List of Archived Posts

2004 Newsgroup Postings (06/27 - 08/06)

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII, Inventor of the Esc worker at IBM, Univac and Honeywell dies

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

I am an ageing techy, expert on everything. Let me explain the Middle East to you

The One True Language

CCD technology

CCD technology

CCD technology

Possibly stupid question for you IBM mainframers... :-)

Mainframes (etc.)

ECC book reference, please

Two-factor Authentication Options?

Two-factor Authentication Options?

Possibly stupid question for you IBM mainframers... :-)

Page coloring required?

Google loves "e"

Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector

fast check for binary zeroes in memory

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

Basics of key authentication

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

Basics of key authentication

Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector

Why are programs so large?

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

Convince me that SSL certificates are not a big scam

BLKSIZE question

ECC Encryption

Usage of Hex Dump

Basics of key authentication

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

Which Monitor Would You Pick??????

fc2, evolution, yum, libbonobo-2.6.2-1.i386.rpm

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

Basics of key authentication

build-robots-which-can-automate-testing dept

SEC Tests Technology to Speed Accounting Analysis

Which Monitor Would You Pick??????

Interesting read about upcoming K9 processors

Interesting read about upcoming K9 processors

Hard disk architecture: are outer cylinders still faster than inner cylinders?

fc2, ssh client/server, kernel 494

what vector systems are really faster at

self correcting systems

very basic quextions: public key encryption

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

Univac 9200, 9300: the 360 clone I never heard of!

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

New Method for Authenticated Public Key Exchange without Digital Certificates

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

From: lynn@garlic.com
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2004 12:00:56 -0700
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Subject: Re: Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

jmfbahciv@aol.com wrote in message news:<40debed4$0$3077$61fed72c@news.rcn.com>...

IIRC, a lot of ours was the memory getting released was
calculated incorrectly, usually off by one.  Another common
bug was blowing the linked address chain fixup.  JRSTing
using a indirect pointer.  Having a hardware PDL with all
the appropriate instructions must have helped a lot.

for the non-subpool allocation/deallocation ... dangling processes and
pointers ... after storage had been deallocated and put back on the
available chain ... resulted in

1) dangling process using a dangling pointer to updating a field that
is now being used as the next available storage linkage field

2) dangling process using a dangling pointer for picking up a field as
an address ... but that field has been cleared to zeros ... so it is
an attempt to do something at or around address zero ... somewhere in
the 3090 time-frame the psa storage protection was introduced ....
turning it on and the first couple hundred bytes of the address space
could not be modified ... low address protection:
http://publibz.boulder.ibm.com/cgi-bin/bookmgr_OS390/BOOKS/DZ9AR004/3.4.4?SHELF=EZ2HW125&DT=19970613131822

3) dangling process using a dangling pointer to address a field where
the storage had been deallocated and then re-allocated as part of a
smaller storage area. this tended to be much more of a problem before
subpool storage allocation logic was intorudced. in the subpool
storage allocation, storage areas tended to be re-used for the same
sized storage allocation ... so dangling pointers addressing past the
end of an allocated storage area was much less common. There were some
cases where logic was just plain wrong ... re-using a pointer variable
 w/o reloading its value .... it was much more common to have a
dangling pointer (as part of some dangling process) accessing storage
after it had nominally been de-allocated (and possibly even
re-allocated to some other process).

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

From: lynn@garlic.com
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2004 20:12:08 -0700
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Subject: Re: Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

Larry__Weiss wrote in message news:<40DF1945.90B35C1F@airmail.net>...

Reminds me of "Do The Right Thing"

http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?DoTheRightThing
http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?DoesWorseIsBetterRequireOpenSource

or simply do right

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

From: lynn@garlic.com
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2004 20:20:32 -0700
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Subject: Re: Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

jmfbahciv@aol.com wrote in message news:<40debed4$0$3077$61fed72c@news.rcn.com>...

I don't believe that...but then that's my paranoia talking.
With computers, all obfuscation implies very large worm-filled cans.

one might claim that is part of the issue of implicit lengths in C
language string-handling libraries. when we were starting ha/cmp
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
we did some detailed vulnerability analysis ... one was that the
implicit lengths in conventional C would contribute to 10-fold to
100-fold increase in buffer length related problems (compared to
experience we had in other environments). lots of
vulnerability/exploit/fraud posts:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subintegrity.html#fraud

specific reference over ten years later (of course this was before a
lot of the scripting and phishing stuff that since has started to raise
its ugly head)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#219 Study says buffer overflow is most common security bug

and whole list of specific posts that touch on buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#cfppki13 CFP: PKI research workshop
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#hackhome Hackers Targeting Home Computers
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#risks credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#bio3 biometrics (addenda)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#bio7 biometrics
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#37 How effective is open source crypto?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#32 An attack on paypal
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#34 virus attack on banks (was attack on paypal)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#38 An attack on paypal (trivia addenda)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#1 FAQ: e-Signatures and Payments
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm16.htm#8 example: secure computing kernel needed
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#6 credit card & gift card fraud (from today's comp.risks)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#65 E-merchants Turn Fraud-busters (somewhat related)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#66 Confusing Authentication and Identiification?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#25 Computer of the century
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000.html#30 Computer of the century
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#17 ooh, a real flamewar :)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#22 ooh, a real flamewar :)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000c.html#40 Domainatrix - the final word
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#50 Egghead cracked, MS IIS again
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#47 what is interrupt mask register?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001b.html#58 Checkpoint better than PIX or vice versa???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#66 KI-10 vs. IBM at Rutgers
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001d.html#58 Very CISC Instuctions (Was: why the machine word size ...)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#52 misc loosely-coupled, sysplex, cluster, supercomputer, & electronic commerce
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#54 Computer security: The Future
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#43 Why is UNIX semi-immune to viral infection?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#49 Virus propagation risks
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#27 Internet like city w/o traffic rules, traffic signs, traffic lights and traffic enforcement
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#30 FreeBSD more secure than Linux
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#71 Q: Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#72 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#76 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#84 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#90 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#91 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#93 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#4 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#5 index searching
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#11 The demise of compaq
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#19 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#20 Younger recruits versus experienced veterans ( was Re: The demise of compa
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#23 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#24 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#25 ICMP Time Exceeded
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#26 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#27 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#28 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#29 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#32 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#33 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#34 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#35 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#37 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#38 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#39 Buffer overflow
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002.html#44 Calculating a Gigalapse
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#34 Does it support "Journaling"?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#37 Poor Man's clustering idea
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#43 IBM 5100 [Was: First DESKTOP Unix Box?]
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#56 Computer Naming Conventions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002b.html#62 TOPS-10 logins (Was Re: HP-2000F - want to know more about it)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#15 Opinion on smartcard security requested
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#42 Beginning of the end for SNA?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#4 IBM Mainframe at home
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#9 Security Proportional to Risk (was: IBM Mainframe at home)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#14 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#16 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#18 Opinion on smartcard security requested
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#32 What goes into a 3090?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#36 Crypting with Fingerprints ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#47 Multics_Security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#58 O'Reilly C Book
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#67 Blade architectures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#68 Blade architectures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#73 Blade architectures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#23 Computers in Science Fiction
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#44 Blade architectures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#2 Computers in Science Fiction
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#35 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#40 Why did OSI fail compared with TCP-IP?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#41 Biometric authentication for intranet websites?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#68 Are you really who you say you are?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#73 Where did text file line ending characters begin?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#74 Where did text file line ending characters begin?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#79 Al Gore and the Internet
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#82 Al Gore and the Internet
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#57 CDC6600 - just how powerful a machine was it?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#62 subjective Q. - what's the most secure OS?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#42 MVS 3.8J and NJE via CTC
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#13 notwork
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#42 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#44 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#45 Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#48 10 choices that were critical to the Net's success
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#8 Backdoor in AES ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#10 Backdoor in AES ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#20 A new e-commerce security proposal
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#58 The next big things that weren't
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#11 Wanted: the SOUNDS of classic computing
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#25 Help! Good protocol for national ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#14 Home mainframes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#41 META: Newsgroup cliques?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#6 unix permissions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002p.html#54 Newbie: Two quesions about mainframes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#37 Calculating expected reliability for designed system
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#54 Microsoft worm affecting Automatic Teller Machines
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#47 diffence between itanium and alpha
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#52 diffence between itanium and alpha
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#45 IBM says AMD dead in 5yrs ... -- Microsoft Monopoly vs. IBM
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#17 unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#0 early vnet & exploit
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#8 Alpha performance, why?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#3 Disk capacity and backup solutions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#15 Disk capacity and backup solutions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#54 Rewrite TCP/IP
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#62 IBM says AMD dead in 5yrs ... -- Microsoft Monopoly vs. IBM
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#9 Why did TCP become popular ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#40 IBM system 370
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#41 Segments, capabilities, buffer overrun attacks
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#47 Segments, capabilities, buffer overrun attacks
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#56 The figures of merit that make mainframes worth the price
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#15 two pi, four phase, 370 clone
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#59 grey-haired assembler programmers (Ritchie's C)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#2 Fix the shuttle or fly it unmanned
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#4 A Dark Day
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#8 A Dark Day
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#15 A Dark Day
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#20 A Dark Day
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#10 What is timesharing, anyway?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#48 Who said DAT?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#64 C & reliability: Was "The Incredible Shrinking Legacy"
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#2 S/360 Engineering Changes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#9 how long does (or did) it take to boot a timesharing system?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#19 Secure OS Thoughts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#36 Proposal for a new PKI model (At least I hope it's new)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#24 Intel iAPX 432
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#25 Microsoft Internet Patch
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#54 Thoughts on Utility Computing?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#14 Poor people's OS?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#44 IEN 45 and TCP checksum offload
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#5 perfomance vs. key size
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#6 perfomance vs. key size
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#20 IS CP/M an OS?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#25 Any experience with "The Last One"?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#50 Pub/priv key security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#55 History of Computer Network Industry
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#68 History of Computer Network Industry
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#13 packetloss bad for sliding window protocol ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#15 packetloss bad for sliding window protocol ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#37 The BASIC Variations
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#39 Mainframe Emulation Solutions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#21 40th anniversary of IBM System/360 on 7 Apr 2004
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#30 Threat of running a web server?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#8 Mars Rover Not Responding
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#10 Mars Rover Not Responding
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#48 Automating secure transactions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#4 OS Partitioning and security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#47 IBM 360 memory
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004e.html#43 security taxonomy and CVE
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#20 Why does Windows allow Worms?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#8 network history

Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII, Inventor of the Esc worker at IBM, Univac and Honeywell dies

From: lynn@garlic.com
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2004 12:45:18 -0700
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Subject: Re: Bob Bemer, Computer Pioneer,Father of ASCII, Inventor of the Esc worker at IBM, Univac and Honeywell dies...

"ed sharpe" wrote in message news:<n5tDc.796$AL2.45941@news.uswest.net>...

j.. He is recognized as the first person in the world to publish warnings
of the Year 2000 problem -- first in 1971, and again in 1979.

k.. And.....  more!  go to his site to learn more.....

there was a thread in the early 80s about various date related
problems, including discussion of some feb. 29 and end-of-decade
problems encountered by ACP/PARS from the late 60s (end of decade
problem is similar to the end-of-century problem)

reposting of something from 1984 thread:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#24 BA solves Y2K

Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

From: lynn@garlic.com
Date: Mon, 28 Jun 2004 12:49:25 -0700
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Subject: Re: Adventure game (was:PL/? History (was Hercules))

re:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#2 Adventure game ...

somewhat related:
Security bug? My programming language made me do it!
http://acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=160

I am an ageing techy, expert on everything. Let me explain the Middle East to you

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: I am an ageing techy, expert on everything. Let me explain the Middle East to you.
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Wed, 07 Jul 2004 19:13:28 -0600

"Jack Peacock" writes:

Actually I do appreciate that the UK has been spared the worst, like
mandatory vacation or the byzantine french labor laws.  I credit
Thatcher for this, the turning point being the moment Scargill caved
in.  Blair gets an honorable mention for skillfully stripping the
TUC of much of it's influence over the Labor party and turning it
into Tory Lite.

sligthly related tale
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#18 IT jobs move to India

The One True Language

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: The One True Language
Newsgroups: comp.arch
Date: Thu, 08 Jul 2004 14:09:28 -0600

J Ahlstrom writes:

Or as one of the people associated with IBM's
Fort Knox project said (paraphrased)
Since it was supposed to solve an IBM problem
rather than a customer problem, it was doomed.

possibly the same could be said of future system project
misc. future system posts:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#futuresys
some specific
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#16 [OT] FS - IBM Future System
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#30 Secure OS Thoughts

which had as one of its main driving factors clone controllers
misc pcm posts:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#360pcm

random 801, fort knox, etc. posts:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#801

a few specific:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#2 vax6k.openecs.org rebirth
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#3 vax6k.openecs.org rebirth
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#5 Card Columns
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#7 what is the difference between ALU & FPU
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#43 IBM says AMD dead in 5yrs ... -- Microsoft Monopoly vs. IBM
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#55 Reviving Multics
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#56 Reviving Multics
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#56 ECPS:VM DISPx instructions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#27 [Meta] Marketplace argument
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#24 |d|i|g|i|t|a|l| questions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#136a checks (was S/390 on PowerPC?)

CCD technology

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: CCD technology
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 11 Jul 2004 09:55:25 -0600

and for something a little different, from long ago and far away, a
fun project that I got to work on



From: wheeler
Date: 08/04/83  22:27:33

I was contacted by branch office about something to do with professor
at Santa Cruz selecting computers for 400in telescope to be placed in
Hawaii (he was interested in getting a meeting specifically to talk
about shipping data between Hawaii and Santa Cruz ... hyperchannel and
satellites).

... snip ... top of post, old email index


From: wheeler
Date: 11/21/84  08:55:26

re: hsdt; oh, almost forgot. I'm having another meeting with the
Berkeley ten meter telescope people (this time just the IBMers working
with them). They want to set-up for remote observing (observatory will
be about 14,000 foot level in Hawaii) from both "local" sea level and
eventually the mainland. Current estimates are that the digitized
image represents about 800kbits/sec of data during the evening hours
(data flow is asymetrical with telescope control commands going in the
opposite direction only about 1200 baud).

... snip ... top of post, old email index

One of the astronomers was at Santa Cruz, the engineering was done by
department at LBL and got to visit several times as the component
engineering was being developed.
http://www.lbl.gov/Science-Articles/Archive/keck-telescope.html

One of the remote viewing issues was altitude sickness issues at the
telescope level. The original Keck grant was for $70m-$85m(?). The
transition was to be to electronic (from film), this was in the days
of small CCDs and the project started off doing tests with 200x200
(40k) CCD arrays; a far cry from today's 5megapixel cameras. There
were rumors of gov. projects with 2kx2k CCD arrays (4megapixel) and
Spielburg funding a 4kx4k CCD array (16megapixel) project (for
movies). other references:
http://www2.keck.hawaii.edu/geninfo/about.html
http://antwrp.gsfc.nasa.gov/apod/ap971227.html
http://www.ps.uci.edu/physics/news/chanan.html
http://scikits.com/KFacts.html
http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/sl9/keck.html

lots of general hsdt (high speed data transport) references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork.html#hsdt

old reference to the 10m project (in a thread about accepting NSF
funding for projects and loosing control):
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000d.html#19

CCD technology

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: CCD technology
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2004 11:20:43 -0600

only tangently related to the original posting:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#33b High Speed Data Transport (HSDT)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#69 oddly portable machines
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000e.html#45 IBM's Workplace OS (Was: .. Pink)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#59 SR 15,15
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004g.html#12 network history

other misc. from the archives:


From: wheeler
Date: 08/22/83  14:47:21

i've been invited to go up to Lick observatory next Tuesday at 1pm to
discuss technical details of the 10meter observatory being planned for
Hawaii.

They are planning on doing image processing ... figuring 8.6*10**9
bits per evening. There will be micros controlling the 36 mirrors and
some big crunchers to handle the data.

... snip ... top of post, old email index


From: wheeler
Date: 08/30/83  18:02:51

went by Lick observatory ... basically it was to see how observatories
currently operate as background for subsequent discussion on the 10
meter proposal. Lick appears to be somewhat primitive on the scale of
being computerized ... although I can't judge if that is just the
current state of the art in that area.

University observatories in general appear to be very strapped for
funds. They are just in the process of installing an LSI/11 as an
upgrade to two PDP8s. A lot of stuff is done with dedicated (cheap)
microprocessors (in many case they put together and maintain
themselves). Even trivial things to computerize things is continuelly
gated by financial considerations.

10 meter telescope hopefully will be better funded in that area but
they are talking about it being 3-5 years out. What is available in
that timeframe may drastically change ... especially in price at the
low end.

... snip ... top of post, old email index


From: wheeler
Date: 05/19/86  10:43:19

i just got a note from TIW (parent company of multipoint) ... they say
they've been awarded mechanical design contract for the Berkeley 10
meter telescope .. now called 10 meter W.M. Keck telescope for the
California Association for Research in Astronomy (CARA). Multipoint is
company making our 2nd set of satellite gear.

