
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#59
misc. other FCS reference:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#13
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#5
doing asynchronous channel extension runs into some misc. issues. I had
written software support for asynchronous channel extension in 1981 (20
years ago) ... which allowed STL to remote a couple hundred people in
the IMS support group. there was actually more of a problem with
speed-matching and collisions ... trying to tunnel channels thru telco
T1/1.544mbit/sec link ... which became severely aggravated by allowing
a large number of simulataneous asynchronous channel operations (needed
to add smarts about collision management & recovery). fiber channel
should be much less of a challenge (since the physical bandwidth is
significantly larger rather than significantly smaller).
recent reference to that support:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#18
other recent hsdt ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#21
random refs to HSDT:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hsdt
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: more old RFCs
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2001 16:16:52 GMT
there is a activity for paople to manually generate softcopy from old
RFCs that currently only exist in paper form ... appended iis list of
the latest that went up today.
The RFC-Online Project:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc-online.html
RFC Editor pointer
http://www.rfc-editor.org/
Pointer to various RFC indexing (including pointer to mine)
http://www.rfc-editor.org/repositories.html
& of course my page
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
0033 New Host-Host Protocol. S.D. Crocker. Feb-12-1970. (Format:
TXT=44167 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC0011) (Updated by RFC0036, RFC0047)
0114 File Transfer Protocol. A.K. Bhushan. Apr-10-1971. (Format:
TXT=38981 bytes) (Updated by RFC0133, RFC0141, RFC0171, RFC0172)
0136 Host accounting and administrative procedures. R.E. Kahn.
Apr-29-1971. (Format: TXT=8016 bytes)
0153 SRI ARC-NIC status. J.T. Melvin, R.W. Watson. May-15-1971.
(Format: TXT=8573 bytes)
0157 Invitation to the Second Symposium on Problems in the
Optimization of Data Communications Systems. V.G. Cerf. May-12-1971.
(Format: TXT=3159 bytes)
0203 Achieving reliable communication. R.B. Kalin. Aug-10-1971.
(Format: TXT=9253 bytes)
0209 Host/IMP interface documentation. B. Cosell. Aug-13-1971.
(Format: TXT=2566 bytes)
0221 Mail Box Protocol: Version 2. R.W. Watson. Aug-27-1971. (Format:
TXT=9805 bytes) (Obsoletes RFC0196) (Obsoleted by RFC0278) (Status:
UNKNOWN)
0381 Three aids to improved network operation. J.M. McQuillan.
Jul-26-1972. (Format: TXT=9305 bytes) (Updated by RFC0394) (Status:
UNKNOWN)
0467 Proposed change to Host-Host Protocol: Resynchronization of
connection status. J.D. Burchfiel, R.S. Tomlinson. Feb-20-1973.
(Format: TXT=14325 bytes) (Updated by RFC0492)
0477 Remote Job Service at UCSB. M. Krilanovich. May-23-1973. (Format:
TXT=40535 bytes)
0518 ARPANET accounts. N. Vaughan, E.J. Feinler. Jun-19-1973. (Format:
TXT=12880 bytes)
0529 Note on protocol synch sequences. A.M. McKenzie, R. Thomas, R.S.
Tomlinson, K.T. Pogran. Jun-29-1973. (Format: TXT=9068 bytes)
0534 Lost message detection. D.C. Walden. Jul-17-1973. (Format:
TXT=3227 bytes)
0537 Announcement of NGG meeting July 16-17. S. Bunch. Jun-27-1973.
(Format: TXT=2695 bytes)
0563 Comments on the RCTE Telnet option. J. Davidson. Aug-28-1973.
(Format: TXT=10788 bytes)
0565 Storing network survey data at the datacomputer. D. Cantor.
Aug-28-1973. (Format: TXT=9307 bytes)
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2001 02:51:22 GMT
Richard Drushel writes:
In 1994, when it seemed that everyone in our ADAM community
wanted to have a hard drive system or an ADAMnet floppy drive bigger
than the original 160K, yet balked at paying $150-300 to the last
remaining ADAM hardware vendor, I had an idea:
Everybody was dumping XTs and ATs for 486s and early Pentiums.
