2007- Collected Postings,
2005-2006 Collected Postings,
2003-2004 Collected Postings,
2001-2002 Collected Postings,
1993-2000 Collected Postings,
Internet History Postings,
Old EMAIL Index
three factor authentcation
Assurance
some mention of EU FINREAD
Risk, Fraud, Exploits, Threats, Vulnerabilities
Account Number Harvesting
postings mentioning MITM attacks
Buffer overflows, overruns, exploits
Secrets and Account numbers
Counterfeit YES CARDS
Naked Transaction Metaphor
- aadsmail.htm#variations variations on your account-authority model (small clarification)
- aadsmail.htm#complex AADS/CADS complexity issue
- aadsmail.htm#parsim parsimonious
- aadsmail.htm#fraud Human Nature ... a little cross-posting
- aadsmail.htm#mfraud AADS, X9.59, security, flaws, privacy
- aadsmail.htm#liability AADS & X9.59 performance and algorithm key sizes
- aadsmail.htm#vbank Statistical Attack Against Virtual Banks (fwd)
- aadsm2.htm#risk another characteristic of online validation
- aadsm2.htm#integrity Scale (and the SRV record)
- aadsm2.htm#account A different architecture? (was Re: certificate path
- aadsm2.htm#privacy Identification and Privacy are not Antinomies
- aadsm2.htm#stall EU digital signature initiative stalled
- aadsm2.htm#straw AADS Strawman
- aadsm2.htm#strawm3 AADS Strawman
- aadsm2.htm#keylength On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation
- aadsm3.htm#cstech3 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech4 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech5 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech6 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech7 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech8 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech9 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech10 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech12 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#cstech13 cardtech/securetech & CA PKI
- aadsm3.htm#kiss2 Common misconceptions, was Re: KISS for PKIX. (Was: RE: ASN.1 vs XML (used to be RE: I-D ACTION :draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-00.txt))
- aadsm3.htm#kiss8 KISS for PKIX
- aadsm3.htm#kiss9 KISS for PKIX .... password/digital signature
- aadsm4.htm#2 Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact
- aadsm4.htm#4 Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact
- aadsm4.htm#9 Thin PKI won - You lost
- aadsm5.htm#epaym "e-payments" email discussion list is now "Internet-payments"
- aadsm5.htm#shock revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
- aadsm5.htm#shock2 revised Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures
- aadsm5.htm#encryp Encryption article
- aadsm5.htm#liex509 Lie in X.BlaBla
- aadsm5.htm#pkimort PKI: Evolve or Die
- aadsm5.htm#pkimort2 problem with the death of X.509 PKI
- ansiepay.htm#privacy more on privacy
- ansiepay.htm#x959pkni Ellison/Schneier article on Risks of PKI ... fyi
- ansiepay.htm#cardsteal Stealing cards easy as Web browsing
- ansiepay.htm#breach Security breach raises questions about Internet shopping
- ansiepay.htm#theory Security breach raises questions about Internet shopping
- ansiepay.htm#scaads X9.59 related press release at smartcard forum
- ansiepay.htm#ifraud Internet Fraud
- aepay2.htm#fed Federal CP model and financial transactions
- aepay2.htm#cadis disaster recovery cross-posting
- aepay2.htm#aadsx959 Account Authority Digital Signatures ... in support of x9.59
- aepay2.htm#aadspriv Account Authority Digital Signatures ... in support of x9.59
- aepay3.htm#riskm The Thread Between Risk Management and Information Security
- aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
- aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
- aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
- aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
- aepay3.htm#aadsrel1 AADS related information
- aepay3.htm#x959risk1 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
- aepay3.htm#x959risk2 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
- aepay3.htm#x959risk3 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
- aepay3.htm#x959risk4 Risk Management in AA / draft X9.59
- aepay3.htm#smrtcrd Smart Cards with Chips encouraged ... fyi
- aepay4.htm#privis privacy issues
- aepay4.htm#dnsinteg1 Domain Name integrity problem
- aepay4.htm#visaset2 Visa Delicately Gives Hook to SET Standard
- aepay5.htm#pkiillfit Some PKI references from yesterday's SlashDot
- aepay5.htm#crackegg hackers crack egghead.com
- aepay6.htm#fraud Online Card Fraud Thirty Times That Offline
- aepay6.htm#x959b X9.59 Electronic Payment standard issue
- aepay6.htm#docstore ANSI X9 Electronic Standards "store"
- aepay6.htm#vouc implementations of "XML Voucher: Generic Voucher Language"?
- aepay6.htm#harvest harvesting of credit card numbers
- aepay6.htm#erictalk Announce: Eric Hughes giving Stanford EE380 talk this
- aepay6.htm#ccfraud latest credit scam puts plastic in peril ... is your credit card being cloned?