... snip ... top of post, old email index

random note: This was an interesting situation ... TIW (toronto iron
works) was a company that got into doing lots of big satellite dishes
... as well as some of the deep space probe dishes. apparently because
they were doing so much satellite mechanical stuff ... they formed a
startup that did satellite earth station electronics. it was otherwise
somewhat strange to have an iron works company with a high-tech
electronics spin-off. multipoint was one of the companies hired to
produce tdma earth stations to our specs.

previous posting:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#7

CCD technology

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: CCD technology
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2004 18:49:19 -0600

misc. keck &/or CCD urls that i stumbled acrossed:
http://www.spaceref.ca/news/viewpr.html?pid=10321
http://www2.keck.hawaii.edu/news/hires.html
http://www2.keck.hawaii.edu/inst/
http://www.chem.arizona.edu/icsoi/pages/2003_presentations.htm
http://cadcwww.dao.nrc.ca/ADASS/adass_proc/adass3/papers/cohenj/cohenj.html
http://cadcwww.dao.nrc.ca/ADASS/adass_proc/adass3/papers/luptonw/luptonw.html

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Possibly stupid question for you IBM mainframers... :-)

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Possibly stupid question for you IBM mainframers...  :-)
Newsgroups: comp.lang.cobol,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2004 08:37:16 -0600

spinoza1111@yahoo.com (Edward G. Nilges) writes:

Be sure to learn Rexx, which is a language developed at IBM UK in the
early 1980s by Mike Cowlishaw. Originally intended as a way to write
procedures on Conversational Monitor System, REXX is now also used on
MVS and Time Squandering Option (TSO).

some old rexx threads:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#11 REXX
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#29 20th March 2000
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#30 20th March 2000
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#31 20th March 2000
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#32 20th March 2000
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#33 20th March 2000
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#57 Amiga Rexx
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#58 Amiga Rexx
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#59 Amiga Rexx
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#60 Amiga Rexx
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#17 REXX still going strong after 25 years
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#19 REXX still going strong after 25 years
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#20 REXX still going strong after 25 years
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#21 REXX still going strong after 25 years
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#26 REXX still going strong after 25 years
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#41 REXX still going strong after 25 years
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#42 REXX still going strong after 25 years

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Mainframes (etc.)

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Mainframes (etc.)
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2004 10:57:56 -0600

tedmacneil@bell.blackberry.net (tedmacneil) writes:

PCB: Printed Circuit Board
Programme Control Block

MAC: message authentication code
     media access control

ECC: error correcting code
     elliptical curve cryptography

... note at least for reed-solomon ECC ... both ECCs involve galois
fields.

minor past refs:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#53 Mainframers: Take back the light (spotlight, that is)

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

ECC book reference, please

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: ECC book reference, please
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2004 11:03:00 -0600

Michael Amling writes:

The ECC Tutorial at www.certicom.com gives you the gist. I think
the NIST has suggested ECC curves, probably in whichever FIPS covers
ECDSA, although I don't have a URL at hand.

FIPS186-2 ecdsa also sites X9.62 ...
http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm

one of the appendixes list "approved" curves. note that there is not
yet conformance testing specification for ecdsa.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Two-factor Authentication Options?

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Two-factor Authentication Options?
Newsgroups: comp.protocols.kerberos
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2004 15:00:40 -0600

hotz@jpl.nasa.gov ("Henry B. Hotz") writes:

In the long run the Kerberos password is a problem because the human
brain does not obey Moore's law.  As I see it the solution is to use
some form of two-factor authentication for the initial ticket exchange.

So what options are there in that space?

AFAIK none --- with the standard open source servers.  There are
patches available for MIT to support CRYPTOcard and SecureID.  There
are patches available for Heimdal to support X509 certificates
(PKINIT).

Anything else out there?

original pkinit specification for kerberos had certificate-less public
keys (aka w/o certificates) .... certificate option was added later.

certificate-less public keys ... basically registers public keys in
lieu of passwords .... and does digital signature verification using
the registered public keys from the online registry.

the nominal problem with shared-secret passwords is that you need a
unique shared-secret for every unique security domain. when a person
was only involved in one security domain authentication scenario, it
wasn't too bad .... but as the number of different security domains
grew, people were finding that they needed scores of unique passwords.

the simple public key scenario is you encapsulate the private key in a
token, register the (single) public key in lieu of password, and use
the token for performing a digital signature. the registered public
key is used to authenticate the digital signature.

the requirement for needing a unique password for every unique
security domain was based on just learning the password (in one
domain) was sufficient for impersonation in a different security
domain (i.e. an ISP garage-operation password shouldn't be the same as
your online banking password). public key doesn't suffer from this
vulnerability since knowing somebody's public key isn't sufficient for
impersonation.

the hardware token, by itself provides one-factor, something you
have authentication .... from three-factor authentication

• something you have
• something you know
• something you are

in theory, a single "digital signature" hardware token could be used
across a multitude of different security domains .... since knowing
the associated public key isn't sufficient to impersonate.

it is also possible to have certified hardware tokens that only work
in the approved manner when the appropriate pin has been supplied. The
result can be two-factor authentication .... aka

• something you have
• something you know

w/o the PIN being a shared-secret ... and therefor not subject to
requiring an unique value for every security domain. This is done by
providing the "secret" (NOT shared-secret) PIN to the hardware token.
The security domain doesn't need to know the person's PIN ... they just
need to have certified that the hardware token only works in the
approved manner when the correct PIN has been entered. Then based on
having certified the hardware token (to require correct pin for
operation), then verification of the digital signature implies
two-factor authentication:

• person has the hardware token
• person entered the correct pin

it is also possible to get hardware tokens which require something
like a fingerprint to work correctly (in lieu of a PIN) ... in which
case it is still two-factor authentication ... but

• person has the hardware token
• person has the correct fingerprint

X.509 identity certificates were somewhat the rage in the early 90s
....  however, it was discovered that they represented a whole bunch
of privacy and liability issues. Some number of x.509 certificates were
used in a truncated manner in the mid-90s ... which effectively only
contained an account number and a public key ... and were referred to
as relying-party-only certificates:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#rpo

however, it was possible to show that such certificates were redundant
and superfluous for normal online environments:

1) key owner registers their public key with online infrastructure
2) online infrastructure stores the public key in database
3) online infrastructure sends a RPO-certificate back to the key owner
4) key owner authenticates something by doing a digital signature
5) key onwer sends the digital signature and certificate back to the
   online infrastructure
6) online infrastructure pulls public key from online database
7) online infrastructure verifies digital signature with online
   public key

the certificate typically contains a stale, static subset of
some online information.

certificates were originally designed to provide some level of
assurance in an offline environment where the relying party had no
recourse to the real online registered information.

when the relying party has access to the real, online, timely
registered information ... then the stale, static certificate subset
is redundant and superfluous.

a side-note about the something you have hardware token; there is
some tendancy that every unique security domain wants to issue its own
"certified" hardware token. this has some human factor issues in much
the same way that trying to manage scores, possibly a hundred
different passwords breaks down in practical application. A person is
as likely going to manage (well) a hundred unique, different hardware tokens
as they are going to manage (well) a hundred unique, different passwords.

a pending issue is how could a person get away with one or possibly
extremely few different, unique hardware tokens .... and avoid getting
into the same proliferation bind that they now have with passwords.

misc. other postings on the subject:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#0 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was:   example: secure computing kernel needed)<
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#1 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#2 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#3 Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#4 Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: examp le: secure computing kernel needed)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#5 Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#7 Phillips, Visa push contactless payments in consumer devices
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#9 Setting X.509 Policy Data in IE, IIS, Outlook
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#13 A combined EMV and ID card
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#15 PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#16 PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#18 PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#19 PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#21 Identity (was PKI International Consortium)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#22 secret hackers to aid war on internet fraud
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#23 PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#25 Single Identity. Was: PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#26 privacy, authentication, identification, authorization
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#27 Re:Identity Firewall. l PKI International Consortium
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#34 The future of security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#36 Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key server
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#38 Study: ID theft usually an inside job
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#39 The future of security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#40 The future of security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#41 Yahoo releases internet standard draft for using DNS as public key server
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#42 Article on passwords in Wired News
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#46 authentication and authorization (was: Question on the state of the security industry)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#47 authentication and authorization ... addenda
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#50 authentication and authorization (was: Question on the state of the security industry)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#51 authentication and authorization
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#53 Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#54 Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm17.htm#55 Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Two-factor Authentication Options?