Even the lowly XTs had a 20MB hard drive, 360K floppy, and serial/parallel
porst. There were plenty of ADAM serial boards around, both new and
used, for $35 or less. Why not create a serial link between an ADAM
and a PC, and let the ADAM use the PC hardware? The PC runs a server
and listens for I/O requests. The ADAM EOS operating system is patched
to reroute I/O requests for ADAMnet devices to the server. So long as
the EOS function calls are handled properly (i.e., correct error codes,
exit flags, updated internal data structures), the user application
will never care that it's not talking to a genuine ADAMnet device.
Voila, instant ADAM serial ports, parallel ports, floppy and hard drives,
plus maybe even (some day) access to the PC graphics screen, real-time
clock, etc. All using PC hardware you already had and were going to
junk...just the price of a serial cable, null modem, and ADAM serial
board if you didn't have one already. I called it ADAMserve.
effectively that was what cp88 did 10 years earlier ... in support of
xt/370 (i.e. the 370 card using the xt as a server using xt devices
instead of 370 devices).
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#42 bloat
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#46 Rethinking Virtual Memory
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#23 Old IBM's
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#5 IBM XT/370 and AT/370 (was Re: Computer of the century)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#29 Operating systems, guest and actual
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#75 Mainframe operating systems
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#52 Why not an IBM zSeries workstation?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#55 Why not an IBM zSeries workstation?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#69 Z/90, S/390, 370/ESA (slightly off topic)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#89 database (or b-tree) page sizes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#28 IBM's "VM for the PC" c.1984??
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#53 S/370 PC board
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#19 Very CISC Instuctions (Was: why the machine word size ...)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#20 Very CISC Instuctions (Was: why the machine word size ...)
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: signature and other stuff.
Newsgroups: gnu.emacs.gnus
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 02:13:25 GMT
paige@rcnchicago.com (Mojo B. Nichols) writes:
I have a program that produces a signature rather then a file how do I
use this instead of a signature file?
previous ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#77
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: microsoft going poof [was: HP Compaq merger, here we go again.]
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2001 20:34:34 GMT
Steve O'Hara-Smith writes:
Pick an app that you want to write, write it without a UI and just
a socket interface (or similar) and document it as a published API of the
app. Now write a UI that goes between the user and this API. You have just
done what I have been advocating, your app is now ready to have multiple
UIs and even to be integrated into other applications smoothly.
actually did something like that for routes ... ref:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#17
the standard interface was command line with something of the form
00/abc,xyz,parm="a;jfd",.../
collapsed three of the above type queries into a single transaction
and then had a couple UI front-ends.
one was command line similar to the original and just listed the
information
another was a client GUI app which would put up a map and a list of
the routes that satisfied the query. locally on the client, a person
could sort the list by departure time, arrival time, elapsed travel
time, most airline points (some people, possible on business travel,
attempted to maximize their airline miles). Highlighting a specific
flight would draw the route on the map. It also had an option to
download from the web, the latest "weather" map ... so the route was
drawn over weather patterns.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
Newsgroups: comp.lang.asm370,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 14:48:58 GMT
Jon Tveten writes:
I think I am the only "thing" here able to read punched cards. :)
--
Jon Tveten
A Norwegian in Australia
the holes in the card or printed text across the top?
when i was in school, i had a 2000 card assembler program that took
30-60 minutes to assemble and produce a TXT deck (depending on whether
i used DCB macros or used my own SIO and device drivers). I soon found
that it was frequently faster to PATCH the TXT deck by finding the
appropriate TXT card and DUP'ing it in an 026, applying the changes by
using multi-punch on the 026 (somewhat similar to C-q in emacs)
... aka the (TXT) cards punched by the 2540 didn't having any printing
across the top (and there wasn't any symbols for the most of the
punched values in any case).
random refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#15 unit record & other controllers
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#17 unit record & other controllers
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#23 MTS & LLMPS?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#53 How Do the Old Mainframes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#4 1401 overlap instructions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/97.html#21 IBM 1401's claim to fame
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#9 Old Vintage Operating Systems
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/98.html#15 S/360 operating systems geneaology
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#9 IBM S/360
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#59 Living legends
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#130 early hardware
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#79 Mainframe operating systems
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#8 finding object decks with multiple entry points
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#14 IBM Model Numbers (was: First video terminal?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#60 Text (was: Review of Steve McConnell's AFTER THE GOLD RUSH)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#22 HELP
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#27 HELP
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
Newsgroups: comp.lang.asm370,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 19:11:21 GMT
gah@ugcs.caltech.edu (glen herrmannsfeldt) writes:
I thought the way it was done was to punch additional TXT cards and
place them at the end. If a later TXT card had an address that
overlapped it would write over the already loaded data. This way
they could be easily changed without removing the original cards.