- 98.html#41 AADS, X9.59, & privacy
- 99.html#85 Perfect Code
- 99.html#136 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#156 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#163 IBM Assembler 101
- 99.html#167 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#168 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#170 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#171 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#172 checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)
- 99.html#189 Internet Credit Card Security
- 99.html#228 Attacks on a PKI
- 99.html#235 Attacks on a PKI
- 99.html#238 Attacks on a PKI
- 99.html#240 Attacks on a PKI
- 2000.html#25 Computer of the century
- 2000.html#28 Homework: Negative side of MVS?
- 2000.html#32 Homework: Negative side of MVS?
- 2000.html#36 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
- 2000.html#42 "Trusted" CA - Oxymoron?
- 2000.html#46 question about PKI
- 2000.html#57 RealNames hacked. Firewall issues
- 2000.html#60 RealNames hacked. Firewall issues
- 2000b.html#17 ooh, a real flamewar :)
- 2000b.html#22 ooh, a real flamewar :)
- 2000c.html#40 Domainatrix - the final word
- 2000e.html#44 Why trust root CAs?
- 2000e.html#45 IBM's Workplace OS (Was: .. Pink)
- 2000f.html#1 Why trust root CAs?
- 2000f.html#4 Why trust root CAs?
- 2000f.html#14 Why trust root CAs?
- 2000f.html#22 Why trust root CAs?
- 2000f.html#50 Al Gore and the Internet (Part 2 of 2)
- 2000f.html#64 Cryptogram Newsletter is off the wall?
- 2000f.html#69 TSS ancient history, was X86 ultimate CISC? designs)
- 2000f.html#72 SET; was Re: Why trust root CAs?
- 2000g.html#33 does CA need the proof of acceptance of key binding?
- 2000g.html#35 does CA need the proof of acceptance of key binding?
- 2000g.html#41 Egghead cracked, MS IIS again
- 2001b.html#58 Checkpoint better than PIX or vice versa???
- 2001c.html#15 OS/360 (was LINUS for S/390)
- 2001c.html#30 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#32 How Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Systems make society vulnerable
- 2001c.html#38 How Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Systems make society vulnerable
- 2001c.html#41 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#42 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#44 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#45 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#46 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#47 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#50 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#51 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#54 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#58 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#59 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001c.html#61 Risk management vs security policy
- 2001c.html#73 PKI and Non-repudiation practicalities
- 2001d.html#1 SSL question
- 2001d.html#19 [Newbie] Authentication vs. Authorisation?
- 2001d.html#41 solicit advice on purchase of digital certificate
- 2001d.html#56 Pentium 4 Prefetch engine?
- 2001d.html#58 Very CISC Instuctions (Was: why the machine word size ...)
- 2001d.html#62 OT Re: A beautiful morning in AFM
- 2001e.html#37 Can I create my own SSL key?
- 2001e.html#39 Can I create my own SSL key?
- 2001e.html#48 Where are IBM z390 SPECint2000 results?
- 2001e.html#77 Apology to Cloakware (open letter)
- 2001e.html#82 The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security
- 2001f.html#15 Medical data confidentiality on network comms
- 2001f.html#24 Question about credit card number
- 2001f.html#25 Question about credit card number
- 2001f.html#31 Remove the name from credit cards!
- 2001f.html#33 IBM's "VM for the PC" c.1984??
- 2001f.html#35 Security Concerns in the Financial Services Industry
- 2001f.html#40 Remove the name from credit cards!
- aepay6.htm#ccfraud2 "out of control credit card fraud"
- aepay6.htm#ccfraud3 "out of control credit card fraud"
- 2001g.html#38 distributed authentication
- aepay7.htm#fakeid Fake IDs swamp police
- 2001g.html#62 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
- 2001g.html#63 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
- 2001h.html#7 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
- aepay7.htm#netbank net banking, is it safe?? ... power to the consumer
- aepay7.htm#netbank2 net banking, is it safe?? ... security proportional to risk
- aadsm6.htm#websecure merchant web server security
- 2001h.html#64 Net banking, is it safe???
- 2001h.html#67 Would this type of credit card help online shopper to feel more secure?
- 2001h.html#68 Net banking, is it safe???
- 2001h.html#70 Net banking, is it safe???
- 2001i.html#16 Net banking, is it safe???
- 2001i.html#25 Net banking, is it safe???
- 2001i.html#26 No Trusted Viewer possible?
- 2001i.html#55 Computer security: The Future
- 2001i.html#56 E-commerce security????
- 2001i.html#57 E-commerce security????
- 2001j.html#0 E-commerce security????
- 2001j.html#2 E-commerce security????
- 2001j.html#5 E-commerce security????
- 2001j.html#9 E-commerce security????
- aepay7.htm#netsecure some recent threads on netbanking & e-commerce security
- 2001j.html#43 Disaster Stories Needed
- 2001j.html#44 Does "Strong Security" Mean Anything?