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Two-factor Authentication Options?
Newsgroups: comp.protocols.kerberos
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2004 15:34:35 -0600

slight addenda .....

hardware tokens .... unless there is biometric or pin/password required
in addition to the hardware token (simply doing something) ... then
it is only single-factor authentication ... aka

• something you have

as opposed to the single-factor authentication

• something you know

for two-factor authentication, it requires that at least two of the
three are required for the authentication to be satisfied:

• something you have
• something you know
• something you are

simple hardware token operation with nothing more, would still only
be single-factor authentication.

x.509 certificates have nothing directly to do with the authentication
methodology ... certificates simply supply the public key used to
verify a digital signature (originally targeted for offline
environments where the relying party has absolutely no access to any
registration information).

the verification of the digital signature may be used to imply
authentication .... say something you know and/or something
you have .... but that is orthogonal to the mechanism that is used
to provide the public key to the relying party for the digital
signature verification.

if the relying party has certified that the private key is stored in
an encrypted software file and that the appropriate decryption key is
required to access the private key, then the verification of the
digital signature (with a public key) can imply, single-factor,
something you know authentication (the key owner supposedly
supplied the decryption key for the software private key file).

if the relying party has certified that a unique private key is stored
in a hardware token (and the private key can never be revealed), then
the verification of a digital signature can imply single-factor,
something you have authentication.

if the relying party has certified that a unique private key is stored
in a hardware token and the token only will operate in an approved
manner when the correct pin has been entered, then the verification of
a digital signature can imply two-factor, something you have and
something you know authentication.

x.509 certificates are a source of an appropriate public key for
performing the digital signature verification ... but
relying-party-only, stale, static, x.509 identity
certificates can be shown to be redundant and superfluous in an
environment where the relying-party has access to any registration.

regardless of whether the source of the public key is certificate
based or certificate-less based, the verification of the digital
signature still doesn't tell you what that verification means. The
verification of the digital signature can imply a number of different
authentication mechanisms depending on the environment that manages
the private key and originates the digital signature.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Possibly stupid question for you IBM mainframers... :-)

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Possibly stupid question for you IBM mainframers...  :-)
Newsgroups: comp.lang.cobol,alt.folklore.computers
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2004 18:25:57 -0600

> The Bunch... Burroughs, Univac, Nixdorf, C????, Honeywell

a few old bunch/dwarf postings:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#78 Newsgroup cliques?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#14 vax6k.openecs.org rebirth
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#36 mainframe
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#71 Card Columns
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#61 diffence between itanium and alpha
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#43 Computer folklore - forecasting Sputnik's orbit with
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#22 System/360 40th Anniversary

seven dwarfs:
burroughs, control data, general electric, honeywell,
ncr, rca, sperry-rand

BUNCH:
burroughs, univac, ncr, control data, honeywell

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Page coloring required?

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Page coloring required?
Newsgroups: comp.arch
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2004 17:42:44 -0600

googlenews@peachfish.com (Zalman Stern) writes:

This covers the data cache aspect of aliasing. Figure 8 of the above
paper illustrates the construction of the 52-bit virtual
address. The use of an inverted page table restricts address
aliasing at the virtual address translation level. The translation
mechanism requires that each physical page have precisely one 52-bit
virtual address. One must either use segment sharing or a mechanism
which effectively faults a page from one alias to another at access
time.

in the ibm mainframes, TLBs tagged different virtual address spaces by
using the real address of the virtual address table. early machines
had a stack of seven concurrent virtual address spaces .... there was
a lookaside of the real address of the (virtual address) table and a
three bit identifier. then every TLB entry contained a 3-bit tag ....
providing TLB line associativity to a specific address space
(identified by the real address of the associated table). when a new
address space was introduced .... one of the existing entries were
scavenged ... and all the TLB entries with that specific 3-bit tag
were invalidated. as the technology progressed, the number of address
spaces that the TLB tracked grew ... and so did the number of bits in
the tag field. the total number of unique virtual address spaces (in a
system) were somewhat limited by the physical space for tables (and
unique real address table origin).

801 went to inverted tables .... so there was no longer a unique real
address that could be associated with an address space. The machine
was also somewhat defined for a different operating system paradigm
... where there wasn't the concept of unique address spaces .... there
were just addressable virtual objects (all within a single operating
domain). romp addressed this by defining a 12bit segment identifier
... and therefor allowed up to 4096 concurrent virtual objects. There
was 32bit virtual addressing with the top four bits selecting one of
16 segment registers ... the segment registers contained 12bit segment
id values. The lookup on the TLB then become the page number from the
28bit segment displacement address ... aka 12bits ... and the 12bits
segment tag-id from the segment register (24bits total).

translating this into a unix-type virtual address space paradigm ....
then was something along the line of pre-allocating 16 12bit tag
numbers for each address space .... effectively translating 4096
virtual segment object paradigm into 256 32-bit virtual address space
paradigm. however, there was some residual leftover from the original
single virtual address space, 4096 virtual segment objects design
point .... that sometimes the description came out as the 12bits tag
(from the segment id for segment-associative TLB) being combined with
the 28bits segment displacement .... resulting in a 40bit virtual
address architecture.

when RIOS doubled the segment tag field size from 12bits to 24bits ...
the residual description talking about a 40bit virtual address
architecture became a 24+28=52bit virtual address architecture.

other architectures have TLB virtual adress space associative
architectures ... where the TLB associativity is at the virtual
address space level ... rather than the segment associative level. So
say, there was an architecture that supported a 32bit virtual address
space identifier .... where each virtual address space was 32bits
... then using the romp/rios logic ... the machine would be a 64bit
virtual address space machine.

Mapping the segment paradigm into address space paradigm .... it is
possible to share/conserve TLB entries because a unique shared segment
could have its own unique segment identifier ... and therefor all TLB
entries for pages in that segment would be the same, regardless of
which address space was involved (aka they are segment-id associative
rather than virtual address space-id associative ... and a "shared"
segment could have the same segment-id regardless of the address space
actually involved). If the sharing is restricted to segment level
sharing in a segment-associative TLB ... then aliases won't exist like
they might in a address space associative TLB ... aka the same virtual
shared-segment page might appear at multiple places in the TLB because
it has been taged by multiple different address space identifiers.

As a side note .... when the sharing unit and the TLB associative unit
are the same .... TLB aliasing is effectively eliminated. In theory,
the same shared segment can appear at different segment numbers in
different virtual address spaces ... and there is still no alias
problem (since the virtual address segment number isn't involved in
the TLB indexing, it is strictly segment-id associative).

when the unit of associtivity (aka segment associtivity means that the
TLB is indexed by unique segment IDs rather than unique address space
IDs) is disjoint from the unit of sharing ... then it is possible to
have alias entries in the TLB ... i.e. unique, different TLB entries
referring to the same thing. Typical operation is that aliases are
searched to see if they have matching real address values.

you don't need an inverted table architecture to have segment
associative TLB. the original mainframe architecture provided for
real-table-address based segment associativity ... but I know of no
machines that implemented it. In that scheme ... rather than taging
the TLB entries with some unique virtual address space identifier
(either a bit-pattern or some unique real address) .... each segment
had a unique real tables (and corresponding real table address).  in a
segment associative/indexed TLB .... shared segments don't result in
duplicate/alias entries (modulo having the same shared segment appear
at different virtual address locations in different virtual address
spaces .... and the TLB page index uses bits from that portion of the
virtual address).

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Google loves "e"

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Google loves "e"
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2004 16:52:06 -0600

"Charlie Gibbs" writes:

I saw a billboard locally that consisted of a string of hex digits
which decoded to an ASCII message.  I forgot what it was, though...

i once went to theater in downtown madrid ... and they were having a
short film produced at univ. of madrid. a big part of the film was in
what looked like an apartment ... but one wall was covered with a
couple dozen tv screens all slaved to scrolling the same text at about
1200 baud. what was wierd was recognizing that they were constantly
scrolling a vm/370 load map ... and even worse, i recognized the PLC
i.e. PLC ... monthly maint. distributions, at the time ... there would
have been well over 100 monthly PLCs ... although there would have
been some tendency that the film used a more recent PLC than an
earlier PLC. The load map didn't explicitly identify the PLC ... but i
deduced it from what maint was listed and what maint wasn't listed.

long ago and far away, i use to be able to read the ebcdic holes in
punch cards. if you were punching your own cards on 026/029 ... the
keypunch printed the meaning of the punch holes on the top of the card
(for at least the character codes). however, if the system punched a
deck (say on 2540) ... there was just the holes and no print line
across the top.

the process actually involved converting the punch holes to hex
... and then possibly for hex that had character representation
... converting the hex to character (and/or just converting the punch
holes directly to character).

binary "txt" cards were the output of assembler or compiler that had a
hex "02" in col-1 (12-2-9 punch) and the letters "txt" in cols 2-4.
Then there was a program (displacement) address (in hex) and up to 56
bytes of contents starting at that location.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#60

cards had 12 rows ... in theory allowing up to 12 holes in each of the
80 card columnes. ebcdic encoded only 256 values per column (one 8-bit
byte) ... some of which had character representation.

pre-360s had allowed encoding two 6-bit bytes per column (column
binary) ... possibility of 4096 punch hole combinations per column
(lace cards with all holes punched in all columns tended to be
somewhat fragile).