Also, many programs would supply a patch area near the end, so that
there was a place to add new instructions.
there was a "REP" card/statement that could go at the end of the deck
that could be punched in "character" hex (as opposed to "binary" hex).
the REP card argument specified displacement in the deck and the data
to be inserted/replaced. REP cards could refer to any displacement in
the deck ... a common batch process might involve replacing a 4byte
instruction with a branch & link instruction to a dummy data patch
area (frequently defined at the end of the program) with new instructions
then inserted in the patch area.
I started using the multi-punch process (and learned to read the holes
in the cards) before I ran across any documentation referring to
REP cards.
misc. REP card references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/93.html#17 unit record & other controllers
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#4 1401 overlap instructions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#14 IBM Model Numbers (was: First video terminal?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#15 IBM Model Numbers (was: First video terminal?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#17 IBM 1142 reader/punch (Re: First video terminal?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#27 HELP
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001e.html#13 High Level Language Systems was Re: computer books/authors (Re: FA:
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: HP Compaq merger, here we go again.
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 19:45:49 GMT
mschaef@eris.io.com (MSCHAEF.COM) writes:
Okay. Can you run an OpenVMS binary compiled for a VAX machine
(11/780 or whatever) on a Alpha machine running OpenVMS? I know
that IBM offered, at various times, emulation systems for running
older binaries on newer machines. Didn't they do something
like this for the System/360? Did Digital do anything similar
during the transition to Alpha?
the 360s for the most part were microcoded machines ... where native
(micro-)code running on the native engines provided support for the
360 architecture (and the different 360 processor models tended to
have different native engine architecture and different microcode).
several of the 360 models had provisions for installed (& having
installed) microcode that support earlier ibm machines like 1401,
7090/7094, etc. and a switch on the front panel that selected whether
the machine was operating in 360 personality or 1401 (7090, whatever)
personality. Not only did the binaries for eariler architectures run
the machines ran the operating system (and/or monitor) for the earlier
machines.
misc. 360 emulation refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/96.html#20 1401 series emulation still running?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#11 IBM 1460
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#10 VM: checking some myths.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#24 "Hollerith" card code to EBCDIC conversion
there were also some packages that provided (at least) 1401 simulation
on 360 ... i.e. the ability to execute a 1401 application binary
within a 360 application providing 1401 simulation.
there was a cp/67 project that also provided the reverse ... that
simulated 370 virtual machines on 360/67 running cp/67. This wasn't a
major effort since for the most part, 370 was a superset of 360 and it
required support in cp/67 kernel for simulation of the new 370
instructions. The somewhat exception was the virtual memory and
control register structure was different on 370s than it had been on
cp/67 so there was quite a bit more simulation work that had to be
done in the cp/67 kernel for that part of the 370 architecture.
one of the stories is that the full 370 simulation was running for a
year (as well as a version of cp/67 that was modified on 370 virtual
memory architecture rather than 360/67 virtual memory architecture)
before the first hardware engineering 370 relocate (virtual memory)
machine was built. So when the engineers asked for a copy of the
370'ized cp/67 as a test case to boot on the first engineering
hardware (to give some idea the level of "engineering" ... there
wasn't a boot/IPL button ... to boot/IPL machine, a knife switch was
used).
In any case, the 370'ised CP/67 was booted/ipled on the machine and
very shortly failed. After some diagnostic, it was determined that the
engineers had implemented something wrong ... so the 370'ised CP/67
was quickly patched to correspond to the incorrect hardware
implementation and testing then proceeded.
misc. "H" & "I" cp/67 refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#48 Rethinking Virtual Memory
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#33 why is there an "@" key?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#16 360/370 instruction cycle time
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
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From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: 3270 protocol
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 11:31:32 GMT
a couple days ago somebody sent me a question on 3270 protocol which I
didn't know the answer to ... but it jog'ed some memory cells that
i've been trying to remember what were the terms used for the
3272/3277 and 3274/3278/9 protocol. I have some vague recollection
that one of the terms was CUT and may refer to the 3272/3277 protocol
... but I can't remember the other term (and/or even sure CUT is one
of the terms).
does anybody remember the two terms?