- 2001j.html#52 Are client certificates really secure?
- 2001j.html#54 Does "Strong Security" Mean Anything?
- 2001k.html#0 Are client certificates really secure?
- 2001k.html#1 Are client certificates really secure?
- aadsm6.htm#terror Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror3 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror4 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror5 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror6 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror7 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror8 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror9 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror10 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror13 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- aadsm6.htm#terror14 Did Encryption Empower These Terrorists?
- 2001k.html#43 Why is UNIX semi-immune to viral infection?
- aepay7.htm#idtheft Another Thing to Feer: ID Theft
- 2001k.html#53 Why is UNIX semi-immune to viral infection?
- 2001k.html#55 I-net banking security
- 2001k.html#58 I-net banking security
- aadsm7.htm#auth Who or what to authenticate?
- 2001l.html#10 E-commerce security????
- aepay7.htm#idtheft2 Reports of Identity Theft Still Rising Fast
- 2001l.html#49 Virus propagation risks
- aepay7.htm#3dsecure 3D Secure Vulnerabilities? Photo ID's and Payment Infrastructure
- aepay7.htm#3dsecure2 3D Secure Vulnerabilities? Photo ID's and Payment Infrastructure
- aepay7.htm#edsecure4 3D Secure Vulnerabilities? Photo ID's and Payment Infrastructure
- aadsm7.htm#rubberhose Rubber hose attack
- aadsm7.htm#rhose3 when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack
- aadsm7.htm#3dsecure 3D Secure Vulnerabilities?
- aadsm8.htm#rhose17 when a fraud is a sale, Re: Rubber hose attack]
- aadsm8.htm#3dvulner 3D Secure Vulnerabilities?
- aadsm8.htm#3dvulner2 3D Secure Vulnerabilities?
- aadsm8.htm#3dvulner3 3D Secure Vulnerabilities?
- 2001m.html#27 Internet like city w/o traffic rules, traffic signs, traffic lights and traffic enforcement
- aadsm9.htm#carnivore Shades of FV's Nathaniel Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"
- aepay8.htm#ccfraud Almost Half UK E-Shopper's Fear Card Fraud (CC fraud increased by 50% in 2k)
- aepay8.htm#ccfraud2 Statistics for General and Online Card Fraud
- aepay8.htm#visapass VISA: All Your Password Are Belong to Us
- aepay8.htm#x959paper Credit Card Fraud and E-Commerce: A Case Study
- aepay8.htm#vulner ccount number & shared-secret vulnerabilities
- 2001n.html#30 FreeBSD more secure than Linux
- 2001n.html#90 Buffer overflow
- 2001n.html#91 Buffer overflow
- 2001n.html#93 Buffer overflow
- aadsm10.htm#cfppki13 CFP: PKI research workshop
- aadsm10.htm#cfppki14 CFP: PKI research workshop
- aadsm10.htm#cfppki15 CFP: PKI research workshop
- aadsm10.htm#smallpay2 Small/Secure Payment Business Models
- aadsm10.htm#cfppki18 CFP: PKI research workshop
- 2002.html#19 Buffer overflow
- 2002.html#20 Younger recruits versus experienced veterans ( was Re: The demise of compaq
- 2002.html#23 Buffer overflow
- 2002.html#24 Buffer overflow
- 2002.html#25 ICMP Time Exceeded
- 2002.html#32 Buffer overflow
- aadsm10.htm#hackhome Hackers Targeting Home Computers
- 2002.html#44 Calculating a Gigalapse
- aadsm10.htm#risks credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
- aepay9.htm#risks credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
- aepay9.htm#skim High-tech Thieves Snatch Data From ATMs (including PINs)
- aepay10.htm#4 Credit Card Scam
- aadsm10.htm#tamper Limitations of limitations on RE/tampering (was: Re: biometrics)
- aadsm10.htm#biometrics biometrics
- 2002c.html#7 Opinion on smartcard security requested
- 2002c.html#10 Opinion on smartcard security requested
- 2002c.html#15 Opinion on smartcard security requested
- 2002c.html#22 Opinion on smartcard security requested
- 2002c.html#23 Opinion on smartcard security requested
- aepay10.htm#16 Worker Accused of Selling Colleagues' ID's Online (credit card scam)
- 2002d.html#8 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
- 2002d.html#11 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
- 2002e.html#58 O'Reilly C Book
- 2002f.html#10 Least folklorish period in computing (was Re: IBM Mainframe at home)
- aadsm11.htm#44 Web site exposes credit card fraud
- aadsm11.htm#45 Web site exposes credit card fraud
- 2002i.html#62 subjective Q. - what's the most secure OS?
- 2002i.html#72 A Lesson In Security
- 2002j.html#14 Symmetric-Key Credit Card Protocol on Web Site