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2004 19:49:04 -0600

http://itmanagement.earthweb.com/career/article.php/3382251

in 1994 there were similar types of stories being published based on
information from the 1990 census. The 1994 quotes were that half of
(all) 18 year olds were functionally illiterate.

ten years later, this article quotes the federal depart. of education
that 7 out of 10 students graduate from high school w/o completing
courses needed to succeed in the workplace (w/o commenting about
those that don't even graduate).

past related postings in various threads:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#41 How will current AI/robot stories play when AIs are real?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#45 How will current AI/robot stories play when AIs are real?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#28 Offshore IT
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#45 Offshore IT
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003i.html#55 Offshore IT
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#33 [IBM-MAIN] NY Times editorial on white collar jobs going
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#2 The SOB that helped IT jobs move to India is dead!
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#42 The SOB that helped IT jobs move to India is dead!
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#18 The SOB that helped IT jobs move to India is dead!

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

fast check for binary zeroes in memory

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: fast check for binary zeroes in memory
Newsgroups: comp.arch
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2004 08:38:04 -0600

anton@mips.complang.tuwien.ac.at (Anton Ertl) writes:

Other than the straigthforward way, the only way that comes to mind is
to check per page if the page was originally mapped to a zero-filled
page (e.g., a MAP_ANON page private to the process), and has not yet
been written to.  This check will give a yes (page all-zero)
relatively fast, but when it fails, you still have to check in the
straightforward way.  I don't know of a way for a user-space process
to use this way.

... slight topic drift ... the original cp/67 that was installed at
the university in jan, 1968 ... had a zeros page implementation
... where there was an actual 4k page of all zeros formated on the
boot volume. in early '68, i changed that code to use store multiple
of cleared registers in a bxle loop. i also changed to lazy
allocation, don't allocate until it was necessary to actually write a
page out. later, i implemented the dup/no-dup allocation strategy
... nominally leave a page allocated on disk (aka duplicate) when it
is brought into memory ... which may save a write if the page was
never changed during its residency in memory. under constrained
circumstances for page disk space ... switch to a no-dup strategy
i.e. deallocate disk space whenever page is fetched ... which then
always requires a later write when a page is selected for replacement
(trading off disk space against write operations) ... modulo a
resident zeros page ... which if not changed ... it is just discarded
... since it can still be accurately recreated on the fly.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 09:56:04 -0600

Rupert Pigott writes:

Joking aside... It seems to me that the POWER/PowerPC brigade
within IBM are attempting to at least replicate the capabilities
of the IBM mainframes. The mainframes are losing their unique
architectural position, so perhaps we might see the death of
the S/360 line within a decade...

slightly related ... my wife and I were doing the ha/cmp project
starting 15 years ... to replicate availability qualities.  During
ha/cmp, we had coined the terms disaster survivability and
geographic survivability.  we had previously both spent significant
time in mainframes. at one time she was responsible for
loosely-coupled in POK.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
specific ref from 92:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/95.html#13

misc. on peer-coupled and shared data
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#shareddata

at one point during the ha/cmp project, i was asked to help write a
section in the corporate continuous availability strategy document
... however it got replaced because both Rochester and POK objected
(in part, at the time, they couldn't meet the objectives). misc.
past references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#41 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#48 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#49 Withdrawal Announcement 901-218 - No More 'small machines'
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#4 Blade architectures
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#71 High Availabilty on S/390
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#128 Examples of non-relational databases

shortly after amdahl had gotten funding (early 70s) he gave a talk at
MIT ... including his reasoning that he used with money people for
getting funding. basically it was that there was so much existing
executable mainframe code (at the time, something like $200b) ... that
corporations would find it simpler to just keep running it for at
least the next 30 years (than rewrite it) ... even if IBM completely
walked away from 360s and went to a completely different kind of
machine.

somewhat behind the scenes was motivation for amdahl leaving and
starting his own company was ibm was in the throes of future systems
to do just exactly that (future systems was more radical change than
the 360 change had been). misc. fs
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#futuresys

one of the prime motivations for FS was the clone control units
... i.e. the plug compatible manufactures ... in some sense the
PCM controllers gave rise to FS ... and FS, in turn, gave
rise to the PCM processors. misc. references for getting blamed
for helping create the pcm controller business
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#360pcm

misc past posts mentioning amdahl & mit
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#20 MVS on Power (was Re: McKinley Cometh...)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003.html#36 mainframe
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003e.html#20 unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003p.html#30 Not A Survey Question
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#22 System/360 40th Anniversary

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Basics of key authentication

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Basics of key authentication
Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 02:46:30 -0600

"OpticTygre" writes:

Ok, so everything I've read basically tells me the client creates a public
and private key.  The public key gets copied to the server, and when the
client wants to log in, the server encrypts some message with the public
key, and the client decrypts it with its private key to prove he is who he
says he is.  Is that right so far?

Alright, if that's ok, then I have a few questions.

1.  A server can have tons of public keys stored on it.  How does he know
which public key to encrypt the message with for the client?

2.  In the process of public / private key authentication for logins, what
is the order things are typically done?  IE:
a. client says "hey, I want to connect"
b. client sends a message encrypted with private key
c. server decrypts through list of public keys
etc..... (I'm sure the above isn't right)

In other words, what's the step-by-step process used for authenticating via
public/private keys between client and server?  Thanks for helping to clear
things up.

a radius scenario .... large percentage of ISPs around the world use
radius as the standard mode of login by clients ... with userids and
passwords. In the public key scenario ... the client registers a
public key (in lieu of a password) and selects digital signature
challenge/response authentication.

the client ppp connection code sends "login <their userid>" ... the
server sends back some random challenge. the client combines the
random challenge with some additional data ... and digitally signs it
with their public key. the client returns the client contributed data
and the digital signature to the server. the server takes the original
random challenge, the client contributed data and uses the public key
on file to validate the digital signature.

another is a kerberos scenario ... the dominant enterprise/campus
authentication mechanism for windows and most open system platforms;
again predominantly userid/password. the kerberos pk-init
specification has a public key registered in lieu of a password and a
digital signature challenge/response process used (process similar
to the radius scenario).

part of the issue in the challenge/response authentication scenario
... is countermeasure against replay attacks ... where eversdropper
records client's transmission and replays them at a later time as an
impersonation attempt (i.e. the server always sends different
challenge every time .... so the correct client responses would always
be different & unique).

... basically, the client doesn't just say that they want to connect
...  they client says that they want to connect as a specific
entity/userid.  the server then chooses the correct public key based
on who the client is attempting to connect as. in the ssh case, it is
found in the .ssh directory off the home directory of the userid (at
the server) that the client is attempting to connect as. in the radius
and kerberos scenarios ... it is a specialized database employed by
those services.

... digital signature is a stylized process for using the private key
for "encoding" a hash of the data ... with a corresponding digital
signature verification process that uses the public key for "decoding"
and checking the results (i.e. the server recalculates the hash of the
same data and compares it against the result of "decoding" the digital
signature).

in all the scenarios ... the connection is NOT being made as a
non-differentiated, anonymous entity .... but as some specific entity
known to the server. the server uses the entity specification in the
connection authentication to select the appropriate public key.

for some additional discussion of digital signature authentication
see the FIPS186-2 standard at the NIST site:
http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/dss.htm

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 09:31:35 -0600

Keith writes:

"They?"  The only bail-out I remember was Chrysler, and that because
it was a defense contractor, as well as employing a
coupla-hundred-thou.  Note that the bail-out was paid off with
interest, long before it was due (not that I believe bail-outs are a
good thing).