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
Newsgroups: comp.lang.asm370,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 16:02:10 GMT
sarr@engin.umich.edu (Sarr J. Blumson) writes:
I thought this was pretty much routine in the early to mid 60s. I don't think
_any_ of the DTSS software ever had a clean assembly, we patched (octal in
this case) the binary and ran that way. A reassembly took a couple of hours
and you always (because you would "fix" other things you noticed) the
editing process would never converge anyway.
the standard process was to use REP cards ... I had just taken my
first programming course, a 2hr introduction to Fortran programming
class and then they gave me this summer job to port 1401 MPIO to 360
(so 360/30 could act as front end to the 709) ... that eventually
became my 2000 assembler card program ... and all i got was an
assembler manual, 360 pop manual and couple other pieces; but nothing
that documented REP cards.
I did get the machine room and all the facilities dedicated from 8am
sat. until 8am mon. (which continued in the fall for other projects,
but made it a little hard to go to mon morning class). I eventually
reverse engineered TXT cards and figured out how to repunch a binary
TXT card on a "character" keypunch (and only later got some
documentation about REP, TXT, ESD, END, RLD, etc cards).
While patch areas could be used with REP cards, I think (360) patch
areas became somewhat more common with load modules and superzap. The
TXT decks had already gone thru the linkage editor and the result was
stored on disk. superzap could read a load module, verify/replace
bytes and write out the updated load module.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Private key
Newsgroups: comp.security.misc
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 16:39:15 GMT
"Edward A. Feustel" writes:
In fact, when A and B copy "their" certificates on to their machine,
the private key comes with them. It is in an implementation dependent
addition to the X.509 certificate. Alternatively, A and B can generate
their key pair and send their public keys to a Certificate Authority
to manufacture and sign the public key certificates and return a copy
to A, B, and who ever might be holding the public key certificates
in a data base.
Ed
another simple example is PGP. Each user generates their own
public/private key pair and (effectively) their own certificate. Users
will distribute their own certificates (with their public key) to
whoever.
PGP puts the private key in the private key file that is encrypted
with password/passphrase. Public key "certificates" (both their own
and others) go into an unencrypted public key file.
A "signed" message is sent by encrypting the HASH of the message with
the person's private key and appending the signature to the message.
Recipients of the message can verify the signature if they have the
sender's public key certificate in their public key file.
An "encrypted" message can be sent if the sender has the recipient's
public key. A random secret key is generated and the message is
encrypted. The random secret key is then encrypted with the
recipient's public key and added to the message.
The recipient can decrypt the message if the random secret key has
been encrypted with their public key.
Certification Authorities (CAs) have added another layer of complexity
to this. Certification Authorities (CAs) distribute their public key
certificates to lots of people. Then CAs generate specially signed
messages called certificates that attest to the binding of some
characteristic (like a person's name or a domain name like in the case
of SSL) to a public key. They sign this special certificate/message
with their own public key.
Now rather than a sender having had to previously distributed their
prublic key "certificate" via some mechanism ... a sender can now
append their "CA" certificate to the end of each message they sign.
The recipient now validates the special "CA" appended
certificate/message with the previously distributed public key of the
CA. Once that is done, then they can take the public key in the
appended certificate/message and use it to validate the signature of
the sender.
This effectively adds one level of indirection compared to the PGP
scenerio ... instead of every sender needing to use a special
out-of-band process for the distribution of their
publickey/certificate, only the CAs are required to have a special
out-of-band process for the distribution of the CA
publickey/certificate. This also adds one level of "trust"
indirection. Certificates can also be organized into a hierarchy where
there are multiple levels of indirection (as well as multiple levels
of trust indirection).
Note however that for the transmission of encrypting messages, the
CA-based mechanism and the PGP-based mechanism is basically the same;
aka at some time previously the sender of an encrypted message must
have acquired the recipient's publickey/certificate and nominally
recorded/saved it in some local repository.
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: 3270 protocol
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 22:24:51 GMT
Don Quixote writes:
CUT and DFT? in very broad terms, the first is dumb, the second
smart.
note while the 3277 CUT was a "dumb" terminal ... in that no microcode
could be downloaded ... it was much smarter than the 3278. A lot of
the head & keybarod function that was implemented in the 3277 was
moved back into the 3274 controller for the 3278.
we had done both a keyboard mod for fast cursor (actually control the
repeat latency, plus the repeat rate for all keys). by appropriate
selection of resister you wired inside the keyboard, you selected the
rate that suited you. I had a keyboard set to the very short delay and
fastest possible repeat. It did have the shortcoming that it was
faster than the screen refresh rate ... so there was the effect of
cursor "coasting" ... you held down a cursor motion key and then had
to get use to when to let up on the key so that it would eventually
stop at the desired location.
the other modification was the addition of a keyboard FIFO that went
into the display head ... you unplugged the keyboaard from the
display, plugged in the keyboard FIFO box and then plugged in the
keyboard into the FIFO box.
the problem was that while 3270 could operate at speeds of kbytes,
tens of kbytes ... they were actually half duplex devices and had a
very unfortunate characteristic that if a screen update (from the
system, as opposed to simple keystroke copy/record) occured just as
key was being depressed ... the keyboard lost the keystroke and
"locked". You then had to hit the keyboard reset button to get it
back. for people used to full-duplex and nominal typing rate ... the
keyboard locking was a frequent and unpleasant human factor
characteristic.
one justification that was given for this characteristic was that
3270s weren't designed for interactive computing ... they were
designed for data entry, and data entry people didn't operate in
full-duplex mode (there was almost no scenerio where screen would need
updating by the system while data entry was going on).
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: A thought on passwords
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 12:20:49 GMT
"Fraser Orr" writes:
An interesting aspect of this is that, since the pass phrase
contains more digits than the ultimate password, and since
these original characters are relatively predictable, such a
system could readily correct errors the user typed before
conversion to the password itself. For example, spelling errors,
and capitalization errors. (Allowing the elimination of the
all to common caps lock password error amongst others.)
the problem with shared-secrets is that they have to be different for
every different business and/or security domain (aka you don't want
some kid at your ISP knowing your banking or stock account password).
As online environment proliferates the number of different business
and/or security domains goes up sharply ... as does the number of
different business/security domains each requiring their own
authentication process. In a shared-secret scenerio with passwords,
that means that the number of unique shared-secrets increases
dramatically also. So the problem becomes not only remembering a
specific password ... but also remembering a very large number of
different specific passwords. Attempts to improve the shared-secret
paradigm for one specific security domain ... is ignoring the
real-world that the requirement is for authentication in a large
number of different and independent business/security domains.
The most difficult task at the moment is not to improve the
characteristic of the something you know authentication requirement
(aka passwords/passphrases), but to 1) eliminate the "identity theft"
characteristic associated with shared-secret authentication schemes
and 2) replace the use of shared-secrets for authentication with some
other paradigm.
The design of password/pass-phrases as part of a something you know
authentication process is still valuable (in conjunction with two or
three factor authentication, i.e. something you know, something you
have, something you are), but it needs to be in the context of a
non-shared-secret paradigm ... aka being able to proove you know
something w/o having to divulge what it is you know ... and therefore
there is some possibility that the individual only has to remember a
very small number of password/pass-phrases instead of tens or hundreds
of them.
passwords don't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#passwords Passwords don't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#36 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#52 Are client certificates really secure?