Of course now that DB screwed up the company I'll not buy another.
I'm back to Ford, at least temporarily (we'll see what happens next
week).

there was an article, i think in one of the DC papers in the 70s
calling for an unearned profits tax on the car manufactures. the claim
was that the quotas on foreign imports was there to give the car
manufactures some breathing room, and excess profits that they could
plow back into remaking the industry (and therefor making it more
competitive) ... but instead they took the excess profits and were
paying it out in higher wages and stock dividends (and not becoming
more competitive). there was some claim that the price of standard,
best selling american cars had doubled in a very short period due to
the quotas and the reduced competitive pressure.

the other was that the imports realized that given the quota limits,
they could sell as many high end cars as they could sell low end
cars. as a result, they took the opportunity to completely remake
themselvs (again), and become even more competitive. as a result the
quotas not only limited the number of imports competing with american
cars ... but it resulted in a totally different import product mix
.... that was no longer causing downward price pressure on american
products.

around '90, one of the american automobile manufactures started the C4
project to remake completely how they did cars. one of the issues was
that imports were taking only 3 years from concept to off the line
... while it was taking us manufactures 7 years from concept to off the
line (there were sometimes two new lines being run in parallel, offset
by 3 years ... so it appeared like new cars were coming on more
frequently). the issue was that the difference between a 3 year cycle
and a 7 year cycle ... was that it allowed the imports to respond more
than twice as fast to changing customer preferences (as well as
leverage new technology developments) ... and as a result having
another significant competitive edge in the market place.

there were some number of big computer companies brought in to be
part of the C4 effort. at the time, some of the mainframes also had
nearly identical development cycles to the automobiles ... taking 7
years from concept to machine rolling out the door (and at times they
also had offset, overlapping development efforts). the issue was how
to leverage dataprocessing technology to help cut their elapsed
development cycle by better than half ... and they were asking for
advice from people that, themselves, had seven year development
cycles. of course, at the time we were asked to be involved ...  we
were working on ha/cmp
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#hacmp
which was in product area that had much shorter development cycles.

a couple past posts on automobile subject:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#41 Reason Japanese cars are assembled in the US (was Re: American bigotry)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#43 Reason Japanese cars are assembled in the US (was Re: American bigotry)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#34 Will Prescott work on Win64?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#52 The SOB that helped IT jobs move to India is dead!
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#51 [OT] Lockheed puts F-16 manuals online

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Basics of key authentication

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Basics of key authentication
Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 09:35:16 -0600

oh, and some slightly related posts on two-factor authentication:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#13 two-factor authentication options?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#14 two-factor authentication options?

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 10:21:06 -0600

here is twist on the subject ... importing smart kids
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,126855,00.html

earlier post
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#18 Low Bar for High School Students Threatens Tech Sector

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Why are programs so large?

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Why are programs so large?
Newsgroups: comp.arch
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 13:21:42 -0600

Bernd Paysan writes:

Which type of memory? top shows virtual, resident, and shared
memory. If you don't have swapped things out, the resident memory
size is the relevant one. Applications often map zeroed memory they
don't really use (that's the "virtual" part), and linking to some
shared libraries also increases the size.

i have a tab folder with over 60 URLs of news sites ... both early
windows and linux versions ... you could watch the mozilla memory
consumption skyrocket after clicking the folder. the linux mozilla has
gotten a lot better ... while the windows version has only gotten
somewhat better. linux version also appears to do a lot better job of
giving back memory after tabs are closed. the current windows version
may still have slight storage cancer (although nothing like both
versions had when i first started stressing tabs in earlier
versions). periodically killing the windows version does appear to
recover memory that isn't otherwise given back after all tabs are
killed.

what i believe to be 100k of screen data (per tab) looks like it can
turn into 1.5-3 mbytes of virtual memory. i've sporacidally seen total
virtual memory consumption (on windows) go from 160mbytes to over
360mbytes just by clicking the news folder (which works out to
200mbytes/60 = 3.3mbytes/tab). for some reason, linux versions seem to
have gotten much more benign.

this is over and above base browser requirements ... including 16mbyte
cache.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 15:08:32 -0600

some additional drift:
http://news.moneycentral.msn.com/breaking/breakingnewsarticle.asp?feed=OBR&Date=20040725&ID=3917981

ford and gm making their profit on financial services ... not
manufacturing ... in fact, ford actually lost money on manufacturing.

the article finishes up with comment that ford & gm facing cutthroat
competition and declincing market share, as they lose sales even for
many heavily discounted vehicles to asian rivals.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 09:22:46 -0600

jmfbahciv writes:

I wouldn't have any idea where to start on that problem.  Just
getting the software update cycling from impossible to managable
took years and lots of work.  It would have been real nice to have
had some way for the computer architect to have a piece of gear made
that ran on real electicity so he could check how much his head was
wedged.  Software emulations were merely fairy tales.

we did that with cp/67 for 370s .... of course 360/370 operational
specifications were very tightly specified in the principle of
operations and the architecture "red book" ... in part because
numerous different plants (even in different countries) were building
to the same architecture specification (from possibly totally
different technologies).

also ... the 370 mainly added new instructions in application/problem
mode ... there were more significant differences in kernel/supervisor
mode. in any case, cambridge/endicott had running virtual 370s under
cp/67 on 360/67s ... a year before the first 370 engineering machine
with virtual memory was cycling (in fact, the virtual 370 work was
used to help validate the hardware).

there were sort of five levels.

1) real 360/67 hardware at cambridge

2) cp/67 (cp67-l) providing virtual 360 machines

3) a modified version of cp/67 (cp67-h) that ran in a virtual machine that
provided 370 virtual machine. this was deemed necessary (rather than
running it on the bare hardware) because the standard cambridge system
was a pretty open time-sharing service that had some number of MIT,
Harvard, and BU students accessing it. the idea was to avoid having
students and other outsiders tripping over the 370 implementation.

4) a modified version of the cp/67 kernel (cp67-i) that utilized 370
hardware and virtual memory tables (which had a number of differences
from 360/67 virtual memory tables). this ran in a 370 virtual machine
provided by "level 3"

5) cms that ran in a virtual machine provided by "cp67-i" (virtual
machine provided by "level 4").

in any case, this had interesting implications with projects that
required a lot of security on the same time-sharing machine open to a
lot of outsiders ... some misc. discussion of open time-sharing
security issues:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#timeshare

misc. past references to the virtual 370 effort:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/94.html#48 Rethinking Virtual Memory
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/99.html#33 why is there an "@" key?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000g.html#16 360/370 instruction cycle time
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#0 HONE was .. Hercules and System/390 - do we need it?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#70 hone acronym (cross post)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#75 30th b'day
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#39 CMS update
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003b.html#0 Disk drives as commodities. Was Re: Yamhill
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#59 unix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#14 Page Table - per OS/Process
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#18 Multiple layers of virtual address translation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#23 Tools -vs- Utility
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#31 determining memory size
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#74 DASD Architecture of the future

misc. past references to architecture red book:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#35 Why IBM use 31 bit addressing not 32 bit?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#39 serialization from the 370 architecture "red-book"
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001n.html#43 IBM 1800
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#52 Spotting BAH Claims to Fame
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#69 history of CMS
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#2 Handling variable page sizes?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#76 reviving Multics
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003f.html#52 ECPS:VM DISPx instructions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#45 text character based diagrams in technical documentation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#57 PLO instruction
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#1 Oldest running code
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#6 If the x86 ISA could be redone
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004c.html#51 [OT] Lockheed puts F-16 manuals online

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Convince me that SSL certificates are not a big scam

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Convince me that SSL certificates are not a big scam
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2004 17:02:14 -0600

"Gian-Carlo Pascutto" writes:

...SSL is just a (very slow) Diffie-Hellman key-exchange
method. Digital certificates provide no actual security
for electronic commerce; it's a complete sham.

SSL domain name certificates were designed to address the issue
regarding the domain name that you typed into the browser and the
domain name of the server (you are talking to) being somehow related
aka things like ip-address hijacking possibly related to integrity
issues with the domain name infrastructure.

recent posting on the subject:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#15
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm18.htm#14

lots of past posts
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#sslcerts

one of the issues is that the certication authorities has to validate
information with the authoritative agency for the information, in the
case of domain name ownership ... it is the domain name infrastructure
(the same infrastructure that has integrity issues resulting being one
of the primary justifications for SSL certificates).

basically an entity registers who they are when they register a domain
name with the domain name infrastructure. when they apply for a domain
name certificate ... the certification authority has to perform a very
expensive, complex and error prone process attempting to match the
information from the certificate applicate with what is on file with
the domain name infrastructure.

somewhat from the certification authority industry, there is proposal
that the domain name applicant supply a public key that it is put on
file with their domain name registration.  then future communication
between the domain name owner and the domain name infrastructure is
digitally signed (which the domain name infrastructure can verify with
the public key on file), minimizing threat like domain name hijacking
and improving the integrity of the domain name infrastructure (so it
can be better trusted by the certification authority industry).

Also when there are requests for SSL certificates, the applicant
digitally signs the request.  now, the certification authority just
has to retrieve the public key on file with the domain name
infrastructure to verify the certificate applicant's request. This has
the advantage of turning a very expensive, complex and error prone
entity information matching process into a much less expensive, simple
and straight forward authentication operation.

there are some side-effects

1) if the integrity of the domain name infrastructure is improved, the
demand (created by integrity concerns) for SSL domain name
certificates are reduced

2) if the certification authorities can retrieve on-file public keys
to validate communication .... then so can the rest of the internet
...  subsuming the function provided by SSL domain name certificates
...  the binding of a public key to a domain name.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

BLKSIZE question

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: BLKSIZE question
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.ibm-main
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2004 14:53:28 -0600

bblack@ibm-main.lst (Bruce Black) writes:

No, z/OS still supports only CKD disks, even when emulated on FBA as
almost all are today.

z/Series now supports native SCSI and FICON connected FBA disks, but so
far this is only supported in Linux and z/VM

remember that vm supported FBA disks at original introduction ....
and, in fact, both CP paging and the CMS filesystem have block
oriented logical access for the original implementation (circa cp/40
and cms on the hardware modified 360/40 with virtual memory ... pre
360/67 and the migration to cp/67 ... pre vm/370 and the migration to
370s).