random shared-secret refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#strawm3 AADS Strawman
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#pkikrb PKI/KRB
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech4 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech6 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#cstech8 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm3.htm#kiss8 KISS for PKIX
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm4.htm#7 Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#shock2 revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#websecure merchant web server security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm6.htm#terror [FYI] Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#votec (my) long winded observations regarding X9.59 & XML, encryption and certificates
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#mcomm (my) misc. additional comments on X9.59 issues.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay3.htm#passwords Passwords don't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#x959b X9.59 Electronic Payment standard issue
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#harvest2 shared-secrets, CC#, & harvesting CC#
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#erictalk Announce: Eric Hughes giving Stanford EE380 talk this
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay6.htm#dspki5 use of digital signatures and PKI (addenda)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#ssexploit Shared-Secret exploit
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#netbank net banking, is it safe?? ... power to the consumer
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#214 Ask about Certification-less Public Key
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#226 Attacks on a PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#228 Attacks on a PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#235 Attacks on a PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#238 Attacks on a PKI
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#39 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#53 Digital Certificates-Healthcare Setting
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#90 Question regarding authentication implementation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#92 Question regarding authentication implementation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#4 Why trust root CAs ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#5 e-commerce: Storing Credit Card numbers safely
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#33 does CA need the proof of acceptance of key binding ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#34 does CA need the proof of acceptance of key binding ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#49 Use of SET?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#30 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#34 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#39 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#40 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#41 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#42 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#54 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#60 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#25 Question about credit card number
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001f.html#31 Remove the name from credit cards!
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#5 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#7 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001h.html#58 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#9 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#16 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#25 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#35 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#36 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#57 E-commerce security????
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#0 E-commerce security????
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#2 E-commerce security????
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#9 E-commerce security????
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#49 Are client certificates really secure?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001j.html#52 Are client certificates really secure?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#1 Are client certificates really secure?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#radius Client and Radius Authentication
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#privacy X9.59, Identity, Authentication, and Privacy
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#fraud Risk, Fraud, Exploits
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Newbie TOPS-10 7.03 question
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers,ed.general
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2001 00:42:24 GMT
cbh@ieya.co.REMOVE_THIS.uk (Chris Hedley) writes:
I believe that the product that really was written in every conceivable
language was AllInOne (or All-In-Bits as it was more commonly known), DEC's
answer to Uniplex (on UNIX) and PROFS (on IBM mainframes)
PROFS had some amount of internal politics. The core of PROFS was an
early 0.x version of an internal email application called VMSG, an
assembler-based application written by a programmer in the UK and
freely distributed internally with source. After the co-op of an early
deverlopment version by the PROFS group, the source distribution was
restricted to two people by the author (me and one other person).
A later dispute about whether the core of PROFS was really an early
semi-functional, development version of VMSG was resolved by pointing
at that every PROFS message in the world had the VMSG author's
initials (HSL) tagged in an (not normally displayed) header control
field.
He was a very prolific programmer. One of his other applications that
saw wide internal use was Parasite & Story ... basically a virtual
terminal scripting application ... it allowed that anybody could run a
(3270) terminal emulation to nearly any system on the internal network
(ala telnet) with extensive scripting that including sophisticated
output string matching and conditional programming (in some sense a
precursor to some the later PC-based "screen-scraping" applications).
from some dark archive (REX was the early, internal name for what is now
called REXX) ... comment header from story assemble:
• Generating the module :-
*
• GLOBAL MACLIB HSLMAC CMSLIB
• HASM STORY ( NOPRINT
• LOAD STORY ( CLEAR ORIGIN TRANS
• GEN STORY MODULE A2 ( SYSTEM
*
• This program runs as a "pre-processor" in conjunction with
• PARASITE. It is invoked by adding "X=STORY" to the PARASITE
• command. i.e.
*
• PARASITE name X=STORY
*
• The Story progamme looks for a file with the attributes of
*
• "name STORY "
*
• This implies that "name" should NOT contain none alphameric
• characters. I can however contain an imbedded ".", this causes
• The story program to use the characters up to but not
• including the "." as the file name of the story file. This
• allows one story file to be used by several differant names at
• the same time. e.g.
*
• PARASITE H5.one X=STORY
*
• Will use a story file "H5 STORY " but will assign the name of
• "H5.one" to the port.
*
• REX variables can be used in the STORY's ( but cannot be set )
• they must be prefixed by "&". They may be used where ever a
• "string" is used.
• A reserved REX variable name "@STORY" can be used to force a
• particular story to run regardles of the name used on the
• PARASITE command.
*
• The file sould contain statements corresponding to the following
• formats.
*
*
EJECT
*
*
• Statements :-
*
• label ID < ON | OFF | RESPONSE | 'string' >
*
• Defines the character string displayed in the ID field
• If no "string" then the id reverts to whatever the user
• specified with the "ID=" command. The string is limited
• to 8 characters.
*
• Id1 ID '(.wait.)'
*
*
• label IF token test token statement
*
• token can be a REX variable, a 'string' or ID
• ( ID is the current ID value )
• test can be = or ^=
• statement can be any valid STORY statement
*
• label If &REXVAR = 'WINVMC' Goto RLSS
*
*
• label ITEM < SBA=xxxx > < 'string' > < SBA=xxxx > .....
*
• Defines a data item to be used in a test or to be
• sent to the port
*
• Item ITEM SBA=5B60 'LOGON MYID'
*
*
• label WAIT < INDEFINITELY | < < UNTIL | WHILE > item > >
*
• Will cause the story to wait for the next block
• of data, or until a block of data matches the
• specifed data item ( item may be the label of
• an ITEM statement or "'string'" )
*
• Wait WAIT UNTIL 'VM READ'
*
*
• label SEND aid < cursor < item < item ..... > > >
*
• Will send the specifed aid ( ENTER, PF1 .. PF24 )
• along with the cursor address ( 4 hex characters )
• and specifed data item ( item may be the label of
• an ITEM statement or "'string'" )
*
• Enter SEND ENTER 5B60 Item
*
EJECT
*
• label GOTO label
*
• Go to the specifed label.
*
• GOTO Loop
*
*
• label WHEN < item < statement > >
*
• When the recieved data matches the specified
• data item then execute the statement.
*
• Loop WHEN 'VM READ' SEND ENTER 5B60
*
• label WHEN EVER( CASE name ) < item < statement > >
*
• This sets up a condition statement that is similar
• to a PL/I "ON" condition I.E. when ever that test
• is satisfied the "statement" will be executed.
• "name" is any non-blank string used to identify
• the "EVER" clause ( another WHEN EVER statement
• with the same name will replace the current one )
*
• Loop WHEN EVER( CASE one ) 'MORE...' SEND CLEAR
*
*
EJECT
*
• Sample story files:-
*
• Sample 1 - Automatic logon of a userid
*
• ID '< wait >'
• Wait Until 'VM/370'
• Send CLEAR
• Wait Until 'CP READ'
• When ever( case ScrFull ) 'MORE...' Send CLEAR
• Login Send ENTER 5B60 SBA=5B60 'LOGIN userid Q'
• ID '< Pswd >'
• User will have to type in the password
• What When 'VM READ' Goto Enter
• When 'RECONNECT' Goto Begin
• When 'ALREADY LOGGED ON' Goto Logoff
• When 'PASSWORD INCORRECT' Goto Login
• Wait
• Goto What
• The ID is logged on elsewhere
• Logoff Send ENTER 5B60 SBA=5B60 'LOGOFF'
• Stop
• The ID has been reconnected
• Begin Send ENTER 5B60 SBA=5B60 'BEGIN'
• Stop
• The ID has been logged on
• Enter ID '< wait >'
• Send ENTER 5B60
• Wait Until 'R;'
• Stop
*
EJECT
*
• Sample 2
*
*
• Collect VM LOGO's from the PVM network
• Rex variable "@NODE" contains the target node name
*
• ID Off
• Wait Until 'VM/370'
• Send CLEAR
• Wait Until 'CP READ'
• Send ENTER _ SBA=_ 'DIAL VMNET'
• Wait Until 'APPLICATION ID'
• Send ENTER D5C6 SBA=D5C6 'KGVM3'
• Now on the main Kingston PVM node
• Wait Until 'VM/370'
• Send CLEAR
• Wait Until 'CP READ'
• Send ENTER _ SBA=_ 'DIAL PVM'
• Wait Until 'Pass-Through'
• Send ENTER 5D4A SBA=5DC5 &@NODE
• See if the target node is there
• Through When 'NODE INVALID' Goto GiveUp
• When 'LINK IS DOWN' Goto GiveUp
• When 'VM/370' Goto GotIt
• Wait
• Goto Through
• It's there copy the LOGO
• GotIt Wait Until 'VM/370'
• Send Control 'C '
• Send ENTER _ '####'
• Wait Until 'Pass-Through'
• Send "PA1" through RLSS to PVM
• GiveUp Send PA1
• Wait Until 'LOCAL TERMINAL CONTROLLER'
• Send PF2
• Wait Until 'DROP FROM'
• Send CLEAR
• Now logoff from Kingston
• Wait Until 'VM/370'
• Send CLEAR
• Wait Until 'CP READ'
• Send ENTER _ SBA=_ 'LOGOFF'
• Wait Until 'RUNNING'
• Send ENTER
• Wait untill dropped from RLSS
• Wait Until 'RLSDIO'
• Send ENTER
• Wait
• Send ENTER
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Newbie TOPS-10 7.03 question
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers,ed.general
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2001 01:21:32 GMT
Anne & Lynn Wheeler writes:
GLOBAL MACLIB HSLMAC CMSLIB
HASM STORY ( NOPRINT
LOAD STORY ( CLEAR ORIGIN TRANS
GEN STORY MODULE A2 ( SYSTEM
some might think that story wasn't all that remarkable but also
consider that its total executable size was under 8k bytes
(instructions plus all data areas).