In effect, both cp and cms have spent nearly the last 40 years
emulating block operations on CKD devices.

one of the reasons that it was so easy to do the original xt/370 ...
was that there was a one-of-one mapping from cp & cms disk blocks to
dos filesystem disk blocks ... aka for i/o ... there was a form of
inter-processor communition between the 370 board and the dos software
on the xt-side (in effect all 370 i/o was emulated doing real i/o on
the dos side).

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

ECC Encryption

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: ECC Encryption
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2004 15:15:12 -0600

Nigel Smart writes:

Public key algorithms are mainly used to transmit symmetric keys which
are then used to encrypt the main data. This is true of RSA and ECC.

For ECC key gen is fast, as is decryption.
For RSA encryption is fast, but key gen and decryption are slow

For ECC the message size to send the symmetric key is MUCH smaller
than the equivalent message for RSA

However, neither is better/worse. They are just different algorithms
to achieve the same kind of thing.

Of course if you wanted to trasnmit a very small amount of data
you "could" use RSA/ECC without the use of a symmetric cipher. But then
it all depends on how small your data is.

another application is authentication & digital signatures
... like in fips186-2, dsa, ecdsa, etc. A huge number of the
public-key ops that go on in the world involve the verification of CA
digital signatures on domain name certificates (as part of SSL
infrastructure).

the power requirements for ECC is significantly smaller than RSA.  for
chip-cards and hardware tokens implementation strong authentication
...  they add possibly a 50-100 percent increase in chip circuits to
try and get the RSA operations down to a second or two (1100 bit
multipliers doing operations in parallel ... rather than an interative
loops doing 16-bit or 32-bit operations) ... while ecdsa can be done
on unenhanced chips within possibly a tenth of a second.

it isn't so much of an issue with contact (say iso7816) chips (other
than the difference between 1/10th of a second to one or two seconds)
since the (relatively) enormous power drain isn't that much of an
issue.

However it does become significant issue with proximity chips (say
iso14443) ... where power is being drawn from RF radiation in the air.
Either you have to have the card awful close to an enormous RF
radiating power source .... or if you plan on using type of power you
would get swiping the card past a metro/transit turnstyle .... you are
back up to possibly tens of seconds for RSA ... but ecdsa is still
within the 1/10th or so of second with simple iso14443 proximity power
profile.

the issue in the early 90s with chip cards was none of the chips had
random number generators that were considered of high enuf integrity
...  and both dsa and ecdsa require quality random number generation
as part of the digital signature process (or the private key becomes
vulnerable).

The trade-off was that RSA on these earlier chips was terribly slow
.... or required a significantly more costly and power hungry chip,
however it would be possible to process the message (to be signed)
externally, include a large random nonce in the body of the message,
calculate a secure hash of the message ... and simply pass the secure
hash to the chip and get back the RSA digital signature (and there was
no issue about whether or not the chip was capable of quality random
number). however, both dsa and ecdsa required the circuits doing the
digital signature also be capable of generating a high quality random
number as part of the digital signature process.

chips started showing up in the late 90s that had random number
capability that could be trusted for doing dsa & ecdsa digital
signatures .... doing them enormously faster than RSA using
significantly less expensive chips and much less power hungry.

random past mention of 14443
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#8 [3d-secure] 3D Secure and EMV
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#21 Smartcard in CD
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#15 A challenge
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#18 A challenge
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#6 x9.59
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000f.html#77 Reading wireless (vicinity) smart cards
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#26 economic trade off in a pure reader system
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#36 economic trade off in a pure reader system
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002d.html#44 Why?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#76 time again
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#77 time again
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#39 Convenient and secure eCommerce using POWF
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#13 Help! Good protocol for national ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#54 Smartcards and devices
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#66 Modular Exponentiations on Battery-run devices
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#8 14443 protocol information
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#64 Can you use ECC to produce digital signatures?  It doesn't see
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#5 Cryptoengines with usage accounting
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#25 Are there any authentication algorithms with runtime changeable
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003o.html#63 Dumbest optimization ever?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#28 Methods of Authentication on a Corporate
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004d.html#8 Digital Signature Standards

random past mention of fips186
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#7 Meaning of Non-repudiation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#17 Alternative to Microsoft Passport: Sunshine vs Hai
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#38 ALARMED ... Only Mostly Dead ... RIP PKI ... part II
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#39 ALARMED ... Only Mostly Dead ... RIP PKI .. addenda
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#13 anybody seen (EAL5) semi-formal specification for FIPS186-2/x9.62 ecdsa?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#14 Challenge to TCPA/Palladium detractors
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#19 TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm13.htm#30 How effective is open source crypto? (aads addenda)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#31 Maybe It's Snake Oil All the Way Down
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#31 some certification & authentication landscape summary from recent threads
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#34 some certification & authentication landscape summary from recent threads
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#36 Identity server infrastructure ... example
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#46 x9.73 Cryptographic Message Syntax
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#65 eBay Customers Targetted by Credit Card Scam
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay10.htm#66 eBay Customers Targetted by Credit Card Scam
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2000b.html#93 Question regarding authentication implementation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#14 Public key newbie question
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002e.html#65 Digital Signatures (unique for same data?)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#38 Why is DSA so complicated?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#41 Why is DSA so complicated?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#42 Why is DSA so complicated?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002h.html#83 Signing with smart card
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#10 Signing email using a smartcard
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002i.html#78 Does Diffie-Hellman  schema belong to Public Key schema family?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#21 basic smart card PKI development questions
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#73 How to map a user account to a digital cert?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#82 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#84 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#86 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#11 Serious vulnerablity in several common SSL implementations?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002k.html#35 ... certification
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#38 Backdoor in AES ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#44 Beware, Intel to embed digital certificates in Banias
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#72 Whatever happened to C2 "Orange Book" Windows security?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#13 Help! Good protocol for national ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#14 So how does it work...  (public/private key)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#16 Help! Good protocol for national ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#20 Help! Good protocol for national ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003c.html#26 Crypto Standards Organizations
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003d.html#18 Efficent Digital Signature Schemes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003g.html#70 Simple resource protection with public keys
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#29 application of unique signature
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003j.html#30 How is a smartcard created?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003k.html#38 Code Sizing for Digital Signature Verification - DSS/DSA
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#5 Multiple ECDSA signatures with the same random nonce
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#61 Can you use ECC to produce digital signatures?  It doesn't see
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#23 Are there any authentication algorithms with runtime changeable key length?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#25 Are there any authentication algorithms with runtime changeable
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#32 NSA chooses ECC
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004.html#37 When rsa vs dsa
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004b.html#22 Hardware issues [Re: Floating point required exponent range?]
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#10 racf
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#12 ECC book reference, please
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#21 Basics of key authentication

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Usage of Hex Dump

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Usage of Hex Dump
Newsgroups: comp.arch
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2004 18:16:19 -0600

jrefactors@hotmail.com (Matt) writes:

I want to know what is Hex Dump? I tried to search in google but
didn't get useful results.  I know it is the hexademical
representation of something.  But I don't know what is something?
From programmer's perspective, when do we need to use hex dump?
what's the importances of hex dump?

sounds like a class assignment to me.

i first ran into it back in the 60s ... when the operating system
failed it would start copying all of computer memory to the printer
(quickly from memory):

six byte hex address .. plus space, 7 places
groups of 8char hex .. plus space, 9*8 72 places
character representation ...       32 chars
                                   .....
                                   111

there is something like another 9 places in there ... to come out to
120 character line per 32bytes of memory; 66 lines per page gives 2112
bytes per page (little better than 2k per page). all on green bar
paper.

couple refs pulled quickly from search engine on emulating
green bar paper.
http://www.experts-exchange.com/Databases/MS_Access/Q_10216760.html
http://www.makingpages.org/pagemaker/tips/greenbar.html
http://www.pdp8.net/images/greenbar.shtml

simulation of green bar paper can be seen at the vmshare archives
website
http://vm.marist.edu/~vmshare/

try doing search on "hex dump" at vmshare archives ... or possibly: hex
dump paper.

share is the ibm customer user group that has been around forever
http://www.share.org/

starting in the mid-70s, tymshare hosted on line computer conferencing
for the vm group at share ... called vmshare. tymshare was an ibm
vm/370-based commercial time-sharing service ... some comments about
time-sharing systems from that era
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#timeshare

doing search engine of simply "hex dump" turns up all sorts of
explanations.

doing search engine of "hex dump" and IBM, the first reference is
http://www.planetmvs.com/hex/

which has detailed description and shows a "half-wide" hex dump format
on the page i.e. 16 byte per line format instead of 32 byte per line
format (which needs 120 wide display; 16 byte per line fits in less
than 80 char wide display).

in addition to the very first returned URL ... there appear to be
another hundred or so that go into some useful detail about hex dump.