another story ... retrieve updates/fixes from the online field
engineering system, aka RETAIN:
*
• BUCKET -- Automatic PUT Bucket Retriever
*
ID '< wait >'
Wait Until 'VM/370'
Send CLEAR
Wait Until 'CP READ'
When ever( case ScrFull ) 'MORE...' Send CLEAR
When ever( case Holding ) 'HOLDING' Send CLEAR
Send ENTER 5B60 SBA=5B60 'DIAL PVM'
Wait Until 'SPECIFIC NODE ID'
Send ENTER 4166 SBA=4166 'RETAIN'
check1 When 'FIELD ENGINEERING' goto go1
When 'SIGNED OFF' goto go1
When 'PORT NOT AVILABLE' goto quit
Wait until 'SIGNED OFF'
goto check1
go1 Send ENTER 5B6D
Wait Until 'ENTER EMPLOYEE NUMBER/PASSWORD'
Send ENTER 4C66 SBA=4C66 &PASSWD
Wait Until 'ENTER UPGRADE/SUBSET IDS'
Send ENTER 406B SBA=406B &SSID
Wait Until 'CHG/INDEX'
Send PF11 C450 SBA=4150 'Y' SBA=4160 'Y' SBA=C450 'Y'
Wait Until 'OUTPUT QUED'
Send ENTER
Wait Until 'UPGRADE:'
Send Control 'C '
Send ENTER 5952
Wait Until 'UPGRADE:'
Send Control 'C '
When Ever( Case Wrap ) 'PG 001' goto done
next Send ENTER 5952
Wait Until 'UPGRADE:'
Send Control 'C '
Goto next
done Send ENTER 5952 SBA=5952 'SIGNOFF'
Wait Until 'TERMINAL'
Send Enter 4F4F SBA=4F4F '####'
Wait Until 'SPECIFIC NODE ID'
quit Send PA1
Stop
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | lynn@garlic.com - http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Refed: **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **, - **
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Is anybody out there still writting BAL 370.
Newsgroups: comp.lang.asm370,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2001 14:13:55 GMT
jmaynard@thebrain.conmicro.cx (Jay Maynard) writes:
Uhm, it's in the base distribution of OS/360 21.8F. Might have been added
late in life, but it's definitely there as IMASPZAP. Was OS/360 revved some
after the introduction of SVS?
i remember it at least using it at least in the 14 - 15/16 time-frame
for (some) PTF application.
remember 15 didn't really ship, it was a consolidated 15/16
release. 15/16 was also the first release that allowed you to specify
where the vtoc went i.e. you could place the highest accessed data in
the middle of the pack and then array data out in both directions.
I had been doing "hand" built sysgens since 9.5, aka I would take the
stage2 output of stage1 (and "in-queue" build since 11, aka rather
than do sysgen with starter system, build with production system)
... and rather than single job with large number of exec steps, would
place a job card on each exec step, completely re-arrainge each job
order so that data would be built on the drives to create optimal arm
access order, and also re-arranged major move/copy statement ordering
to also create optimal arm access ordering.
The elapsed time to run a FORTG (single-step) fortran compile was
reduced from approx. 30 secs elapsed time (a straight starter-system
built MFT14 system with HASP) to 12.9 seconds elapsed time with my
hand-built custom MFT14.
The problem of course, was that standard PTF (loa