In the very early 80s I had written a software debugging tool in
REX(X) that somewhat mitigated the need for having paper copy of
kernel image on a failure.
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#dumprx

at one time it was in use by the majority of the internal data centers
as well as significant number of PSRs handling customer problems. the
following isn't specifically about internal datacenters ... but there
are a lot of references to the internal datacenters on the internal
network (and the internal network being larger than arpanet/internet
from just about the beginning until possibly sometime mid-85)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subnetwork.html#internalnet

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Basics of key authentication

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Basics of key authentication
Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2004 13:28:28 -0600

jerup3500@yahoo.com (Jonathan) writes:

I am IT student at a nation college.We have been talking in class
about both public and private keys the question I have to pose is
whether or not using the same public or private key is possible to
use on differnt operating system in a complex network over a WAN.

seems like at the start of each new school year ... there are a rash
of classroom work assignments posted to usenet in attempt to get
somebody else to do their work for them.

recent example from comp.arch:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#31

some earlier posts in this thread
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#21 basics of key authentication
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#23 basics of key authentication

random past threads discussing use of usenet to do class work assignments:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001.html#70 what is interrupt mask register?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#10 Memory management - Page replacement
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#11 Memory management - Page replacement
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001c.html#25 Use of ICM
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#75 Disappointed
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001l.html#0 Disappointed
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#0 7.2 Install "upgrade to ext3"  LOSES DATA
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#32 Number of combinations in five digit lock? (or: Help, my brain hurts)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#2 Need article on Cache schemes
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#32 Biometric Encryption: the solution for network intruders?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#40 e-commerce future
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#83 Questions about computer security
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#58 Spin Loop?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002l.html#59 Spin Loop?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003m.html#46 OSI protocol header
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003n.html#4 Dual Signature
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#51 before execution does it require whole program 2 b loaded in
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004f.html#61 Infiniband - practicalities for small clusters

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2004 16:52:35 -0600

radical change at chrysler?
http://www.forbes.com/home/free_forbes/2004/0816/058.html

An automaker and it union workers are gambling that an innovative
factory concept will rescue them both from extinction.

recent related posts:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#22 Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#26 Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Which Monitor Would You Pick??????

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Which Monitor Would You Pick??????
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2004 06:26:53 -0600

"Gary A. Gorgen" writes:

In the '60's the code that controlled a timesharing system
was known as monitors.
Tops-10 & Tops-20 from DEC.
The timesharing monitor that ran on the SDS-940, was known
as "The Monitor". Its original name was "Genie".
Monitor was also used, for the code in development boards,
"Debug Monitor", that was in the '70's, IIRC.

and/oor control programs .... cp/40 circa 1965 for the modified 360/40 with
virtual memory was control program/40. the interface for users was cms
or cambridge monitor system. cp/40 was move to 360/67 and called
cp/67. when 370s came out ... cp/67 morphed into vm/370 (virtual
machine 370) and cms was renamed cms ...  conversational monitor
system. most of this was done at cambridge science center, 545tech sq:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech

some number of operations used it for commercial timesharing services
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#timeshare

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

fc2, evolution, yum, libbonobo-2.6.2-1.i386.rpm

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: fc2, evolution, yum, libbonobo-2.6.2-1.i386.rpm
Newsgroups: linux.redhat.misc
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2004 13:01:01 -0600

i've been running evolution 1.4.x happily thru 9, fc2, and fc2.

however, yesterday yum updated libbonobo-2.6.2-1.i386.yum

and now evoulation gives me four popups:

 Cannot activate component OAFIID GNAME_Evolution_Mail_ShellComponent
 (or something similar).  The error from the activatioin system is:
 Unknown CORBA excpetion.

and then doesn't show anything useful in the evoluation window. This
is under KDE ... which has been working fine all along. Under GNOME
the error message is different but the results are the same.

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Vintage computers are better than modern crap !

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Vintage computers are better than modern crap !
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2004 13:19:19 -0600

Keith writes:

The article I was reading (sorry don't remember where) referred to the
advancements in CAD and plastics manufacturing that allows small
production runs.  It wasn't addressed in the article, but I wondered about
replacement support (accidents and such).  Oehrwise consumer insurance
costs may be the real barrier.

all sorts of things are barriers; getting effectively semi-custom
models to the correct car dealer and customer.

i've heard tales of models with heavy air conditioning showing up in
maine dealers instead of alabama ... and models with seat heaters
showing up at miami dealers (instead of minn.)

then there is the whole repair & maint. issue ... if special training
and/or stocking any custom parts.

they've worked out flexible manufacturing processes that can turn them
out ... but then there is the whole rest of the operational
infrastructure (once they leave the plant).

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Basics of key authentication

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Basics of key authentication
Newsgroups: comp.security.ssh
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 2004 15:55:43 -0600

"Old Man" writes:

Part of what they are "supposed" to do in American colleges is to
teach students to think.  So,

Question:  If you download the OpenSSH 3.2 package on your machine,
and I download OpenSSH 3.2 on my machine, then why wouldn't
ssh-keygen generate a compatible key on both systems, and decode both
keys equally?  (Package -- no compiling it to be your way.)

even better if you have a several hundred thousand webservers across
the world supporting https/ssl ... on a wide variety of different
platforms and several hundred million clients around the world
accessing those webservers with SSL ... are the SSL public/private key
operations really working ... os is it a figment of everybody's
imagination?

random reference to ssl, https, electronic commerce, etc
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn2
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm5.htm#asrn3

previous posts in this thread:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#21
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#23
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2004h.html#32

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

build-robots-which-can-automate-testing dept

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: build-robots-which-can-automate-testing dept.
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 01 Aug 2004 11:04:40 -0600

build-robots-which-can-automate-testing dept.
http://it.slashdot.org/it/04/07/31/1819250.shtml?tid=185&tid=4

I did something like this for the resource manager product. we had
performance and workload profile data from thousands of systems ... so
we built a parameterized benchmarking/testing infrastructure. we
predefined something like 1000 benchmarks that selected statistical
samples from range of workloads and configurations. we then had an apl
workload and performance model. after the first 1000 or so benchmarks,
all the results were feed into the apl performance and workload model
which got to pick the next set of workload and configuration
parameters for the next benchmark ... this was automated and turned
loose. In all approximately 2000 benchmarks were run taking three
months of elapsed time to calibrate and validate the operation of the
resource manager before it shipped to customers.

http://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=116421&cid=9854377

some benchmarking methodology references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#bench

various performance, scheduling and resource manager references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#fairshare

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

SEC Tests Technology to Speed Accounting Analysis

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: SEC Tests Technology to Speed Accounting Analysis
Newsgroups: alt.folklore.computers
Date: Sun, 01 Aug 2004 11:46:57 -0600

SEC Tests Technology to Speed Accounting Analysis
http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=reutersEdge&storyID=5836818

EDGAR Online XBRL
http://xbrl.edgar-online.com/x/
Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)
http://xml.coverpages.org/xbrl.html
Welcome to XBRL International
http://xbrl.org/
AICPA XBRL introduction
http://www.aicpa.org/trustservices/ecommentnewsletterbi402.htm
XBRL: The Universal Language For Financial Business Reporting
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/oct2000/supps/gov1.htm
Is XBRL an Answer?
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/cpaltr/may2002/supps/audit6.htm
XBRL: The Language of Finance and Accounting
http://www.xml.com/pub/a/2004/03/10/xbrl.html

some "ML" history from 545tech sq cambridge science center
(i've been a "ML" programmer for going on 35 years):
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#sgml
general science center references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subtopic.html#545tech

IBM Cambridge Scientific Center TR 320-2094
http://www.sgmlsource.com/history/G320-2094/G320-2094.htm
Charles F. Goldfarb's SGML SOURCE HOME PAGE
http://www.sgmlsource.com/
The Roots of SGML -- A Personal Recollection
http://www.sgmlsource.com/history/roots.htm
Charles F. Goldfarb's All the XML Books in Print
http://www.xmlbooks.com/

--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler | http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/

Which Monitor Would You Pick??????

From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Subject: Re: Which Monitor Would You Pick?????